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PREFACE
There is a growing band of social scientists who
are examining the ways in which social systems may be
understood as systems which in some sense "learn. " Among
the investigators are political scientists, organization-
al theorists, philosophers, sociologists and economists.
Many of these have created models describing the
"learning" process in the social systems which interest
them.
In this dissertation I will examine four such
*
models and try to clarify some of the issues they raise.
Further, I will examine the possibility that behind the
diversity of disciplining perspectives, there may be
grounds for searching for a more general, cross-
disciplinary model. Finally, I will enumerate issues
a general model of collective learning would have to
address.
The scope of such an inquiry is so great that I
would not dare begin if I did not believe that the very
scope and centrality of the topic promised some rewards
for understanding. Perhaps I can suggest my sense of
the importance of the topic by describing my experience
as a graduate student, a person, a futurist, an
IV
educator, and an observer of the social sciences.
first, as a graduate student, I have come to a
deeper acknowledgment of the extent to which my own
learning is supported by a larger collective learning
process. I have come to have an appreciation for the
immense body of knowledge and scholarly tradition that
provide the ground for any new student. And at a more
personal level, I have come to acknowledge my debt to
those with whom I have had contact in this endeavor.
This growth in appreciation is, I suppose, a necessary
part of any graduate program. It is reflected in the
fact that the "Acknowledgments" section of a disserta-
*
tion is often both the most predictable section and the
most poignant.
My case is no different from any other. My intel-
lectual debts are too numerous to mention, or even re-
member. The thinking of Karl Deutsch, James March,
Johan Olsen, Chris Argyris, Donald Schon, and Jurgen
Habermas have become so much a part of my thinking, I
cannot tell you where their thinking ends and mine be-
gins. The same may be said of Edgar Dunn, Kenneth
Bouldry
,
Donald Michael, and Peter Berger. Conversa-
tions with James Botkin and James Keen are woven into
my thought. I am indebted to Howard Peele for helping
me start, to Peter Wagschal for letting me explore, to
v
Tom Fraser for pointing me to apt anthropological
studies, to David Schuman for raising fundamental issues,
and to Dwight Allen for stimulation and prods to apply
theory to practice. Thus, no matter how solitary the
process of writing a dissertation, it is also, in many
ways, a collective one. This dissertation is not the
product of one mind, but of many.
My debt is emotional and practical as well as intel-
lectual. I am indebted to Dwight Allen for his care of
my person, as well as my intellect; to David Schuman for
forcing me to finish despite my "best efforts to do
otherwise"; and to Tom Fraser for his quiet support.
It would have been hard to finish the course if some
friends, especially Ed Frey, had not helped unlock some
fetters. I am indebted to my family for their support
and patience, and to my daughter Faith who, on typing
the last word of my dissertation, insisted it be fol-
lowed by an exclamation point? And beyond saying is my
debt to steadfast Jean.
Such acknowledgment of intellectual and emotional
debts is a way of suggesting the importance of collec-
tive learning as a field of inquiry. No one learns
alone. We learn together.
Not just as a graduate student, but also in my
everyday life do I see the pervasiveness of collective
vi
learning. From the time the quartz alarm sounds to the
time I turn off the eleven o'clock news, my day is sur-
rounded by the products of collective learning. The T.V.
is the product of lessons learned by countless people at
Sony and elsewhere. The news is a societal process of
self-reflection. The food I eat, the tools I use, the
laws I follow, the language I speak, the goals for which
I strive are all in many ways the cumulative learned
products of countless learners preceeding me. And what
I learned may get used in at least some small measure by
those around me. I live at the edge of an endless
tapestry of collective learning, eager to add a few
threads to the wool.
As a futurist, I launch this inquiry because I am
worried about the capacity of our current social systems
to solve the complex and dangerous problems which con-
front our globe. We all know the threats—of nuclear
holocaust, environmental degradation, population explo-
sion, economic crisis, injustice, social disintegration.
What is not often enough recognized is the extent
to which these threats are problems of collective learn-
ing. They are the product of prior collective efforts,
and demand collective learning for solution. For in-
stance, the nuclear peril is partly the result of a
certain success in collective learning. The learnings of
vii
people like Bell, Einstein, Goddard, as well as the
learnings of countless people at IBM, MSA, DoD, the
U.S. and U.S.S.R. —have converged to give us nuclear mis-
siles poised to protect the views of followers of
Jefferson and Marx. Our predicament is the product of a
vast tapestry of technological, ideological and social
collective learning. And our task is to learn collec-
tively ways to prevent such missiles' use, to institute
new ways of managing international conflict.
The same analysis can be made of problems we face
in energy, the economy, the environment and whole range
of collective learning tasks. Behind all specific
social problems, there is a more general problem--how
to improve the collective learning by which problems
are addressed. Thus, insofar as we can shed light on
the nature of collective learning, to that extent may
we contribute to the solutions of problems we face.
As a futurist, I am not only concerned with prob-
lems threatening the human future; I am also concerned
with establishing a framework with which to promote
more effective thinking about the future. The study of
the future demands a theory of social change. Any at-
tempts to predict the human future must rest on a
theory of social change. But no such theory will be
complete, I will argue, unless it includes an account
viii
of the collective learning that permeates our lives and
forms our choices. And any attempts to form a better
future require strategies which at least tacitly include
a view about how to promote a collective process of
learning new collective ways of doing things. Thus,
better definition of the dynamics of collective learning
may help the field of "future studies" better assess the
future and more effectively suggest strategies for change.
As an educator, I am motivated to launch the in-
quiry by a sense that the pervasiveness of collective
learning and an understanding of what promotes it may
have implications for our definition of purposes and
methods of education. There may be a tendency in
American culture to focus too much on learning as some-
thing happening in individual students, and too little
as something that emerges out of the social life of the
mind. If, as I will argue, learning is only incomplete-
ly understood as individual, and if our collective
success may depend on developing the skills of collec-
tive learning, then perhaps a shift is called for,
away
from an individualistic approach toward a more
collec-
tive one
.
Finally, as an observer of social theory,
I sense
the time is ripe for a general model of
collective
learning. The various disciplines have
accumulated a
IX
great store of concepts, insights, data, conclusions, and
grounded theory that bear on so vast a topic as collec-
tive learning. But their insights have remained depart-
mental ones and few dare to see the subject whole.
Such departmentalization strikes me as an injus-
tice to who we are. Humans learn, and humans are
social; psychologists study the first fact, social
scientists, the latter. But too few study the corollary
to those two facts—a third, that humans learn together.
The danger is that we might believe the division is
real, that what we do as social creatures is separate
from what we do as individual learners. But, of
course, no such division really exists. I am socialized
to a culture, and what I invent may change that culture.
Individuals and social groups form one another. To
think of learning happening only in individuals is
like thinking the apple happens without the tree, soil,
rain and sun. And to think of a disembodied "society
learning" without individuals is like thinking the tree
can grow without the apple's seed. We need to see the
process whole. And, with the separate insights of
the
different disciplines, with the growth of interest
in
cognitive components of socio-cultural life, and
with
the contribution of the models we will study,
I sense
that we are ready for the reintegration of
a more
X
complete understanding of learning.
As a step in that direction, I will, in Chapter
II to V, review models of collective learning developed
in a variety of disciplines. In Chapter VI, I will in-
vestigate whether a general model is possible in prin-
ciple, and will identify some issues such a general
model must resolve.
xi
ABSTRACT
Towards General Model of Collective Learning:
A Critique of Existing Models of Specific
Social Systems and a Sketch of a Model
for Social Systems in General
September 1983
John McClellan, B.A., McGill University
Ed.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor David F. Schuman
This dissertation examines four models of particular
social systems as systems which "learn,” clarifies issues
those models reveal, and uses those clarifications to
suggest a preliminary model of collective learning by
social systems in general. Models examined are the model
of governmental learning by Karl Deutsch, the model of
organizational learning by James March and Johan Olsen, the
model of organizational learning by Chris Argyris and
Donald Schon, and the model of societal learning by
Jurgen Habermas. Each is assessed for its contribution and
limits
.
The dissertation suggests that all social systems
have enough in common to permit, at least in principle, the
development of a general model of collective learning,
discussing issues which any general model will have to
address. These include questions of how to define collect-
ive learning, how to differentiate it from individual
learning, and how to describe its dynamics. The disser-
tation suggests its own provisional responses to such
issqes in the form of a preliminary model.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation examines four existing models of
particular social systems as systems which "learn." It
clarifies issues those models reveal, and uses those
clarifications to suggest a preliminary model of collective
learning by social systems in general. Its primary
objective is the clarification of the issues on whose
resolution the construction of an eventual general model
of collective learning must depend.
Use of collective "learning" in the social sciences
There is growing interest in the ways in which social
systems may be understood as systems which in some sense
"learn.
"
Perhaps one source of this interest has been the
emergence of electronic control systems and computers as
images of systems with the capacity to receive, process,
and produce information. Concomitant with the emergence of
such machines was the development of the thinking on which
they rested--information theory, cybernetics, and general
systems theory (Wiener, 1965 and 1967; Bertalanffy, 1968;
Ashby, 1954) . Another source may have been the articulation
1
2of a body of theory about learning by modern psychologists
such as Skinner and Piaget. At the same time there was
growing appreciation for the difficulties of adaptation
faced by social systems in an age of rapid change (Schon
1971; Michael 1968 and 1973; Toffler 1970; Emery and Trist
1972; Vickers 1971 and 1973). So it should not be surpri-
sing that a growing band of thinkers has turned to the
imagery offered by cybernetics and psychology as a way of
describing the dynamics of adaptation by social systems.
The interest in applying such imagery has extended
to a wide variety of disciplines. Perhaps the field which
9
has seen the most extensive use of the imagery has been
organizational theory. Theorists who have in one form or
another used the imagery related to "learning" in their
analysis of organizations include Cadwallader (1959) » Cyert
and March (1963)* Cangelosi and Dill ( 1965 )# Beer ( 1966 ,
1972, 1975), Katz and Kahn ( 1966 ), Wilensky ( 1967 ).
Litterer (1969)* Churchman (1971). Michael (1973. 1977).
Argyris and Schon (197^. 1978), Hage (197*0, Alderfer and
Brown (1975), March and Olsen (1976), Nolan (1978, 1979).
Duncan and Weiss (1978), Jelinek (1979). Hedberg (1981),
and Shrivastava (1983).
The interest has been seen in other disciplines as
well. It has been used in the analysis of politics by
Deutsch ( 1963 ), Schon (1971). Steinbruner (197*0, Etheredge
(1983), and Etheredge and Short (1983). It has been used
3in analyzing social and cultural change by Boulding (1964,
1970, 1978). Etzionni (1968), Hughes (1969), Breed (1971),
Dunn (1971. 1974), Miller (1972. 1978), Inoguchi (1974),
Conger (1974), Jantsch (1975. 1976), Campbell (1969), Dow
(1976), Crane (1978), and Ionescu Sisesti (1979). The
imagery is also contained in the works of some social
philosophers and theologians, including Teilhard de Chardin
(1959. 1964), Desan (1972) and Habermas (1971, 1975, 1979).
Among futurists, the image is pursued by Michael (1973),
Wuest (1978), and Botkin et al. (1979). And the notion
appears in less explicit form elsewhere, as in the
discussion of "learning curves" by economists and
organizational theorists (Abernathy and Wayne, 1974). It
also appears in the stress on the cognitive, learned,
cumulative quality of culture seen in such anthropologists
as Goodenough (1971). Levi-Strauss (1966), and Geertz (1973).
Opportunity for integration
Every discipline has applied the image of "learning"
in its own special way to its own special object of study.
And within disciplines, each author has his own special
view.
But I am intrigued that such a variety of investiga-
tors all find the imagery of "learning" to be suggestive
in their attempts to understand their various social
processes. Perhaps behind their diversity, they are
4sensing the presence of a pan-disciplinary principle;
perhaps there is a dynamic common to all social systems,
a dynamic rooted in the way social creatures learn together.
It is to such speculations that I am responding in this
dissertation. I sense that an examination of the variety
of perspectives on social systems' learning may reveal
opportunities for insight and integration.
The choice of models for analysis
For this dissertation, I have chosen to examine
four of the above models. They are Karl Deutsch’s
cybernetic model of politics ( 1963 ), March and Olsen’s
model of organizational learning under ambiguity (1976),
Argyris and Schon's model of organizational learning as
a correction of organizational theories-in-use
,
and Jurgen
Habermas’s model of social evolution as homologous to
cognitive development. I have chosen these models because
they are among the most extensively developed and
thoroughly articulated models we have. As such, they offer
the best material with which to understand what problems
remain if we wish to pursue such models further. I have
also chosen these models because they represent a variety
of disciplines, social systems, and assumptions, and as
such, may supplement each other and reveal more general
patterns.
5Issues that must be addressed
Through a close examination of each different model’s
assumptions, intentions, scope, concepts, terms, claims,
and implications, I hope to clarify the range of issues
we are likely to confront in trying to model the dynamics
of social systems in terms of collective learning. The
simple analogy that social systems, like individuals,
learn" is appealing, but before we can use the analogy
seriously, we must confront a series of questions. These
will include the following:
. In what sense does the model claim that the social system
is "learning"?
. Who learns? The "system," a "group mind," just the
member learners, or some combination?
. Is that usage valid? Why?
. When can the system be said to have learned? By what
criteria?
. How is such learning possible? What are its sources and
processes?
. Are varieties of learning distinguished? On what
measures?
. Can stages in development of learning capacity be
distinguished? What is the logic of their development?
. What factors are seen to help and hinder the social
system's learning?
. Is the model grounded enough to be of worth in practice?
6• What are the values from which the model grows and to
which it aspires? Are these sufficient?
. Does the model leave out elements in the life of a social
system that have bearing on its process as a system that
learns?
. To what extent can the model serve as a guide in the
understanding of other social systems as systems that
learn?
These are difficult and slippery issues, but they are
so fundamental that we must address and resolve them if we
are to proceed with confidence in the construction of any
subsequent model.
Defining "collective learning ”
One of the primary issues will be to clarify the ways
in which investigators speak of collective "learning," to
ask if such usages are valid, and if so why. For, even
if the analogy between individual learning and collective
dynamics is appealing, we must still decide whether the
analogy is simply a heuristic tool or one which accurately
describes the workings of social systems. That issue will
be one with which we wrestle throughout the dissertation.
One of the goals of this dissertation is to end with
a clearer definition of "collective learning." In order
for the reader to understand my intent, however, I ought
at the outset give at least some sense of the territory
7that interests me; I ought to offer at least a preliminary
definition of collective learning.
.
Perhaps the most honest and vivid way to begin is to
list examples of the kinds of things that interest me,
that seem in some way to involve aspects of collective
learning. I am interested in;
. How a family recognizes that it is having a recurring
problem with finances, and institutes procedures for
averting it
. How a School of Education moves from a traditional
hierarchy to an experimenting polyarchy
. How Data General rushes out a new computer (Kidder 1981)
but has trouble maturing in a recession
. Why Texas Instruments was able in the 1940s and 1950s to
invent and market new products; was able in the 1960s to
recognize that its success brought lack of integration,
and to institutionalize an integrated, corporate-wide
system of planning; but was unable in the late 1970s and
early 1980s to capture markets for watches and computers
(Jelinek 1979)
. How a scientific discipline adds to its knowledge and
shifts its "paradigm" (Kuhn 1970)
. How food cooperatives have emerged
. How the Clean Air Act got passed and enforced
. Why Japan was quicker than the United States to respond
to the shortages of oil by conserving energy-intensive
8industries (Yergin 1982)
. How the United States decided to go to the moon, and
•how NASA martialled the resources of thousands of people
in learning how to get there
* How science, technology, capitalism, and puritanism
advanced in seventeenth century England (Merton 1970)
. How "computerese" and "valley talk" took form
. How speech, print, TV, computers and Atari games affect
r
how people think and communicate
. How the Freeze Resolution got passed, and how to sustain
that movement for the transformation of the way humans
provide security
. Why the Catholic church was slow to question the war in
Vietnam but has come to challenge the nuclear arms race
. Why the ancient Greeks shifted from a herding culture
to an agricultural one, and then, to one based on olive
oil and trade, but were unable to invent ways of
adjudicating conflict between sovereign city states,
bleeding themselves white in the end
. How the League of Nations and United Nations emerged,
and how humanity might institutionalize effective modes
of averting international conflict before, rather than
after the next war
If the examples above help suggest the sorts of
processes I consider to involve aspects of collective
9learning, they do not define it. As a start at definition,
let me say that I have in mind something like the process
of change in a social system's culture. I am interested
in how intelligent members go about changing their shared
views of the world and their shared ways of doing things.
I am interested in how they together invent new tools,
"their structures of social interaction, imagine
new worldviews, expand their knowledge, mature their
purposes, enrich their language, and elevate their
discourse. I would like to know more about the process
by which social systems adapt to changing realities, and
how they expand the range in space and time in which they
are able to comprehend their world and cope with it. I am
interested in how people share what they know and how they
achieve something like a growth of collective wisdom. I
want to know how the lessons of individuals get combined
and raised to the level of a lesson incorporated in the
social system's culture. I want to know how the threads
of individual learning are woven into the cloth of a
collective apprehension of the world.
This list of interests and examples suggests that
the term "learning" might be applied in a variety of ways
to a variety of social processes. That in fact is what
has happened; different investigators use the term to mean
different things. As we shall see, Karl Deutsch uses the
10
term to refer to governmental information processing
leading to decisions to dissociate and recombine resources
to meet existing goals or to forge new ones. March and
Olsen use the term to describe the process in organizations
by which changes in individuals' beliefs about environmental
responses get incorporated into organizational action. For
Argyris and Schon, organizational learning is joint
inquiry to detect and correct errors in organizational
theories of action. And Habermas uses the term to refer
to societal institutionalization of higher forms of
individual cognition and reason.
One of the purposes of this dissertation will be to
see whether there might be a common pattern behind all such
processes. In chapter VI, I will examine whether social
systems of all kinds and sizes share common features
which might serve as the base for a model of collective
learning by social systems in general.
In brief, I will use the terms that grow out of that
discussion to define collective learning as a change in a
social system's collective lesson set. A simple form of
this is the addition of someone's new lesson to the
aggregate lesson set accessible by others in the social
system. A more difficult form is the collective alteration
of the "co-ordering lesson set" shared by members of a
social system and governing their interactions.
11
The collective learning process in this view is a
continual dialectical interplay between individual learners
and their more-than-individual collective lesson set. The
collective lesson set shapes individuals and their learning;
individuals* learnings are the material for change in the
collective lesson set. The process is not random or
mindless; it is the product of intelligent member learners
who recognize problems in the collective lesson set and
who enter into a collective dialogue to improve it. Col-
lective learning arises from the desires of learners for
a more satisfying and harmonizing order. Because every
learner's experience of "reality" is different, the social
dialogue is a prod to a broader understanding of reality
and to a more inclusive social order. The result is an
understanding not achievable by learners in isolation. It
is more than individual learning; it changes the more-than-
individual collective lesson set.
But, I get ahead of myself. This gives some sense
of my meaning and intention in the dissertation. The hard
work remains--to scrutinize with care the major models so
far offered, to explicate the issues the models reveal, and
to build on the insights, terms, and concepts they provide.
My goal is more than exigesis; my central objective in this
dissertation is to clarify the issues and terms on which
an adequate general model of collective learning depends.
12
Before we go on to the examination of the major
models, we should consider briefly the uses and limits of
model-building as a process of inquiry.
Model Building as a Method of
Promoting Understanding
The term "mode^." is used in a variety of ways. Some-
times it is used to refer to one physical system meant to
depict another, as in a model airplane or molecular model.
That will not be my usage here. Another usage is
equivalent to "analogy." Thought about social systems has
often advanced by the use of analogy. For instance, in
The Republic
. Plato saw similarities between qualities of
the individual and the state. In the same way, any discus-
sion of "learning by a social system" begins with an
analogy between an individual process and a social one.
Biological analogies have also been important in social
thought, as in Oswald Spengler's view that every culture is
born, matures, and must die (1918). More recently, James
Miller (1978) has used analogy between all levels of living
systems, from the cell to the individual to the internation-
al system, to develop a general theory of living systems.
An analogy from cybernetics is the basis of much of the
work of Karl Deutsch, one of the first and most thorough-
going theoreticians of social learning systems.
13
Science can hardly proceed without such analogies.
They provide the images and mental material which scientists
can manipulate in their attempt to comprehend reality
(Kaplan 1964; Nisbet 1969 ). It would be difficult to
formulate theory without analogies and they remain
embedded as an essential part of the theory's way of
understanding reality. They cannot be discarded once
formulation is complete.
The term "model" often refers to a specific kind of
analogy—one that can be depicted in a diagram, flow chart
or other form of pictorial representation. These can be
very helpful in identifying elements and their relation-
ship. Argyris and Schon (1978) for example, use flow charts
to represent the recurrent feedback loops typical of two
different styles of organizational learning. Karl Deutsch's
pictorial representation ( 1963 ) of the inputs, outputs,
processing and feedback loops between elements of a govern-
mental system helps draw together in a single view all the
key elements and their complex relationships.
Such pictorial representations and analogies may be
seen as subsets of a more general usage of the term "model."
In this usage, widely seen among social scientists of the
last few decades, a model is a mental abstraction which
stands for or represents a concrete phenomenon. Or, in
James Miller's definition, a model is "a formal identity
14
between a conceptual system and a concrete or abstracted
system" (1978, p. 83). It is in Miller's sense that
I will use the term model, examining conceptual systems
that have a formal identity with concrete social systems.
Models in this sense serve to describe. But
description requires a set of terms and propositions about
them. Indeed, one of the main benefits of modeling of
collective learning systems will be to foster the precise
labeling of elements and their relations. This is
especially important in a new field like collective
learning. To contribute to a clarification of terms is
one of the aims of this dissertation.
With clearer terms, it is then possible to offer
precise propositions about the relations between elements
of the model. These propositions may be tested, and in
time, lead to a network of grounded propositions forming
a theoretical system capable of explaining and predicting
a class of phenomena. By then the initial analogy and
early models will have given rise to something more—
a
mature system of thought.
Such a system of thought for collective learning
in general is far off, and is no part of the objectives
of this dissertation. Rather, this dissertation seeks
to examine the root analogy and to clarify terms in its
use
.
15
Model building is an iterative social process.
Each new attempt to define assumptions, terms, and
propositions exposes what is unknown or problematic.
And each model stimulates further thought. Thus, the
authors reviewed in this dissertation build on the in-
sights of each other and the work of others.
My hope in this dissertation is to begin sketching
one more frame of a long film, one still picture as part
larger motion toward a collective understanding
of collective learning.
CHAPTER II
KARL DEUTSCH: A CYBERNETIC MODEL
OF GOVERNMENTAL LEARNING
Background
r
Karl Deutsch developed the first major model of a
social system as a system that learns. As a political
scientist, he was interested in the long history of at-
tempts to create models describing the political process.
In that history students of politics had often borrowed
from images available to them, images often taken from
the organic and mechanical world. But by the 1950s,
during which Karl Deutsch began his work, a new set of
images presented themselves, images taken from the world
of electronics, computers, systems theory, information
science, and cybernetics. In all these, the central
image was of a system which used the flow of information
to control processes.
One of the pioneers in the field of cybernetics was
Norbert Wiener, author of Cybernetics (19^8) and The
Human Use of Human Beings i Cybernetics and Society (1967).
The term, cybernetics, is adopted from the Greek
"kybernetes" meaning a helmsman, the one who holds the
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rudder and steers the boat. This captures well Wiener's
concern
-with self-steering systems.
Karl Deutsch was a friend and colleague of Norbert
Wiener and recognized the potential of cybernetics as a
model for the self-steering nature of government. Such
a model could capture aspects of government not contained
in the older biological and mechanical models. He saw in
the cybernetic image the possibility of modeling the senses
in which the political process meant a certain kind of
intelligence or learning.
Politics in Deutsch’ s usage is concerned with
decisions, especially those decisions which are binding on
members, either through members' voluntary compliance or
through the state's enforcement. Since cybernetics was a
science centered around making decisions for the control
and steering of systems, Deutsch saw great potential in
the use of cybernetics for the political decision-making
process.
The Nerves of Government
The model which Deutsch developed received its first
full description in The Nerves of Government > Models of
Political Communication and Control (1963)» Deutsch has
continued his efforts to model political process throughout
his lifetime, spending special attention on the modeling
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of international relations. However, since our interest
in this dissertation is less with politics and more with
learning by social systems, we will focus here only on
^e_ Nerves of Government
. In this chapter, we will first
describe the key features of Deutsch's model; then we will
conclude with a consideration of the value of that model
in attempts to model collective learning by other kinds of
social systems.
A schematic diagram of Deutsch's model is shown in
figure 1. The model is an attempt to describe the dynamics
of political decision-making in terms of the flow of infor-
mation. As such, it relies heavily on the concepts of
cybernetics, some of whose main features we will describe
as follows.
One of the most important concepts for cybernetics is
the concept of "feedback." Feedback is information about
the result of a system's actions, information used to
modify subsequent actions. The household thermostat is a
common example of a cybernetic system using feedback. The
thermostat senses the temperature of the room. The thermo-
stat also has a control which sets the goal temperature
which the system would like to achieve. For instance, the
thrifty householder might set his thermostat at 58 degrees.
When the furnace is on, it heats the room to 58 degrees.
At that point, the sensor of the thermostat gets information
from the room, telling it that it has reached the goal
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state of 58 degrees, and that information in turn is
channeled to a switch at the furnace telling it to shut
off. Then, the cold air outside cools off the room, the
temperature falls below the goal state of 58 degrees, the
sensor in the thermostat says, "We're below goal state,
here is some more feedback, furnace. Turn on." This cycle
by which the furnace gets information about the results of
its own actions and uses that information subsequently to
regulate its own behavior is called feedback. The furnace
turns on and heats up the room and so forth, in an endless
cycle of feedback and action.
We might also distinguish between amplifying feed-
back which tells the system, "That got us closer to the
goal, do more of the same," and negative feedback, which
says, "That got us further from the goal; stop or try
something else."
As shown in figure 1 , Deutsch's model incorporates
the concept of feedback, linking the results of a govern-
ment's "effectors" to subsequent "input" to governmental
receptors.
There is a further set of concepts in cybernetics
involving relationships between the goal, the system, and
the time required to meet goals. One such concept is
cybernetics is that of "lag," which is the time between a
shift in the target, and the response of the system. For
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example, the greyhound is chasing the rabbit and the rabbit
veers left; there may be a "lag" of two seconds before the
greyhound responds. Clearly, the shorter the lag time,
the more responsive the system. This concept can be useful
in considering the rapidity of response of a social learn-
ing system.
A second concept in cybernetics is that of "load,"
which is the amount of change in behavior per unit time
needed to meet a goal. To take the case of the greyhound
and the rabbit, the rabbit is such an artful dodger that
a considerable load is put on the greyhound who is required
to change behavior rapidly every few seconds. Applied to
social systems, we can see that there are periods during
which a social system has a heavy load of change per unit
of time to deal with. Load is a factor in what is commonly
called "future shock." In comparing social systems we can
compare the size of load they can each carry. For example,
the performance of Texas Instruments has indicated that
they can carry a heavier load of change than that of their
competitors.
A third such concept is that of "gain," which is a
change in behavior in response to new input. For example,
the greyhound on seeing the rabbit turn left may also turn
left. The catch here is that the gain may either overshoot
or undershoot. Thus, the greyhound may decide to turn only
part of the way to the left, undershooting the actual turn
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on the part of the rabbit. A clearer example might be that
of the skeet shooter who, in leading the clay pigeon,
overshoots. An example of this in a social system might
be the response of the automakers to the input about an
increasing demand for small cars. There may turn out to be
instances in which automakers have "overshot" and put too
much of their effort on the production of small cars.
Plymouth, for example, may have put too many of their chips
on the lemon of a small car they produced to compete with
the Volkswagen Rabbit.
A fourth concept is that of "lead," which is the time
within which the system can predict the future state of the
target. A greyhound chasing a turtle has a long lead time
within which to predict the future state of the turtle.
But he does not have a long lead in chasing the rabbit.
Likewise, in an age of rapid change and future shock, it
can be seen that many social systems have less and less
lead time within which to respond. For instance, if a
target of United States military policy is to maintain a
level of technological competency equivalent to that of the
Soviet Union, given the exponential rise in scientific and
technological development, there is less and less time
within which the policy-makers can be sure just what level
of technological competency the Russians will have. They
could develop entirely new military technologies within a
matter of a few years. That gives policymakers a short
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lead time, bringing with it certain kinds of anxieties which
I believe are dangerous.
Deutsch's chart in figure 1 reflects the influence
of cybernetics. The habit of modeling processes with boxes
and arrows has become part of the vocabulary of cybernetics
and systems worlds. The reader should recognize that they
are mere ways of trying to represent a reality which is far
less clearly drawn than are the boxes. However, within
Deutsch's model there are certain features which are
recurrent features of cybernetic models. First, there are
receptors, or sensors, modes of knowing what is happening
outside the system and inside the system. I find it impos-
sible to conceive of a system having in any sense an
intelligence without such receptors.
Second, there is the concept of memory or storage.
Since a system exists in time, it must have ways of con-
necting its present situation with situations in prior
times. Without such connections in time there can be
nothing that has the sense of the word "learning." The
system becomes nothing more than flotsam on the waves of
time
.
A third concept is closely associated with that of
storage. It is not enough to store information about prior
times. That storage must be recalled. Further, there must
be a principle of selectivity in the recall. Learning, to
be true learning, must carry with it a degree of aptness
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in the response of the subject. That aptness demands the
principle of selectivity, matching what is stored in
memory with what is sensed in the current situation.
Matching may be a fourth principle implicit in
Deutsch's model though not explicitly represented. What is
represented in Deutsch's model is the "decision point."
This is the point at which two streams of information
converge requiring a decision. Deutsch, incidentally, f
feels that usually it is better for a system to have many
streams for decision-making rather than one, allowing a
comparison of decisions.
A fifth concept in Deutsch's model is that of "effec-
tors."
r
i'he system does not exist in a vacuum; it does
something with the information it receives and matches with
its memory to result in decisions. It then does something.
On the chart you can see that the output of the effectors
loops around to become feedback, or input for the receptors.
The sixth element in Deutsch's model is one which to
my knowledge is one of his own devising, consciousness.
By saying that a social or political system might have
consciousness, Deutsch means that the system is self-
monitoring for coordination, simultaneous inspection, and
decision. That involves the processing of second order
messages, abstracted from first order messages. For
example, "war rooms" allow simultaneous inspection
of
messages about the state of the system and
its environment.
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This gives the political system a measure of self-control
insofar as it knows what is going on inside and outside the
system.
However, there are certain limitations built into
consciousness itself. First, it costs time and money for
a political system to monitor itself thoroughly. War rooms
are not cheap. Further, there is the danger that this so-
called consciousness in its very nature may abridge, con-
strict, and distort reality. A message about a message
must necessarily be less than the first message or else it
is the message itself. It is this kind of problem that is
built into the process of modeling, for example. A model
must be less than that which is modeled or else it is not
a model. But, insofar as it is less, it may distort that
reality. This i s a problem of consciousness too.
I find Deutsch's concept of consciousness both
thought-provoking and slightly limited. I am certain that
his talk of consciousness of a political system has helped
people look at political systems in a new way. However, I
believe that it is unclear in his system exactly in whom
the consciousness exists. Is it in President Johnson and
his cohorts in the war room? Or, is it in the polity at
large? Or somewhere else? If it is in Johnson, can that
consciousness strictly be called systems consciousness or
is it not merely individual consciousness? If it is in the
system, where in the system? It is for considerations
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such as these that I find it useful to keep in mind that
what exists is a combination of lesson sets and learners.
The lesson sets on the one hand can be viewed as embodiments
of consciousness. The "situation map" in a war room is a
collected consolidation of the perception of large numbers
of military and intelligence personnel around the world.
In my terms, it might be viewed as a lesson set. On the
other hand, that lesson set is being operated on by
individual learners like Johnson, McNamara and company.
There is a dialectic of learners and lesson sets. I do
not believe that that dialectic is adequately represented
in Deutsch's model.
Another limitation of Deutsch's model is its central-
ist orientation. The implication is that decision-making
is done by discreet central units. My impression of the
actual workings of government is that it is considerably
more messy than that. There is an interplay of countless
individuals, interest groups, forces and considerations,
making for decisions that seem more to happen than to be
made. A similar objection is that implicit in his model
is the view that decisions are somehow made rationally,
that is, there is the collection of relevant information
matched with relevant memories, confronted and simultaneous-
ly inspected for a conscious decision-making process that
leads to action. Again, my impression is that decisions
made by governments are not made nearly as rationally as
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the neatness of the boxes would suggest. However, I am
not sure that Deutsch would disagree with this. I think
his point is to try to represent in schematic fashion
certain of the logical requirements and interactions in-
volved in governmental decision-making.
I will go on here to further aspects of Deutsch'
s
model. It is interesting that Deutsch distinguishes
different levels of learning that are not unlike those of
Donald Schon. First, he talks about changes in responses
to meet fixed goals; second, changes in goals for the
larger purpose of self-preservation; and finally, some
thoroughgoing self-transformation for larger purposes be-
yond self-preservation. He further notes that such changes
can happen gradually as may have been the case in the
evolution of British parliamentary procedure, or by
revolution, as in the French Revolution.
Deutsch also attempts to identify the processes
needed for a system to have creativity and learning capacity.
There are two elements in this view.
First is that there needs to be the possibility of
"dissociating" elements. The system needs to be able to
break up its existing configuration into parts. But that
breaking apart, to be useful, needs to lead to the second
process which is the "recombination" of the elements int o
a new configuration. A sequence of dissociation of elem-
ents and their recombination is, in Deutsch' s terms,
28
creative on the part of the system.
I believe the case of Texas Instruments, described
by Jelinck (1979). may fit here with what Deutsch is trying
to describe. At Texas Instruments, until the early 1960s,
there had existed a decentralized system of independent
product customer centers responsible for their own planning,
innovation, manufacturing and marketing. Their reorganiza-
tion in the 1960s in a sense dissociated the functional
elements of the existing system and rearranged them in a
new order. The product customer centers continued to be
responsible for particular innovations and manufacturing,
but some of the marketing, and much of the planning activity,
became reorganized into a corporate-wide process. This cut
down on overhead, eliminating unnecessary overlap of the
marketing function, and allowed for more coherent long-
range planning.
I see Deutsch' s notion expressed in various ways among
many of the people talking about organizational theory. For
instance, Donald Schon advocates the separation of resource
units available to an organization at large, and task units,
assigned particular tasks. These task units may then call
resource units when they need them. In Deutsch 's terms,
such a configuration allows for the continual recombination
of elements in the organization according to the specific
demands
.
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This possibility for dissociation and recombination
is the factor which gives rise, in Deutsch’s opinion, to
learning capacity. By learning capacity, Deutsch means the
range of possible effective internal dissociations and
recombinations within a system. This learning capacity
varies with the uncommitted and reassignable resources
within the system. In Deutsch’s view, although it is dif-
ficult really to assess the learning capacity of a given
organization, a rough measure of that learning capacity
is sometimes the size and complexity of the system's
structure. He believes that the more complex the structure,
the more capacity it has for differentiated reassignment
of its resources. I am not sure that that is always the
case. However, I think his principle is worth heeding,
that a social system which can reassign its resources and
bring about new recombinations of its elements is one which
may be viewed as having a good learning capacity. On the
other hand, a social system incapable of reorganizing its
internal elements or reassigning its resources would be so
rigid as hardly to deserve the description of being capable
of learning. If there still remains confusion about what
Deutsch means by this learning capacity, we can think of
individual learning capacity, and it is probably true that
individuals who are able to dissociate their prior config-
of ideas and to rearrange those elements in some new
configuration are individuals whom we tend to view as
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intelligent.
I would add once again that the distinction between
learners and lesson sets may help to advance further
Deutsch's notion of learning capacity. It is not enough
to ask a social system to rearrange its parts. We must
also ask how that is possible. I believe that one of the
elements making that possible is the examination of the
social system s own lesson sets by the individual learners.
A rearrangement of the system's elements without such
examination would be a mere random, mindless rearrangement.
The mind quality, as always, comes from the individual
human learners operating on the materials around them.
Therefore, to repeat my theme, I think it behooves social
systems to encourage their member learners to examine the
existing social lesson set as intimately as possible, and
further, to encourage those learners to suggest possible
modes of rearranging the lesson set elements.
Deutsch's Contribution to the Search for a
General Model of Collective Learning
My concern in this dissertation is with the collective
collective human process by which we might gain a greater
understanding of our own collective learning. To what
extent has Karl Deutsch's model contributed to that search?
Is his cybernetic model of general enough validity that it
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may be fruitfully applied to the understanding of social
systems of all kinds and sizes? Are there any important
aspects of the collective learning dynamic which seem to
be left out of his model? To what extent can it serve us
in the practical business of improving our collective
learning systems.
Deutsch's influence
I cannot emphasize enough how original and influential
Deutsch's model has been and continues to be. It was the
first major attempt to model a social system in terms of
learning capacity. The very notion of seriously pursuing
the idea that governments in some sense "learn" was a land-
mark contribution. Others in political science and systems
theory immediately recognized the potential of that notion
and have pursued it in diverse ways. Among the more cyber-
netically minded we might cite Ashby, Beer, Laszlo, and
Miller as among those who have pursued similar lines of
thought. However, among many of these, the tendency has
been to keep more strictly to the cybernetic and electronic
model. There the interest has been in systems of communic-
ation, decision, and control. However, what is intriguing
about Deutsch is that to this he has added the imagery of
learning, which is something more than the mere processing
of information. Indeed, this tension between the cybernetic
imagery and the human imagery of learning may be one of the
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sources of confusion in Deutsch’s model. Besides the
Cybernetically minded, there were others influenced by
Deutsch
' e work. These included political scientists such
as David Easton, who pursued a similar systems analysis of
political life during the same period (1953 and 1965), but
most important for our consideration in this dissertation
is the set of people who pursued attempts to model social
systems of one kind or another specifically in terms of
learning. This is especially true in the work of Donald
Schon and Chris Argyris whose models we will consider at
length in chapter IV. It is also true of others including
Edgar Dunn, Kenneth Boulding, Donald Michael, and James
Botkin. Whether directly or indirectly, one can see the
influence of Deutsch' s ideas throughout their works. By
offering his model, he made concrete a number of issues
which must be dealt with in any attempt to understand the
process of collective learning.
In what ways can Deutsch' s model be applied to
to social systems in general?
Deutsch 's concern is with politics, especially that
part of politics involved in decision-making. To what
extent do other social systems like families, corporations,
schools, and the human species at large share features of
the nation state which is Deutsch' s object of study in
The Nerves of Gorvernment?
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First, it is probably true that all social systems of
whatever kind or size, must engage from time to time in the
process of making decision. Since decision-making is
Deutsch's central concern, his model here may have general
applicability. However, this should not obscure the fact
that different social systems may have different degrees
of concern about decision-making per se and may engage in
that process in different fashions. It is true that it is
one of the central concerns of the United States congress
and of the United States presidential administration and of
the supreme court to be deciding continually on issues.
That is their business. But decision-making may be less
the business of other social systems. A college fraternity,
for example, is in many ways a discreet social system, but
it is relatively little concerned with making decisions
and considerably more concerned with making merry. Thus,
the degree to which Deutsch's model is applicable to social
systems in general may vary with the degree to which
decision-making is central to that system's purpose. Fur-
ther, even when decision-making is a central purpose of a
social system, that in no way guarantees that the process
will necessarily be accurately modeled by the model sugges-
ted by Deutsch. For example, governmental units within the
United States may follow different processes for making
decisions. Town government may hold in one locality; town
management, in another. And town government may in certain
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ways differ from the decision-making processes of the
federal government. Further, it is surely true that the
decision-making process of the government in the Soviet
Union is different from that in the United States which
in turn is different from that in South Africa or India.
It may be true that Deutsch has accurately identified the
full range of functions that any decision-making entity
must perform. But the mention of these functions alone
may not be adequate to describe fully differences between
different decision-making organizations.
Nonetheless, all decision-making social systems
may be seen to share a second common characteristic, name-
ly the processing of information. I find it impossible
to think of any social system without thinking of its
having at least some degree of information processing.
Humans do process information. That does not mean that we
are computers. But we do take in information, toss it
around, and give out information. This is a social process,
and a process engaging us with our environmental realities.
Information processing is something that can be seen in a
family deciding what to buy at the grocery store or in a
corporation deciding what to charge for a new product.
I think it a fair assumption that all social systems share
this attribute. Therefore, Karl Deutsch' s model will surely
be useful in understanding that aspect of social systems
in general.
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A third way in which social systems across all levels
may share attributes of Deutsch’s model of politics is in
the presence of what he calls "learning capacity." You
will recall that by learning capacity he means the ability
to dissociate and recombine resources to meet changing
demands. Just as the United States government must decide
every year on a budget, so too must a family. Even though
that budget may shift little from year to year, those shifts
represent the kinds of redistribution which Deutsch sees
as a part of a government’s "learning," or shift in
programs or goals. Just as a government may decide on the
adoption of certain retraining programs, so too may a
corporation. Just as a government may one year decide to
draft young men into the army and another, to send them off
to the Peace Corps, so too may a fraternity one month decide
to spend its energies on making snowmen and another, on
making money for the blood drive. This stress on the dis-
sociation and recombination of resources is probably the
singlemost import element in Deutsch's view of collective
learning, and it may be seen to hold across all levels of
social systems.
Learning capacity, however, is something which
according to Deutsch varies with the size and complexity of
an organization. His claim is that the more complex a
governmental system, the more likely it is to show
increased learning capacity. If we accept that notion for
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the moment, it would imply that there are ways in which
comparisons of small social systems with large social
systems would be invalid, at least in terms of their
capacities to learn. That is, there may be ways in which
familities are not so smart as the United States govern-
ment. This does not mean, however, that the examination
of the capacity to dissociate and recombine resources is
not something that does not hold across all levels of
social systems, and it may provide a useful yardstick for
the comparison of the capacities of varying social systems.
Limitations of the model
If, as we have argued above, Deutsch’s model can be
seen to apply to all kinds of social systems--systems
which make decisions, process information, have a political
life, and dissociate and recombine resources— can we then
apply his model to all social systems as a model without
reservation? No. For my part at least, Deutsch’s model
does not do justice to the full human reality in collective
learning endeavors. Of course, it is very easy to criti-
cize a model, especially one as early and original as
Deutsch's, by what it leaves out. And, as I hope I have
suggested above, what is in Deutsch's model is in many
ways highly useful. But I feel we must build on what he
has offered to form a more complete description of human
collective learning. I will try here to suggest a few
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aspects of collective learning that Deutsch may not have
included in The Nerves of Government .
By focusing on decision-making, we should not forget
that there may exist other forms of human collective
learning. Not all learning is centered around decision.
Somehow to talk about the advance of science as centered
around decision is surely inadequate. Yet surely science
is one of the hallmarks of collective learning. So too
with the evolution of worldviews, philosophies and myths
by which we somehow capture what we have learned about
our world. Here our learning is centered not so much on
decision as on description—another form of learning. It
may even be possible to talk about subtle shifts of attit-
ude and confidence of the public toward government in the
decade and a half since Vietnam and Watergate. Yes, that
shift may to some extent be viewed as a "decision" to put
less trust in the leaders of the country, but it is better
viewed as a shift in perception or commitment, learned as
a result of experience. Not all collective learning is
explicable as decision-making.
Second, even when decision is at the center of
collective learning, that does not necessarily mean that
it takes on the centrist form implicit in Deutsch' s model,
tyiere is a sense that by and large Deutsch' s concern is
with what governmental decision-makers in Washington do
as opposed to what citizens in Peoria may think. Again
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that is fine as far as it goes, but it leaves something
out. something vital to the political process-the partioi-
pation of the people.
Such a centrist view is a natural outgrowth of
Deutsch' s original metaphor— the model of a helmsman at
a rudder. But a state is not a ship; it is a collection
of humans. These humans have a multiplicity of goals,
often pointing in different directions. If the "ship of
state" were really a ship, it would likely be torn into
each on its own trip. Of course, it may be true
that the "ship" can be seen as settling on a final vector,
but that settling is not the work of a single helmsman at
a rudder— it is the result of a very social, "political"
process. X think Deutsch would agree with this; my only
objection is that the focus of the model is such that it
lends itself to a centrist orientation. We will see a
contrast to this later in the model of governmental
learning offered by Donald Schon. In brief, Schon sees
the role of government to facilitate a public process
of learning, one in which most often ideas arise at the
"free margins" and work themselves into the center of
governmental thinking only after a long, and complex
social process. Such is not the perspective offered by
Deutsch.
Related to this reservation about this centrist
quality of Deutsch' s model is a feeling that his chart
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does insufficient justice to the role of the environment
in collective learning. It is true that his model depends
heavily on the notion of feedback which occurs between the
time that governmental effectors do something and the time
governmental receptors detect reactions. But little is
said by Deutsch about what happens in between. Yet that
surely is an important part of the whole process, a part
that needs elaboration. Thus a decision in Washington
affects citizens in Peoria and policymakers in Moscow,
the nature of those effects may be critical to an under-
standing of the whole picture.
In a similar way, there may be another form of feed-
back not properly elucidated in Deutsch’ s model, an
aspect whose absence forms my fourth reservation. That
spect concerns the effects of decisions on the very model
itself held by the government or social system. What I
mean to say is that what a social system does may in turn
change how it learns. Or, to put it another way, a
social system can learn about itself. A social system
can learn about how it receives information, and may
decide what to receive and what to exclude. It may learn
to screen some information and exclude others. It may
learn to accept some things as important, and ignore
others as trivial. It may learn that some ways of
"confrontation and simultaneous inspection" work better
than others. It may learn that some ways of "effecting"
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their decisions work better than others. That is, all
the functions identified by Deutsch are themselves objects
of collective learning. This aspect of collective learning
may be critical to the kind of self-examination and self-
transformation to which he alludes and yet, are not properly
or adequately described in his model.
A fifth feature of learning not adequately represen-
ted in Deutsch' s model is consideration of the future.
Deutsch' s model tends to stress feedback rather than "feed-
forward," or the anticipation of possible feedbacks before
a decision is made between alternatives. Yet such anticipa-
tion is surely a central feature of human psychology (Kelley
1955)* it is an especially important feature today, when
the pace of change is rapid, the complexity of our actions,
immense, and the potential consequences of them lethal.
For instance, anticipation by the human body politic of the
consequences of nuclear war is imperative if we are to
prevent it. Somehow, there does not seem to be adequate
room in Deutsch' s model for such anticipation.
Perhaps the reason anticipation is not an apparent
feature is that Deutsch has been so intent on pressing the
ways politics is like cybernetics that he has failed to
return to the fact that politics is about people, not
machines. This is the last omission I will mention, and one
with the most significance.
This helps to explain my strange feeling that the
41
politics his model describes is only part of what I feel is
fully politics. Let us consider the politics of the arms
race. ihere are indeed many important features of it which
Deutsch's model highlights well. For example, it describes
well the feedback loop by which "the government" in
Washington a) "effects" a decision to build a new weapon;
b) "inputs" the reaction of the government in Moscow (to
build one too); c) screens its recall to forget that it
built the first weapon; d) decides the Soviet Union is the
focus of evil in the world, intent on world domination;
e) decides it might then be good and godly to build a first-
strike system; f) to n)
,
continuing on (forever?).
But there are other aspects of this whole "story"
that seem left out. Consider my little town, Woodstock,
Connecticut. In the fall of 1981, a number of townspeople
were independently growing alarmed at President Reagan's
bellicose talk. One person, on hearing Helen Caldecotte,
visited her Women's Party for Peace offices, came back, and
called a meeting. Five people came. Over the winter,
word spread, the numbers grew. In March, the Town Hall
was filled with 175 people. They spoke their piece. And
when the resolution for a nuclear freeze was put and 166
hands went up for "Yes," it looked like a collective form
of prayer. Deutsch's description does not show the people
in that setting, nor the tens of millions engaged in
similar ways.
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Rather, the boxes in the model are faceless; the
model is mute. And if one imagines people in the model,
they are men in the war room of the White House, backs to
us, staring at controls. If one imagines words, they are
Fear not, dear people of Woodstock, we know how to decide
about nuclear war here in Washington."
Of course, such an image is a gross injustice to
Karl Deutsch, who has devoted his life to the modeling of
international affairs and to the quest for peace. But if
the image is unfair to Deutsch as a person, it may not be
unfair to the culture from which his model arises. For his
metaphor is taken from electronics, and electronics in many
cases have been robots born of war. The electronic
communications and controls, the computers, the systems
theory, the cybernetics which are the source of Deutsch'
s
inspiration were largely inspired by massive military
research and development during World War II and the Cold
War that followed.
These robotic genes have two consequences for the
model Deutsch produced. The first is that his model of
collective learning is less than human. He tries to ascribe
to collections of humans one of his most precious qualities
as a human—his ability to learn. How does he make this
ascription? By mimicking chips. It will not work. -*-he
analogy is limited from the start, because electronics do
not have the quality of mind essential to what we fully
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mean by "learning."
Yes, there is today great interest in artificial
intelligence, but it is very far from demonstrated that
the kinds of quite ingenious things computers can be made
to do approach what is involved in human learning. Choosing
moves in chess is less than engaging in discourse on war
at town meeting. Guiding a missile over the Urals is
different from inventing new ways to solve international
conflict
.
With such robotic roots, then, it should be no
surprise to see the model ascribing "consciousness" to
"governments." In Deutsch's definition, such consciousness
involves self-monitoring for coordination, simultaneous
inspection and decision. It requires the processing of
second order messages about first order messages. But
what is lost in the building of this electronic icon is
that it is humans who are doing that "monitoring,"
"inspecting," "deciding," and "messaging." Not chips.
The second consequence of these robotic roots is
that a politics of chips, rather than of human souls
engaged in collective speech and action, is a politics with-
out sensitivity, perhaps a politics of extinction. It is
one thing to design cybernetic systems capable of launching
World War III with neither a tear nor a grin; it is another
to reduce the political decision to the same. That is
dangerous. Safer is a view of politics populated by
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populated by people hearing one another out at town meeting.
Not so neat, perhaps, as cybernetics. But human, and
hence capable of learning.
That, then, is ray central reservation about Deutsch's
model. He has left the learner out. He has forgotten
the source. Instead of a vision of collective human
learning, we are left with a diagram of collective elec-
tronics
.
So, in our search for a general model of collective
learning, there are many elements from Deutsch’s cybernetic
model we could fruitfully use. But to these, we must
reintroduce the actions of human learners.
CHAPTER III
MARCH AND OLSEN:
ORGANISATIONAL LEARNING UNDER AMBIGUITY
The concept of feedback advanced by cyberneticists
and incorporated by Deutsch was also quickly adopted by
organizational theorists. But feedback for an organization
is seldom as clearcut as it is for a thermostat. In a
thermostat there is no ambiguity about the temperature
set as the goal, the method of sensing environmental
temperature, and the rules for warming the room or letting
it be. All aspects of the feedback loop are clearly
defined and have mechanical dependability. Not so for
organizations, and it is organizational ambiguity that
forms the material of the work of James March and Johan
Olsen.
Background
James March has long been a leading theorist of
organizational behavior. In 1958, with Herbert Simon,
he wrote the widely influential Organizations . a review
and critique of existing theories of organization. There
they provide a number of concepts underlying March's later
theorizing about organizational learning. Among these is
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the importance of conflict in organizations, especially
between organizational units. These conflicts may arise
from the need for a joint decision, differences in goals,
and differences in perceptions of reality. Organizations
seek to restore equilibrium through analysis of the
differences and through group politics and bargaining.
The existence and resolution of such conflicts are clearly
embedded in March's perception of an organization's ability
to perceive environmental reality and to change organiza-
tional "programs" and goals. The resolution of conflicts,
in March and Simon's view, seldom aims at or achieves an
"optimal" solution. Rather, decision makers tend to
"satisfice," to settle on an alternative that at least
meets minimum standards of satisfaction. The need for
satisficing in part grows from the limits of rationality
in organizations, which seldom have a clear and complete
picture of all alternatives, nor a complete and universally
accepted set of goals and criteria for evaluating such
alternatives.
From information science, March and Simon borrowed
the term "programs" to describe the standard operating
procedures followed by organizations. These "programs"
are complex sets of responses giving detailed instructions
for the coordination of tasks and for the solution of
recurring problems. An example might be the standard
operating instructions in producing a Volare station wagon
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at a Chrysler plant. When existing programs do not satisfy
the organization s goals and criteria (often because of
changes in the environment)
, organizations may change
their old programs, invent new ones, or borrow from other
organizations already having a satisfactory program. Thus
the organization's programs can be seen as a product of the
organization's problem solving process.
March continued this line of thinking in his
collaboration with Richard Cyert, giving rise to A Beha-
vioral Theory of the Firm (1963). There they describe the
cycles of experiential learning by an organization in its
interaction with its environments. An organization is seen
as preferring at a given time one "state" over others, and
as having internal decision variables and rules. An
uncontrolled external "shock" leads to a decision which
changes the system's state. Decision rules which lead to
preferred states are more likely to be used in the future
than rules which do not.
March's longstanding concern about the limits of
rationality of organizations is continued in his collabora-
tion with M. Cohen, in Leaderships and Ambiguity: the
American College President ( 197^) • There they examine
situations of ambiguity in which organizational leaders
must rely on shaky inferences about the effects of their
organization' s behavior on the environment.
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Ambiguity and Choice in Organization;^
The concerns with ambiguity and the interest in
cycles of experiential learning are combined in March's
collaboration with Johan Olsen of the University of Bergen,
Norway, Together
,
they edited Ambiguity and Choice in
Organizations (1976), a collection of articles about
organizational choice. Here, I will focus on their presen-
tation (in chapters five and six) of their own model of
organizational learning as it proceeds when conditions
interrupt or weaken a full cycle of organizational learn-
ing.
March and Olsen see "organizational intelligence" as
built from two processes » 1) rational calculations about
consequences of choices and 2) learning from prior
experience. But they see most organizations as severely
limited in their ability for rational calculation. Rational
planning, forecasting and decision-making are made diffic-
ult by the existence of conflicting goals, lack of aware-
ness of alternatives, and insufficient knowledge about
the consequences of their actions. Therefore the other
process for "organizational intelligence" seems critical--
the trial and error experimental process by which managers
see which organizational behaviors lead to success or
failure and improve the organizational behavior accordingly.
But March and Olsen see even thi3 experiential learning as
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limited in the real world of organizations. In most real
organizations, policy makers are faced with considerable
ambiguity about what happened and why. In the face of such
ambiguity, they are forced to make decisions on the basis
interpretations of reality which may or may not be valid.
The complete cycle of experiential learning.
To understand these limitations, let us first examine
March and Olsen's model of a complete cycle of choice in
which each step of experiential learning clearly affects
the next in an unambiguous way, as shown in figure 2.
Figure 2. March and Olsen's complete cycle of choice.
The lines in figure 2 may be read "affect," as in
"individuals' cognitions, preferences, and models of the
world affect their actions or their participation in a
choice situation."
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March and Olsen draw most of their material from the
study of cycles of learning in university settings, but
for our purposes let us consider some examples drawn from
the United States Department of Defense. Consider for
example individuals in the Department of Defense who held
a set of beliefs and model of the world under which the
United States and Russia would deter each other from nuclear
attack under the doctrine of "mutually assured destruction."
Let us also assume that those individuals prefer to keep
the United States superior in technology and without any
vulnerability to attack. This set of beliefs, then, can
be seen as having led them to participate in a choice to
develop an arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles
capable of striking the Soviet Union in retaliation. This
set of proposals and actions gave rise to an organizational
action on the part of the Pentagon to develop a wide arsenal
of intercontinental ballistic missiles. But the effect of
this development on Russia was of course to spur Russia to
the development of their own arsenal of intercontinental
missiles. As the Russians responded with more powerful
and accurate missiles, their actions affected the individual
beliefs and models of the world of the individuals in the
Pentagon, who then perceived the world as more dangerous
and as one in which the United States was vulnerable to
a preemptive first strike by the Soviet Union. In their
view, reactions of Russia put into question the efficacy of
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the traditional Mutually Assured Destruction ("MAD")
doctrine. "Learning" from the Russian response, they can
be seen as having taken individual action to propose a new
round in the arms race, which in fact was that chosen as
the outcome of the organizational decision making of the
Pentagon in the late 1970s. Those decisions led to the
decision to develop a new couterforce capability in the
United States' arsenal including the development of the
MX missile and highly accurate first strike weapons launched
from Trident missiles. We have yet to see what the Russian
reaction will be to that and where the next cycle of learn-
ing will take us, but at any rate, there is a limited
sense in which the Pentagon employees can be seen as having
"learned" from the environmental response of the Russians
to the arms race.
This, I think, would satisfy March and Olsen as an
example of a full cycle of experiential learning. One
might note, however, that the learning in this full cycle
was confined to the field of vision of the individuals in
the Pentagon and in no way transcended the dangers of a
self-fulfilling prophecy and an endless loop in the arms
race.
Role constrained experiential learning .
Usually organizations lack even the limited range of
experiential learning available through a completed cycle
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of March and Olsen's model. Organizations are often denied
a clear and unambiguous understanding of the environmental
responses. In terms of their model, very often the lines
of causality between boxes may be broken and this in turn
affects the quality of experiential learning. For instance,
it is common in organizations that individual beliefs and
views of the world may have little effect on their individ-
ual actions, as diagrammed in figure 3 .
Figure 3» Hole constrained experiential learning.
Let us imagine, for example, an individual working
in the Pentagon who on his own account begins to examine
the continuing cycles of experiential learning by which
the United States and Russia respectively react to one
another's buildup in arms in a spiralling arms race. Let
us also imagine that this individual perceives that one of
the requirements for ending the arms race would be the
development of a new set of technologies making verifica-
tion of arms treaties relatively certain. What is our
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imagined member of the Pentagon to do in his role at work
in the Pentagon? Is he to march into work one day and
announce a plan for the cessation of the arms race?
Probably not. "It's not my department."
March and Olsen call such a situation "role constrain-
ed learning" (1976, p. 57). In this case an individual
may have learned from the environment but has no role in
which to take action on his perceptions. There is no way
m which his individual learning may lead to organizational
adaptation.
I would add that it may not be just role definitions
which may constrain an individual from taking action on
the basis of what he has learned. For example, one can
imagine an employee in the Pentagon whose role it is to
consider verification technologies but who nonetheless does
not take action, not because of role but because he may be
too busy with other things, may not have the staff or budget
to devise a plan, or may be waiting for a more opportune
moment to act. Thus I find the descriptor "role
constrained" too narrow. Perhaps something like "actor
inhibited" might be more inclusive, but it is not the label
that is important. What is important is the block which
often exists between individual beliefs and actions.
Organizations commonly inhibit collective learning in this
way.
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experiential learning
.
A second break identified by March and Olsen is
shown in figure 4. It occurs when an individual does take
action on the basis of changed beliefs, but the individual
action has no effect on organizational action, or has only
an unclear or ambiguous effect.
Figure 4. Audience experiential learning.
For example, one can imagine that if someone in the
Pentagon did in fact propose a major new development in
verification technologies that the Pentagon as a whole
might reject such proposals on the grounds that verification
is not the Defense Department's main concern and that
limited resources must be spent on the development of
weapons instead. March and Olsen call this "audience
experiential learning." In this instance some individual
learning does occur, but the learning does not lead to
organizational adaptation.
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Supers titious experiential learning
.
A third break which can occur in the experiential
learning cycle occurs between the organizational action and
the environmental response. Sometimes organizations take
action but those actions fail actually to cause an
nmental response
,
or at least the response which
members of an organization expect.
Individual Individual
action \ beliefs
v <
7 T
Organi zati onal
action -h Environmentalresponse
Figure 5* Superstitious experiential learning.
Here, as shown in figure 5» the connection between
an organizational act and an environmental response is
severed. Nevertheless, individuals may associate certain
changes in the environment with the organizational action,
inferring a causal connection when none exists. Hence,
March and Olsen call this "superstitious" experiential
learning.
For example, many members of the Pentagon from the
1950s to the 1970s may have believed that military spending
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was good for the economy. Acting on this belief the Pentag-
on had little hesitation spending large amounts of tax-
payers’ money on the military buildup. And what did those
individuals perceive as happening to the United States
economy? Did it not thrive during those decades? And
with whom did Pentagon officials have contact? Their con-
tact was not with unskilled, unemployed workers in inner
cities; rather, it was with prosperous contractors doing
business with the Pentagon. Thus it is easy to understand
why many members of the Pentagon could hold without question
the belief that military spending is good for the United
States economy?
The actual effect of that military spending, however,
is much more open to question than members of the Pentagon
might indicate. Many economists argue cogently that
taxpayer monies spent on military spending, far from
boosting the American economy, create fewer jobs than
equivalent spending in other areas (United States Depart-
ment of Labor 1975; De Grasse et al. 1982). And economists
as different as George Gilder and Gordon Adams agree that
defense spending spurs inflation. In the view of such
economists the experiential learning of Pentagon officials
in this instance would rightly be called "superstitious."
It is based on the widespread fallacy of concluding that
because two events are associated, there must therefore
be a causal link.
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Experiential learning under ambiguity
.
Finally, March and Olsen identify a break in the cycle
of experiential learning that occurs between the action of
the environment and the accommodation of individual beliefs.
Figure 6. Experiential learning under ambiguity.
Here, individuals see only dimly or indirectly what
happened and why. Despite such ambiguity, however,
individuals try to infer what happened and modify their
perceptions and actions according to such interpretations.
We have already suggested one such example in the case of
a Pentagon official whose experience is only with prosperous
contractors and never with unskilled workers whose opportu-
nities for jobs and retraining may be lessened through the
appropriations for capital intensive and knowledge inten-
sive defense projects.
In this case, the individual in the Pentagon is
sheltered from the full impact of the Pentagon's actions.
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Or, as another example, perhaps more to the point, employees
of the Pentagon working in their air-conditioned offices
may be largely screened from the effects on villagers in
Vietnam bombed by United States bombers. Or, as a final
example, it is sometimes difficult for the Pentagon to know
clearly how the Soviet Union is responding to the actions
of the Pentagon. Our intelligence is in some ways
inadequate. In all these instances, individuals are either
screened from an understanding of the effects of their
organization's actions or are forced to guess at what the
results of those actions actually are.
In the face of such breaks in the experiential
learning cycle, individuals continue, in March and Olsen's
view, to try to make sense of their world. But lacking
adequate means of testing views against reality, members
provide themselves with cognitive consistency by a variety
of social ploys. Individual members will tend to see what
they want. Well-integrated members will like what they
see; alienated members, not. Because no one can be witness
to all events directly, what members learn is screened by
the choice of the people they trust. But people they trust
tend to be people confirming their likes and ways of seeing.
Thus under ambiguity, organizations are prone to what
Irving Janis called "groupthink" (1972). They provide
one another confirmation of the rightness of their views
and actions without real tests from reality.
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Evaluation of the Model
Our concern in this dissertation is to clarify issues
that must be addressed in attempts to model collective
learning and to speculate on features of collective
learning that may be seen in social systems in general.
What then are the uses and limits of March and Olsen's
model for our purposes here?
One value of March and Olsen's model is that it
draws attention to the links between the beliefs and
actions oj. individuals, the actions of organizations, and
the responses of environments. This is a useful addition
to Deutsch's cybernetic model described in the previous
chapter. There we saw the limits and dangers of a model
so abstract as to give no attention to the action of indiv-
iduals. March and Olsen help fill this gap by focusing on
the ways members of organizations serve organizational adap-
tation by changing their worldviews in response to the
world's actions, and by suggesting actions for the organ-
ization at large. While March and Olsen's concern is with
formal organizations, I find it plausible that individuals
may fill similar roles in social systems of all kinds.
Whether in a family or a nation, a social system's
adaptations are surely mediated by the beliefs of its
members. March and Olsen help bring attention to this
obvious but important aspect of collective learning.
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Perhaps the greatest value of the work of March and
Olsen is to remind us that real organizations often operate
under conditions of ambiguity and that despite the attempt
of individuals to learn, the organization is unable to act
m a way that adapts to the realities of their experience.
As March and Olsen point out:
. . . the literature on organizational learning is
rarely uncoupled. from the idea that learning is
adaptive. Experience is viewed as producing wisdom
and improved behavior. For purposes of studying
organizational learning under ambiguity it is
necessary. to relax such an assumption. Modern
organizations develop myths, fictions, legends,
folklore
,
and illusions. They develop conflict over
myths. The connection between environmental response
to organizational action and individual interpretation
of that response is often weak. (1976, p. 59)
The weakness of that connection may be common for
many social systems that are not the kind of "organizations"
studied by March and Olsen. Thus, their perspective may be
useful for understanding aspects of governmental behavior
not readily accounted for in Deutsch's "rational" model.
Indeed, all of the disjunctions described in March
and Olsen's four types of experiential learning may well
prove fruitful in understanding difficulties in collective
learning for social systems of all kinds, not just organi-
zations. For example, role constraints may inhibit a
child's contribution to solving a family problem, and role
constraints may inhibit a citizen from offering ideas on
the intricacies of the arms race.
Since members of any social system fill "roles,"
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March and Olsen's notion of role constrained experiential
learning is likely to be useful in analyzing social systems
of all kinds. Of course, the rigidity of role definitions
vanes immensely from one social system to another. Thus,
roles in the Freeze movement may be less "constraining"
than those in the kinds of formal organizations which are
the objects of March and Olsen's study. Nonetheless, the
notion is sure to have at least some usefulness for all
social systems.
Similar observations could be noted here about the
general usefulness of the three other forms of experiential
learning described by March and Olsen. Their models are
likely to be useful in understanding collective learning
in social systems of all kinds.
We should note that March and Olsen's usage of
"learning" seems usually to refer to something done by
individuals, and that what is important to organizations
is "adaptation." It is individuals who have "cognitions
and preferences." The organization makes choices and takes
actions which may or may not be adaptive, that is, respon-
sive to the real effects the organization has on the
environmental actions.
The focus on purely "adaptive," or after-the-fact
experience, may not give adequate attention to the role of
anticipation in learning, but that is by March and Olsen's
design. Their focus is on experiential learning and grows
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from their observation of the difficulties organizations
have in forecasting and planning. However, the line between
lessons of the past and expectations about the future is
sometimes quite thin. We often articulate our sense of
the past in phrases like, "If you do this, that will
happen. Thus, the individual beliefs shown in the March
and Olsen model are quite likely to have embedded within
them expectations about the future. A full model about
collective learning, it seems to me, should include some
accounting of anticipatory features of individual cognition.
The benefits of model building mentioned in Chapter II
are apparent in March and Olsen's model. Their model prods
further modelling; their clarifications call for other
clarifications. First, by building a model of the flow
of effects between environmental action, individual beliefs,
individual acts, and organizational acts, they have helped
lay open the question of what happens when the flow between
those events is broken. Second, by articulating elements
and their relationship, they bring to mind in other
investigators additional considerations, which in an
iterative social process can contribute tov/ards a more
complete model.
For instance, March and Olsen's model of the links
between the four boxes brings to mind the possibility of
including in the model a further link, that between
organizati onal actions and individual beliefs as shown
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in figure 7.
Figure 7. Experiential learning about internal
environment.
It is apparent that an organization' s actions
directly affect the perceptions and beliefs of individuals
in that organization. For example, if the Pentagon chooses
to reject proposals for establishing verification technol-
ogies, the people proposing those technologies will learn
to propose such endeavors less frequently in the future.
My intention here is different from that diagrammed
by March and Clsen's "superstitious" learning or
"ambiguous learning." In those cases, real links between
organizational acts and environmental acts are obscured,
requiring individual learners to modify their models of
the world on the basis of inadequate information. Here,
my concern is with the direct effect of an organizational
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act on individual beliefa.
Of course
, such learning by individuals is not about
the experience with tho external environment which is the
object of concern in March and Olsen' a discussion of
"experiential learning." But I suggest that learning about
the internal environment is at least as important as a form
ol experiential learning as is learning about the external
environment. It can help an organization to have a clear
appreciation oJ its own nature, dynamics, and resources so
that in making decisions it does so with a clear image of
what it can and cannot do. Further, my own experience in
organizations is that individuals spend considerably more
attention to the nature of their organizational realities
than they do to tho realities of their external environment.
Moot employees, at least in the United States, see their
rewards coming from their ability to manipulate tho organ-
ization rather than from the organization' s effectiveness
in dealing with the external environment. It would 3eern
that both kinds of experiential learning can help organiza-
tions bo more effective.
In fact, understanding the realities of a situation
requires that individuals perceive not only environmental
actions but tho full relationship of those actions to all
factors and dynamics v/ithin tho organization.
When individuals alter their beliefs without such
a holistic vi ew, there is a danger that their images will
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not match the full reality. Therefore, it is important
to represent the process by which all factors in the system
are acknowledged in the individual "models of the world."
Another elaboration suggested by March and Olsen's
model involves the nature of the environmental actions,
as suggested m figure 8. First, it should be noted that
March and Olsen's model focuses on those actions coming
from the environment that are in direct response to the
organization's action. However, there are many actions
coming from the environment that are not at all in response
to the organization's actions and that occur for other
reasons. Nonetheless, the organization is called on to
react to those extraneously induced action. Any full
accounting of organizational learning should picture the
process by which organizations apprehend such external
actions
.
Figure 8. Environmental actions can be complex and
autonomous
.
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Though March and Olsen probably do not intend so,
their model encourages us to think of the environment as
unitary. But in fact, organizations are usually affected
by a multiplicity of environments. Thus, for example, the
Pentagon's actions affect contractors, researchers, tax-
payers, welfare mothers, politicians. Nevada ranchers,
allies, and enemies. A decision to build MX missiles in
Nevada may enrage some ranchers and please some hawks; it
may enrich cement manufacturers and impoverish people
whose food stamps are cut; it may comfort Americans and
engender distrust in the Russians. And as this example
suggests, sometimes organizations do not pay attention to
certain environments which they affect. Individuals in
the Pentagon get considerable feedback from contractors
but little from Food Stamp recipients.
Often different subgroups within an organization
focus on different external realities. The Navy may have
different concerns from those of the Air Force; Defense
Intelligence may focus on different environments than the
Pentagon's public relations people. Such differences in
goals, concerns and perceptions of reality are part of
the source of conflict examined by March and Simon in
Organi zati ons . Therefore, it often happens in organi- .
zations that the perceptions of environmental reality are
skewed by the results of the power conflicts within
organizations
. It would seem, then, that an organization's
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experiential learning would be adaptive to the extent that
it recognizes all perceptions and manages to balance them.
The complexities of this process, while a continuing part
of March's discussion of organizations, are not immediately
apparent in the simple, four-box model.
Despite such intraorganizational conflicts, however,
there usually does exist a set of beliefs shared by
virtually all members of the organization. These can
include its charter, roles, strategies, tactics, procedures,
memories, language, technologies
,
etc.. Such shared beliefs
beliefs and views of the world are different from the
beliefs represented in March and Olsen's diagram. The
shared beliefs socialize individuals, and affect their
actions. Thus, they tend to set the direction and para-
meters of organizational choice and affect to which environ-
ments organizational members give their attention. While
such shared beliefs are an implicit part of March's earlier
work, they do not appear explicitly in the simple diagram-
matic model of March and Olsen.
Thus, the articulation of March and Olsen's model
serves to suggest elaborations which may help in the
collective process of working toward a more general paradigm
of collective learning. But the possibility of elaboration
does not detract from the usefulness of the model as it
stands. March and Olsen's model offers a clear and simple
template with which to diagnose deficiencies in an
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organization's learning,
organization's learning
it based on the model.
Someone wanting to improve an
can ask a series of questions about
Are individuals constrained from
translating what they have learned from an environment
into their actions within the organization? Are actions
based on experience thwarted from being considered and
chosen as organizational actions? Do the organizational
actions have clear causal effects on the environment? How
are these ascertained? Are individuals in a position to
see clearly what these responses are, and to alter their
beliefs accordingly? Such questions can be of immediate
practical worth to anyone attempting to assess an organi-
zation and to improve its organizational learning.
In short, March and Olsen's model, while not
inclusive or complete, is useful for the insights it
provides, for the new directions it suggests, and for the
immediate uses to which it can be put.
CHAPTER IV
DONALD SCHON AND CHRIS ARGYRIS:
BEHAVIORAL WORLDS AND CHANGES IN
ORGANIZATIONAL THEORIES OF ACTION
Background
At about the same time that March and Olsen were
developing a model of organizations articulated in terms of
organizational learning, another team was developing
theirs. Chris Argyris, an organizational theorist at
Harvard, and Donald Schon, a professor of education and
public policy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
collaborated to develop a behavioral theory of
organizational learning.
Like March and Olsen, Argyris and Schon were concerned
to identify aspects of organization that inhibit
organizational learning. But they focused less on the way
members of organizations learn about external environments
and more on how members learn about their internal
organizational environment. Argyris and Schon were
interested to examine the ways behaviors, rules, and views
shared within an organization may limit the ability of the
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organization as a whole to reflect on errors and to change
its goals and strategies accordingly.
The theory Argyris and Schon produced in their book,
-Organizationa l. Learn i ng (197 8) , is the most complete yet
produced about organizational learning. it is a book which
directly or indirectly addresses most of the major issues
involved in modeling a social system as a learning system
and which offers a number of concepts which we will argue
later are useful in the construction of a general model of
social learning systems. Since our goal in this
dissertation is the development of a general model of
collective learning, in the pages below we will evaluate
Argyris and Schon' s model for its general worth. We will
examine specific concepts as we go ending the chapter with
an overall assessment of the value of the model of
organizational learning as a model of collective learning
by social systems in general.
The theory presented in Organizational Learning was
long in the making. Therefore before considering
Q.l.9an J,ZAtiflnal- Learning in detail it will help us to review
Argyris and Schon' s prior work on the dynamics of firms and
public systems. This review will set the stage for a
better understanding of Organizational Learning , and will
offer some independent insights about public learning not
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dealt with in that book.
I&nald Schon; Bevond i~ he Stable statP
Donald Schon has long had an interest in learning as a
public endeavor as well as issues concerning technology and
society. His interest in learning took full form in his
1971 book. Payond—Lhe Stable State . Here he examined the
learning of public and private institutions under
conditions of turbulence. No longer, explained Schon, can
institutions act as if they are in a stable state. They
exist in environments which change rapidly and are
sometimes turbulent. This has created stresses on many of
our existing institutions which are based on assumptions of
a stable state. Many institutions recognizing the rapidity
of change respond with what Schon calls "dynamic
conservatism" by which he means that they change just as
little as possible, seeming to be flexible but aiming to
maintain the status quo.
In the face of unstable conditions, institutions of
all kinds are faced with the increased need to "learn". In
Schon' s usage, "a social system learns whenever it acquires
new capacities for behavior. . ." (p. 116). Schon gives
cases of such learning for a range of social systems.
72
including formal organizations, loose informal social
systems, and government.
Organizational Learning
In his analysis of organization, Schon is concerned to
identify new patterns of response that help organizations
renew their ways of doing things. For short-term renewal
Schon recommends breaking down organizational boundaries,
bringing in "young Turks" and using underground networks to
accomplish tasks that formal organizations can't.
For long-term adaptability Schon recommends a
combination of three elements. The first element is the
establishment of pools of competency, resource spaces which
may be called upon to meet changing demands. The second
element is special task forces assigned well defined jobs.
These first two elements are coordinated by the third which
is management, whose role it is to set the overall goals
and to determine how to allocate resources to achieve them.
Thus, they determine which task forces should be
established and how the pools of competency should be
assigned. This threefold organization, Schon believes,
offers more flexibility to respond to a changing
environment than does an organizational structure in which
the management and resources tasks are cemented together in
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an unchangeable fashion.
Schon distinguishes between what he calls the
center periphery model of organization and the ”ad hoc"
model, schon believes that there has been a decline in the
the center periphery model with its centralized
control and an increase in the use decentralized adhoc
model. He likes to talk of his second form of organization
as "existential" to connote that it responds to its current
state with new choices.
Important to Schon' s system is his recommendation for
the increased use of people serving go-between roles. In
such roles people cross boundaries between existing
institutions, combining resources and needs to meet
changing conditions to which the institutions as they are
now constituted seem incapable of responding. The
go-betweeners may take the roles of broker, networker,
entrepreneur, or underground activist. In all cases they
perform functions which existing organizations are slow to
perform.
Public Learning
While Schon was interested in learning by formal
organizations, his interest also extended to broader, more
societal forms of social learning. For instance, he gives
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an account of the evolution of stone cutting techniques in
colonial America
. In this case the evolution of the
technologies was inseparable from political and military
needs, from the availability resources, and from the
pressures of economic need, what evolved was a whole new
system of architectural, technological, and economic
systems of which the stone cutting technology was only one
part. Or, as another example, Schon describes the "system
for keeping us in clean clothes," a system composed of
loosely connected small stores, huge equipment
manufacturers, transportation, and social values. But the
evolution of such loose systems, that is their learning,
their acquiring of capacities for behavior, is largely
undirected. No central agency determines how to improve
such a system.
In contrast to the undirected social learning of such
loose systems, the learning of government is relatively
more directed. Schon calls this "public learning" which he
defines as "a special way of acquiring new capacities for
behavior in which governments learn for the society as a
whole." Government "undertakes a continuing, directed
inquiry into the nature, causes, and resolutions of our
problems" (p. 117) . But this, in an unstable state,
carries with it the need not just to solve specific
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problems, but also to "design and bring into being the
institutional processes through which new problems can
continually be confronted and old structures continually
discarded" (p. 117)
.
Schon's theory of government departs markedly from
most previous theories. Whereas prevailing theories were
concerned with how government met specific crises, Schon is
concerned to develop a theory of how government can promote
a public learning process to meet a wide range of problems.
Traditional theories often view policy formation as
rational; Schon, as less rational and more a matter of
political struggle. Some theories (as in those of Campbell
and Dunn) tend to view public learning as a process of
social experimentations conducted somewhat in the tradition
of the physical sciences by federal policy makers. On the
basis of his observations of the United States federal
governmental process, Schon rejects the accuracy of such
"rational/experimental" models, and offers his own
alternative model of public learning.
Stages in the emergence of ideas in good currency.
Many models of government tend to view ideas as arising in
central government and being disseminated later to the
periphery. But Schon asks where such ideas come from and
tends to see them as arising as the periphery and making
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their way to the center later, schon calls this process
"emergence of ideas in good currency", ideas in good
currency are ones powerful in the formulation of public
policy. Governments can only handle a fairly small number
of such ideas at one time since there is a limited amount
of time, resources and positions of power capable of
carrying such ideas. The ideas which are in good currency
tend to shift over time. They must do so "at a rate
commensurate with (the government's) own changing
situation. More broadly, the adequacy of a learning system
is in part shown by how far its ideas in good currency are
adequate to the situation actually confronting it"
(p. 123)
.
Schon ' s model of the emergence and change of ideas in
good currency pictures a series of phases. While Schon
makes clear that these phases are overlapping and not
clearly demarcated for purposes of exposition we will
identify six phases described in Schon' s work. These are
shown in Figure 9 below, which attempt to indicate the
overlapping nature of those phases.
In the first phase of the emergence of ideas in good
currency a given social system is "dynamically
conservative," modifying its structure technology and
concept as little as possible, maintaining its system of
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Phases
1 .
2 .
3.
4.
5.
6 .
Dynamic Conservatism
Crisis
New Ideas at Free Margins
Ideas Spread to Public
Ideas Attach to Political Struggle
Ideas are in "Good Currency"
Time
Figure 9
Phases in the Emergence of Ideas in Good Currency
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ideas in good currency. Although Schon offers his own
example, I will choose in the following pages to use the
current example of the recent emergence of ideas about the
nuclear arms race, in keeping with our concern with issues
of global survival. During the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s the
United States strategy concerning nuclear policy was based
on concepts and technology aimed at avoiding war through
deterrence and "mutually assured destruction" (MAD)
.
Contained in this was the assumption that the United States
should continually improve its nuclear arsenal in order to
be certain that the Soviet Union understood that the United
States had an invulnerable and overwhelming retaliatory
capacity. While this was the policy of all presidents
during that period there were disarmament groups at work,
promoting the idea of stopping and reversing the nuclear
arms race, but such work was largely ignored so long as the
"MAD" policy seemed realistic to policy makers. It is also
true that during this period arms treaties were negotiated,
but these did more to define the rules of the game than to
actually slow the arms race. Thus the number of nuclear
warheads possessed by the superpowers rose from a small
number in the 1950s to almost fifty thousand by the 1980s.
This period during which only minor adjustments were made
to the continuing arms race might be an example of what
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Schon meant by "dynamic conservatism."
The second phase of Schon 's model occurs with a crisis
in which events call into question the efficacy of ideas in
good currency. To continue the example of arms policy,
events of the 1970s conspired to call into question the
"MAD" policy. First, technologies had changed in ways that
made it possible to envision scenarios where one side might
attack the other with preemptive first strike against the
missile silos of the other side, thus calling into question
the threat of retaliation on which the "MAD” doctrine
depended. Second, many in the conservative United States
military industrial complex began to be alarmed that the
Soviet Union's buildup of large intercontinental ballistic
missiles might in fact be capable of launching such a
preemptive attack against the United States land based
missiles, forcing the United States to capitulate for fear
of destruction of its populated cities. These perceptions,
combined with United States frustrations about Iran, helped
to elect Reagan president on a plank of massive military
buildup. The Reagan administration then began talking of
waging limited nuclear war, alarming large number of
citizens. A crisis in the course of United States policy
had been reached—whether to respond to the new realities
of the nuclear era with a new round of development of
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nuclear war fighting technology, or to find some
alternative approach to the arms race as a whole.
The alternative approach which was seized on was the
proposal by Randall Forsberg and others that the United
States and the Soviet Union agree to immediate, verifiable
Freeze on the testing, production, and deployment of
nuclear weapons and their delivery system. This is an
example of the third phase in Schon's process of the
emergence of ideas in good currency. During this third
phase, ideas develop at "the free margin" of society and
are seen to be applicable to the current crisis. These
ideas are developed by people in "vanguard roles" - such as
artists, muckrakers, Utopians, philosophers and prophets.
In the case of the Freeze movement, the specific proposal
has been attributed to Randall Forsberg, an MIT student of
international armaments and a former employee of the
Stockholm Peace Research Institute. In 1979, seeing SALT
falter, she began advocating the Freeze proposal as simple
and acceptable enough to gain wide acceptance. In 1980 a
band of long-time peace activists and Quakers in western
Massachusetts managed to get proposals similar to the
Freeze passed in a number of localities. The seeds were
taking root but they had yet to be planted in Washington.
In Schon's fourth phase, the ideas at the free margins
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are diffused to a broad public through networks,
popularizers, and the media. The diffusion often involve
the invasion of the source group by other groups waiting to
capture the aspects of the new proposal. Thus in the case
of the Freeze, the idea was rapidly diffused through
existing peace, church, and professional networks.
Popularizers arose, including the charismatic Helen
Caldicott . By early 1982, the mass media began to
recognize that the movement had intense and widespread
appeal (and hence could sell advertising)
. As the idea
spread, different localities and groups altered the
original proposal to suit their own goals, but the vectors
were all in about the same direction.
In Schon's fifth phase, alternative ideas become
attached to political struggles in which careers and power
ride on the public choice determining which ideas shall
prevail. Perhaps a major reason for the success of the
Freeze movement has been that it became an object for
public debate and vote in countless town meeting and state
referenda. Local organizations were formed to promote its
passage. Public learning was no longer a theoretical
inquiry; it was inquiry raised to the level of public
decision.
In Schon's sixth and final phase, the ideas once at
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the "free margin" are adopted by the powerful people at the
center of government. The ideas are legitimated. They
have become part of the small set of ideas that are "in
good currency" that are commanding serious attention as
solutions to actual crises. They are no longer merely
ideas in the hands of kooks; they are on the verge of being
considered as public policy and law. For the Freeze, this
occurred swiftly. Most Washington politicians in 1982 were
hardly aware of the Freeze, but as the power of the
movement burgeoned, leaders left to catch up with their
electorate. Kennedy and Hatfield proposed a resolution in
the Senate and by the summer the resolution nearly passed
in the House and did manage to pass in the Spring of 1983.
The fact that the idea had become legitimate may be seen by
the attempt of the opposition to delegitimize it by
implying that the Freeze supporters were "dupes of the KGB"
and too naive to be included in the decision about nuclear
war. But by the fall of 1982 the Freeze had clearly become
what Schon an "an idea in good currency." It was an issue
in many congressional campaigns and was voted on by more
than a quarter of the electorate in state and local
referenda. The Reagan administration was acknowledging the
power of the movement by the orchestration of statements
against the Freeze by leading members of the Cabinet and by
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the President himself. By the end of 1982, Reagan’s
proposal for a massive military buildup and the
counterproposal for a Freeze were both "ideas in good
currency" vying to become the policy of the nation in a
nuclear age.
The example of the Freeze helped highlight a
difference between Schon's view of public learning and that
of others. Karl Deutsch, you will remember, modeled
government as a central processing unit similar to that of
a computer. Schon's model is an entirely different one
from such rational information processing model. His
acknowledges the human struggle the mix of politics in the
messy process by which nations learn new ways of coping
with problems.
Schon s model is also very different from models which
tend to think of governmental learning as happening at the
center of governmental power. it is further different from
the model given by Rogers and Schoemaker who describe the
diffusion of innovation as something primarily eminating
from the center to the periphery. But in Schon there is
much more acknowledgement given to the importance of the
periphery. Says Schon, "The opportunity for learning is
primarily in discovered systems at the periphery, not in
the nexus of official policies at the center. Central's
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to detect significant shift at the periphery, to
pay explicit attention to the emergence of ideas in good
currency, and to derive scenes of policy by induction"
(p. 177)
.
Thus Schon's model of public learning serves as a
useful counterpoint to the centrist and rational model as
exemplified in the work of Karl Deutsch. He is further
valuable in his attempt to offer a schemitization of the
phases through which public learning is likely to proceed.
And perhaps most pervasive is his acknowledgment of the
existential quality of public learning as something
requiring choice under uncertain and changing
circumstances.
ArgyriS and Schon's Theory in Practice
Donald Schon's first collaboration with Chris Argyris
came in 1974 with the publication of Theory in Practice:
increasing Professional Effect iveness . To this Chris
Argyris, brought his many years of experience as a leading
organizational theorist. He had written extensively about
the relationship between interpersonal competence and
organizational effectiveness (1962) and that relationship
remains at the core of his eventual analysis of what
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inhibits or helps organizational learning. Argyris also
brought to the collaboration his use from prior works
(1965) of feedback loops to model organizational behavior
for instance, he modeled through such feedback loops the
deterioration of a research and development organization,
emphasizing the way in which interpersonal competency can
lead to conditions that impede the effectiveness of the
organization's Research and Development and which reinforce
those varying dysfunctional interpersonal behaviors. Such
feedback loops become an important part of Schon and
Argyris s analysis of organizational learning. In Theory
in Practice , Argyris and Schon develop another element
central to their eventual model of organizational
learning— the concept of theories of action . They see
humans as constructing theories of what to do under various
circumstances. Schematically a theory of action says, "In
situation S, if you want to achieve consequence C, under
assumptions a...n, do A" (p. 6).
Argyris and Schon distinguished two kinds of theories
of action—
"
espoused theories " and " theories-in-use . " An
espoused theory is one which someone says he follows; a
theory-in-use is the one he actually follows. These are
not always congruent, and the person may be unaware of the
incongruence since the theory-in-use has passive dimension
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which can only be inferred. It is theories-in-use which
command more of Argyris and Schon's attention, for such
theories determine what organizations actually do.
Because theories of action, and especially
theories-in-use, are so important to Argyris and Schon's
theory of organizational learning we will pause here to
consider certain ramifications of this point of view. The
formulation given above is so bare that it is important to
realize some of its implications, for the point of view
chosen is bound to determine what a theory of
organizational learning will stress, and what it will
ignore.
We might first note that these theories of action are
inferred rather than observed directly. This puts a
special burden on the inferer. what one person infers
another person may not. There may be some who dislike this
reliance on inference. For my part I have few reservations
about this procedure. it is the one followed by Piaget and
many other cognitive psychologists in studying individual
cognition and I see no compelling reason not to rely on
inference in examining organizational learning. Questions
of how to go about such inference and how to make claims of
universal validity are ones discussed earlier in chapter
II.
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We should also note that Argyris and Schon's view sees
humans as theorizers as creatures who put together
strategies for action, but these strategies are not
automatically arrived at. They are the work of learners
who have constructed a certain view of reality. While
Argyris and Schon do not discuss such issues, they are
imbedded in their view. Any view of learning or
organizational learning necessarily rests on a theory of
knowledge and truth.
It is also worth stressing that Argyris and Schon's
concern is with
.action . They are not concerned with other
forms of less active learning such as ones involving
reflection or the acquisition of knowledge and
understanding or in the search for truth and beauty. Their
concern rather fits the concern of practical businessmen
whom organizational theorists serve. But one may question
whether a theory of action is a complete theory of
learning, one accounting for less active forms of learning.
For instance, the acquisition of knowledge and the search
for truth and understanding may follow more contempletative
and reflective forms of activity than those followed by
decisive businessmen. Scientists may respond to different
imperatives than technologists (Polanyi 1962) . Of course
Argyris and Schon argue that a theory whose goal is action
88
must be based somehow on theories whose goal is
understanding. Nonetheless the focus in organizational
learning here is on organizational learning aimed at action
and only secondarily an organizational learning aimed at
understanding.
Associated with Argyris and Schon's concern with
action is their stress on consequences. They are very much
in the American pragmatic tradition. That tradition, as
expressed variously in the works of William James and John
Dewey among others, tends to hold that the test of a belief
or theory is in its practical consequences. While we do
not have room here to discuss the merits of that widely
held view, we should at least note that there are many who
put less stess on consequences as the test of belief.
Michael Polanyi, for instance, argues that the pragmatic
concern with consequences is in many ways at odds with the
true nature of science. Scientists, he argues, follow
heuristic urges, personal hunches resting on personal
commitments, long before the facts of experimental
consequences justify such hunches. The tests of a
scientific theory in his view include such things as
coherence, breadth and beauty, and less on the test of
consequences.
Another feature of Argyris and Schon's formulation
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worth emphasizing is the situational nature of theories.
This too is in some ways in the pragmatic tradition. For
instance, John Dewey frequently reminded us that there is
no final separation between the knower and the known nor
between the environment and the environed. Similarly, one
does not sense that Argyris and Schon expect members of
organizations to be establishing absolute and immutable
truths, or to be discovering a priori knowledge independent
of experience. Their concern is with what to do in the
flux of organizational experience. This pragmatic cast of
Argyris and Schon' s view of theories of action in many ways
determines the strengths and limits of their eventual
theory of organizational learning.
Organ izationa l
—
Learning: A Theory of
Acti on Perspective
Organizational theories of action
Argyris and Schon build on the concept of theories of
action to give their major account of organizational
learning in their 1978 book, Organizational Learning: A
Theory of Action Perspective . They argue that just as the
theory of action can be inferred from an individual's
behavior so can one be inferred from an organization by its
behavior (p. 13) . Organizational behavior is composed of
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decisions and actions carried out by individuals governed
by collective rules. An organization's theory of action,
then, is made up of the norms, strategies, and assumptions
imbedded in its practices (p. i 4) . For examplei a
semiconductor firm has certain norms about quality, certain
strategies for assuring quality (e.g. training new
employees) and certain assumptions linking strategies to
norms (e.g. that a fixed sum for training per year is
adequate)
.
Organisationa l—
L
earning is the correction of pr^nr
The norms, strategies, and assumptions of an
organization's theory of action are supposed to achieve
organizational goals. But when outcomes do not match
expectations, a condition of " error 11 exists.
Organizational learning, as defined by Argyris and Schon,
is the detection and correction of such error. Error
usually results from changes in the internal and external
environment of the organization. As an example, if the
above semiconductor firm failed to meet its quality control
standards, found out why (e.g. increased worker turnover),
and made changes in procedures (e.g. more money for
training) so that its standards were met, "organizational
learning" could be said to have occurred.
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Thus we can see that- 4-u~he pragmatic framework which
Argyris and Schon applied to the individual learning is
brought to bear on organizational learning. Their focus
will be on practical consequences, and not on less active
practical forms of learning. Fur ther the stress on
response to error runs the risk of reducing organizational
learning to a mechanical model of learning. This may limit
the range of behaviors included in Argyris and Schon's
model. It excludes the kind of "heuristic urges" Polanyi
sees as motivating the learning offered by scientists, it
may even ignore the kind of indigenous play and tinkering
offered by inventors. Such behavior is not adequately
described by response to error alone. And if this is true
of individuals, it may well be true of organizations.
Healthy businesses do not simply respond to error,- they
also create and recognize opportunity. They develop new
products, and perceive new markets. Argyris and Schon's
model is successful at describing the more bureaucratic and
conservative aspect of an organization. It may not,
however, be as successful in describing the more
entrepreneurial and inventive aspects of organization.
Individua l s a
.re agents of organizati onal learning
This pragmatic organizational learning does not happen
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in a vacuum— its agents are individuals. It is they who
recognize, for example, that the chips produced by a
semiconductor firm fail to meet expectations of quality.
It is they who inquire into the causes of error, invent
solutions, and make them a regular part of subsequent
organizational practice.
Organ J.Z at I Qna l—
l
earn ing—cL£—change in shared map of
organizational theory-in-use
However, if individuals detect error but fail to imbed
solutions in the organization's theory-in-use, only
individuals will have learned, not the organization.
"Individual learning is a necessary but not proficient
condition for organizational learning" (p. 20) .
Organizational learning, in Argyris and Schon's phrasing,
requires that "learning agents' discoveries, inventions,
and evaluations must be imbedded in the organizational
memory. They must be encoded in the individual images and
shared maps of organizational theory-in-use from which
individual members will subsequently act" (p. 19) . By
"ahared map, " Argyris and Schon mean "public
representations of organizational theory in use to which
individuals can refer" (p. 17) . They include such things
as diagrams of work flow, office layouts, and statements of
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procedures. They are the meshing of scattered individual
images of organization which once pieced together become
"...guide to future actions by members of the organization.
As musicians perform their scores, members of an
organization perform their map" (p. 17 ). Organizational
learning results in the alteration of these maps.
It cannot be emphasized enough here that a subtle but
important distinction has been made here, a distinction to
which we will return in later discussions. For Argyris and
Schon see organizational learning as not merely the sum of
individual learning; rather they see organizational
learning as a change in something we might call
"supraindividual , " a change in a shared map of the
theory-in-use inferred to govern the behavior of members
and their organizations as a whole. Scattered individual
learning has somehow been brought to the level of a change
in something organizational— the organizational
theory-in-use.
Another aspect of Argyris and Schon' s view worthy of
note is the highly suggestive quality of speaking of
organizations as creating "theories." The latent image,
not pursued by Argyris and Schon, begins to approach those
of the mystic Tielhard de Chardin in his view of the
"noosphere" and of Hegel's "Spirit" coming to know itself.
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Organizations are theorizers. They are entities which try
to come to grips with the realities within which they act.
individuals are the agents of that learning. But
organizational learning is richer than individual learning.
It is almost as if the organizations ^Le theories of the
world, are ideas of reality.
The more apparent value of Argyris and Schon's model,
however, is that they have articulated such a clear and
consistent definition of organizational learning that
further discourse is made easier. Organizational learning
is seen as a pragmatic endeavor, in which members detect
that outcomes have not met expectations, and reflect
together until they have changed their shared map of the
organization's strategies, assumptions, and goals.
£ta cLe.s in organizational inquiry
Argyris and Schon do not consider that every change in
the shared maps qualifies as learning. Some changes may
result by fiat, force, ecological eruption, or chance.
These lack the cognitive quality which distinguishes
learning. Organizational learning, by their definition, is
the result of inquiry.
They schematize that inquiry has a cycle consisting
of four phases as shown in Figure 10. (In some of Argyris
and Schori* s descriptions
broken into a number of
four phase model here.)
the last of these four phases i
further phases. We will use the
s
DISCOVERY
Of error in
GENERALIZATION
of the results as a
regularized part of
organizational Theory-in-use
INVENTION
of new strategies,
assumptions, or norms
PRODUCTION
of inventions
Figure 10
Phases of Inquiry
96
For the discoveries and inventions of individuals to
bring about organizational learning, they must be produced,
evaluated, and generalized by the organization. That is
they must become a regularized part of the organization's
map and practices. As such they are unaffected by the
departure of the original inventors, and become a standard
part of the socialization of new members. Such
regularization marks the completion of a cycle of
organizational learning.
—Organizationa l—dialectic." or the cycle
of_inguiry. is continuous
Figure 10 above also diagrams the never-ending nature
of organizational learning, in which the solution to one
problem gives rise to the next. Thus the new strategies,
assumptions, and norms regularized as a part of an
organization's theory-in-use are sure to beget their own
dilemmas or errors which must be met by a subsequent cycle
of organizational learning. Argyris and Schon called this
"organizational dialectic," stressing the continual
conflictual nature of this process (p. 42)
.
Since the term "dialectic" is a permanent part of my
own model of collective learning, I should note that their
usage of the term is very different from that I developed
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earlier (McClellan 1978). Theirs is concerned with the
cycles of the problem solution problem process. Mine is
concerned with the interplay of individual learners, their
supra individual lesson sets, and their environing
realities.
Returning to Argyris and Schon, they see an
organization as having "good organizational dialectic" when
the members are continually open to recognizing and solving
conflict. This is characterized by the willingness to test
for errors and incongruities, to inquire into the nature of
conflicts, and to overcome them in a satisfactory way
(pp. 144-146) .
Limits of stage schemes
The notion that there may be stages in the process of
inquiry is hardly new, nor is this particular
schematization as presented by Argyris and Schon. Elements
of it can be found implicitly in discussions of science
since the time of Bacon. For instance, John Dewey's
discussions of problem solving in Logic: The Theory of
inquiry (1924) contains similar elements. What is useful
here is the attempt to apply such analysis to inquiry that
is organizational rather than individual. It would be
desirable for an eventual general model of collective
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learning to continue such attempts to clarify analytically
separate stages.
However I find myself wondering if the process of
inquiry is quite so neat and linear as presented in this
chart. My own experience of inquiry, and the accounts from
works such as Ghislin's book Creativity . Kuhn's The
Structure Of Scientific Revolutions
,, and Polanyi's Personal
Knowledge all attest to the messy, multivariate,
back— forth—many— stages-all-at-once-nature of inquiry as it
actually proceeds within individual inquirers. If this is
true of individuals, it seems even more likely to be true
of collections of individuals. While some individuals may
only be "discovering" organizational error, others may
already be "inventing" solutions. And, as a whole, an
organization may often perform a number of functions
simultaneously. The actual cauldron of organizational
politics is much more full of bubbles and blobs than is
represented by the chemical equations of the lab.
This is not to say that Argyris and Schon would
disagree that the actual process of organizational inquiry
is messier than their idealized pattern suggests. Remember
that Schon in Beyond the Stable State saw public learning
as a vast complex process with overlapping stages. I mean
here, rather, to stress that while a schematization of
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stages may be useful for analytic and linguistic purposes,
it should be viewed with caution as a full representation
of reality.
-Sing l e- loop.
l
earn ing and donm g
-] oop i Par nin^
One of the best known distinctions made by Argyris and
Schon is that between two kinds of organizational learning,
each changing a different aspect of the theory-in-use. In
"single-loop learning," it is the strategies or assumptions
that are modified; in "double-loop learning," not only are
the strategies and assumptions modified, so are the norms,
goals, and objectives of the organization. Argyris and
Schon called the former "single-loop" because only one
feedback loop is involved— that which links the detection
of error to the strategies the organization uses in forming
its goals. "Double-loop learning," in contrast, involves a
second feedback loop which links the error to the very
norms which define effective performance.
An example of single— loop learning might be the case
mentioned above of a semiconductor firm correcting a drop
in the quality of its product. Here there was no change in
the company's norm— only a change in the assumption about
the amount of money required to adequately train the
workers.
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But consider the more difficult learning recently
required many United States semiconductor firms when they
began losing large shares of the market to Japanese
competitors. Examination of the causes revealed among
other things that the Japanese were delivering much more
reliable chips and that the old United States standards of
quality control were simply not good enough. For United
States firms to compete, they needed to raise quality
standards. But actually to meet much higher standards,
corporate quality control strategies needed revamping,
giving rise to suggestions to such structures as "quality
control circles" modeled after those of the Japanese. Also
important to the Japanese firms were systems guaranteeing
lifelong employment and indexing of an employee's pay to
yearly corporate performance. For United States firms to
adopt such "strategies" actually implied alteration of
central United States norms about worker participation and
control. These in turn were in conflict with older norms
about managment control and the division of profits. Thus
many United States firms have been involved in a learning
process that pervades their organization's theory-in-use,
affecting not only assumptions and strategies but central
norms as well. This would be an example of what Argyris
and Schon called double-loop learning. But unlike the
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straightforward single-loop learning which focuses on
increasing effectiveness without changing central norms,
double-loop learning is difficult, requiring the
understanding and resolution of conflicts between members
holding different norms. Such conflicts, which are usually
treated as undiscussable, need to openly discussed if
double-loop learning is to be achieved.
Deutero-learning
Argyris and Schon distinguish a third kind of
organizational learning which is one level more general
than either single-loop or double-loop learning. Whereas
those involve learning ways of correcting specific errors,
"deutero-learning" involves learning about organizational
learning in general. It is second order learning,
connecting errors in the way an organization's theory and
use detection corrects its first order errors.
Deutero-learning is reflective, requiring that members
examine prior context for learning to discover what helps
or impedes organizational learning. Like all other kinds
of organizational learning, deutero-learning requires a
complete learning cycle of the sort shown earlier in Figure
10. It ends with the regularization of new practices in
the organizational maps and theory-in-use.
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This distinction is not new to Argyris and Schon;
Edgar Dunn (1971) discussed
"learning to learn", and
Gregory Bateson (1972) draws on one of his early articl es
which used he termed
"deutero-learning.
» But the
familiarity of the notion does not belittle its value; it
focuses our attention on the processes which social systems
learn about their learning in general, it is this notion
which we have earlier abbreviated as "(CL) 2," or collective
learning about collective learning. It is of that process
that I hope this dissertation may be a part.
Behavioral wor~M
If organizational deutero-learning is to be successful
say Argyris and Schon, members must examine how an
organization's habitual styles of interpersonal interaction
affect the organization's capacity for learning. Argyris
and Schon call these characteristic styles " behavioral
KQ.fIds . They include the language, norms, and strategies
for interpersonal actions that typify an organization and
permit it to be described by such terms as "defensive" or
openend," "cautious" or "experimental." If organizational
learning is a matter of bringing together individual's
scattered perception of error and collectively imbedding
new procedures in the organization's theory-in-use,
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then clearly the quality of interpersonal relations can
have a great impact on the quality of organizational
learning. For that reason, most of Argyris and Schon's
attention in Organizational learning is devoted to the
study of different behavioral worlds and their effects on
organizational learning.
The importance of behavioral worlds can be sensed
first by considering the conditions that give rise to error
and the responses required to correct conditions, as
summarized in Figure 11.
In order for the corrective responses in Figure 11 to
be carried out members of the organizations must
collaborate. But the quality of collaboration will depend
on the nature of the behavioral worlds that the members
inhabit. For instance, consider the case mentioned above
of the semiconductor firm meeting higher standards of
quality control. Some members may advocate quality control
circles, but their norm of greater worker participation may
be in conflict with some other members' older norm of tight
managerial controls. Or some may advocate greater profit
sharing, but this may conflict with the norms of those who
view profits as reserved for investors. In order for the
firm to deal with these incompatibilities, members must be
willing to surface the conflicts and resolve them. But the
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Conditions for error
Mistaken assumption
Incongruity
Incompatibility
Vagueness
Ambiguity
Excess/sparseness
Untestability
Scatter
Information withheld
Information kept important
for action
Corrective responses*
Reformulate
Reconcile
Resolve
Specify
Clarify
Prune/enrich
Make testable
Concert
Surface
Bring into good currency
‘Corrective responses to conditions for
of the organization.
error may be inhibited by the behavioral world
Source: Argyris and Schon, 1973, p .59
Figure 11
Conditions for Error
behavioral world of the firm may shun such conflict. The
theory-in-use of members may have as a governing norm the
avoidance of open interpersonal confrontation. Therefore,
the organization may not even surface the incompatible
options in the first place. Instead, members may ignore
the problem, and seek less fundamental ways of approaching
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the quality control problem. That is, the modes of
interaction characterizing the behavioral world of the firm
would have inhibited the firm's double-loop learning.
Case studies and ethnography
Argyris and Schon construct elaborate models of two
different behavioral worlds and of their effects on the
capacity of an organization to learn. But before we go on
to consider those models, we will first pause to examine
the methods by which Argyris and Schon study behaviors,
collect their data, and construct their models.
Argyris and Schon' s method is the "case study" method
often used by organizational theorists. Some of the dozen
or so cases Organizational Learning are drawn from Argyris
and Schon' s own extensive experience as consultants and
researchers. Some of their data comes from tape recordings
of their interventions as consultants. Other cases are
apparently based on accounts written by members of the
authors classes. Still other cases are drawn from the
organizational theory literature. The diversity of cases
is one of the strengths of the book, a strength hard to
convey in a synopsis. One gets some sense from the cases
of what is meant by the general models.
An acceptable model paradigm of collective learning by
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social systems in general will only emerge if researchers
from different disciplines report their findings and
procedures with sufficient texture and detail to persuade
each other that their findings are indeed commensurable,
and that there are valid commonalities to be found in the
learning observed in a wide variety of social systems.
Without such solid detailed description, researchers will
suspect that claims to generalizations arise more from the
imagination of the model builders than from the reality
whose diversity the models purport without proof to match.
So paradoxically, the richer the description of detail, the
more likely the acceptance of claims of generality.
Such questions of methodology have already been
carefully thought through by ethnographers. Glaser and
Strauss (1967) have shown techniques by which theory can be
grounded in observation. Clifford Geertz (1973) has called
for "thick description" so rich in concrete observations of
an entire context that the researchers can feel confident
in comparing the observed context to another. Egon Guba
(1980) delineates a set of rigorous methods by which a
researchers naturalistic observations can achieve
trustworthiness in the eyes of others. These methods
include such techniques as prolonged observation and
collection of raw data for the establishment of
107
credibility; random sampling and thick description of
context to establish a sense of fit; use of self audit
trails to establish dependability of analysis; and
tr i angul at i on to establish confirmability.
By the standards of ethnographers, Argyris and Schon
are partially successful in at least one case— that of a
major chemical company. in that study by one of the
authors, the analysis was sufficiently long, intense and
detailed to establish credibility. But even in that case,
the author does not give us an audit of his own process of
observation and analysis, nor sufficiently rich raw data to
be entirely convincing that his conclusions are valid
generalizations. I have even stronger reservations about
the cases based on reports done by students in the authors'
classes. True, these cases all give detailed accounts of
conversation between the reporter and someone else in that
person's organization. An excerpt of such a case is given
on the following page in Figure 12. However, we are not
given much more than a dialogue and private thoughts; the
complexities of the setting, the nuances of body language
are left out. What is reported is done so in recollection
well after the events. Of course Argyris and Schon do give
much richer description than many other organizational
theorists, whose tradition often values the kinds of charts
108
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and boxes which give busy executives a quick handle on the
chaos they face. That is fine for action, but for the
development of grounded scientific theory capable of
commanding trust across disciplines, my own taste is to
want more. Here it seems to me is an example of an
occasion on which a sharing of methodological perspectives
across disciplines could greatly further the quest for a
theory of collective learning that is both scientifically
sound and practically useful.
My reservations about the way Argyris and Schon report
their observations does not mean that I consider their
models to be of no worth. Far from it. I am confident
that their models emerge from a wealth of experience, even
if not articulated. Further, as aids to further
observation, the concepts and classifications in their
models are invaluable. Their stated goal has been to aid
in the "mapping" of organizational learning. It is a goal
which they have achieved.
Model I theory-in-use
Let us return then to the behavioral worlds which
Argyris and Schon see. On the basis of their wide
experience as consultants to business, education, and
government, they offer a model of the theory-in-use held by
Model I Theory-in-Use
Governing
variables
Design and man
age the environ-
ment unilateral-
ly. (Be persua-
sive, appeal to
larger goals,
etc.)
Actor seen as
defensive, in-
consistent, in-
congruent. con-
trolling, fearful
of being vulner-
able, withhold-
ing of feelings,
overly con-
cerned about
self and others
or undercon-
cemed about
others.
Self-sealing.
Maximize win-
ning and mini-
mize losing.
Own and con-
trol the task.
(Claim owner-
ship of the task,
be guardian of
the definition
and execution of
the task.)
Defensive inter-
personal and
group relation-
ship (depen-
dence on actor,
little helping of
others).
Single-loop
learning.
Minimize gener-
ating or express-
ing negative
feelings.
Be rational.
Unilaterally pro- Defensive norms Little testing of
tect yourself. (mistrust, lack theories public-
(Speak in in- of risk taking. ly.
ferred categories conformity, ex-
accompanied by temal commit- Much testing of
little or no di- ment, emphasis theories pri-
rectly observable on diplomacy. vately.
data, be blind to power-centered
impact on others competition and
and to incongru-
ity between rhet-
oric and behavior,
reduce incongru-
ity by defensive
actions such as
blaming, stereo-
typing, sup-
pressing feelings,
intellectualizing).
rivalry).
Unilaterally pro- Low freedom of
tect others from choice, internal
being hurt (with- commitment.
hold information,
create rules to
censor informa-
tion and behav-
ior, hold pru : e
meetings).
and risk-taking.
Source: Argyris and Schon, 1978, pp. 62-63
Figure 13
Model I
Ill
most members of most orn^ni ~ •organizations. As shown in Figure 13,
"Model I" describes the personal i-nl theory- in-use that governs
the interpersonal behavior of individual members of
virtually all organizations Argyris and Schon have
encountered. The left column in Figure 13 lists typical
norms or objectives that govern individuals' behavior. The
next column identifies strategies typically used to achieve
those norms. The middle column lists the effects such
norms and strategies have on the climate within which
members interact. The next column summarizes the effects
of such a climate on organizational learning. And the last
column gives the result: reduced organizational
effectiveness.
Inhibiting 1 nop e;
Argyris and Schon describe the difficulties which the
Model I behavioral world produces for attempts at
organizational learning. The most important of these they
call "primary inhibiting loops" (p. 46). These are loops
m the sense diagrammed in the Figures 14 and 15. That is,
the conditions for error (listed earlier in Figure 11)
cause individuals to behave with one another in a way that
inhibits organizational learning. The typical modes of
interpersonal behavior, in turn reinforce those conditions
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for error, in a self sustaining cycle that limits the
ability of the organization to detect and correct errors.
Argyns and Schon call such loops "priory" to indicate
that they involve the all important interpersonal
of individual members. But such primary loops can engender
"secondary inhibiting loops," ones involving the dynamics
between subgroups of the organization (p. 109).
Ambiguity in division
of responsibility
- » ~ .w Dysfunctional
Vagueness in criteria — response
for task assignment
Source: Argyris and Schon, 1973, p .52
Figure 14
Example of an inhibiting loop
Modei-l —
_ ,.
.
-Behavior* Conditions
w?ma- — for error
Source: Argyris and Schon, 1973, p .96
Figure 15
Inhibiting loop
fg?r^L ttlPnrY
~ in~ n ° n 1
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The effect of the Model I theory-in-use is to limit
the organization's learning system. Defensive
interpersonal strategies mean that individuals avoid open
confrontation and are unlikely to test openly aspects of
their theories of action, such as the assumptions,
strategies, and norms governing interpersonal behavior.
When members' assumptions and views are not discussed
openly, there is no opportunity for them to be disconfirmed
and corrected. Instead, members hold theories of action
which remain untested, and self-perpetuating. Argyris and
Schon call such privately held theories " sel f-seal i ng "
Their cost is to avoid the kinds of information that could
lead to learning.
The Model I theory-in-use does not necessarily inhibit
single-loop learning, that is, the alterations of
assumptions or strategies. As long as such learning does
not create conflict within the Model I governing variables,
the strategies and assumptions can be changed. But the
Model I theory-in-use is bound to inhibit double-loop
learning, which by definition entails conflict between
people supporting different norms. But conflict is at odds
with the Model I demand that negative feelings be kept
114
hidden. So long as members hold to that conflict-avoiding
behavior, double-loop learning is impossible. The more
central the norms in conflict, the less able a Model I
theory-in-use is able to deal with this conflict.
Model I theory in-use creates similar inhibitions on
attempts to encourage organizational "deutero-learning. n
Such learning to learn requires shared reflection on the
inadequacies of the existing norms, strategies, and
assumptions. But this reflection creates the kind of
negative feeling, uncertainty, and conflict which Model I
avoids. Further, deutero-learning requires joint inquiry
in which members gather together scattered impressions of
organizational dynamics. Once again this is prohibited by
Model I which offers members no guides or collaborative
inquiry into uncomfortable topics.
Argyris and Schon offer a number of case histories
which exemplify the many ways in which existing
organizations capacity for learning is inhibited by the
Model I theory-in-use. We cannot review here their
complexities, but will simply reproduce the charts Argyris
and Schon present to summarize the dynamics of such limited
learning systems. Figure 16 and 17 give the general model
of organizational learning constrained by Model I
individual theories-in-use. They call this model of most
115
existing organizations the "Model 0- 1 "
from a second ideal model which we will
to distinguish it
describe below.
Primary Secondary
inhibiting —
- inhibiting
loops loops
Correctable Learning
errors cycle
— Action
Error
Appropriate response
Uncorrectable
errors
Organizational
camouflage and
games of
deception
Primary loops
that inhibit
deutero-
learning
Decrease probability
for double-loop and
deutero-learning
Double binds for
individuals
Source! Argyris and Schon, 1978, p.110
Figure 16
Model 0-1: Limited Learning Systems
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The Model O-I learning system is capable of correcting
errors which are not too threatening to members. But it is
incapable of dealing with errors whose detection and
correction threaten central norms of the organizational
theory in-use. Since these require revision from time to
time in a changing world, long-term organizational
effectiveness suffers.
-0 11
—
k
SflEninq Systems . To overcome the limitations of
the common Model 0-1 organizational learning system,
Argyns and Schon first envisage an ideal organizational
learning system, and then suggest ways to work towards such
an ideal. The model they envisage (called Model O-II) is
not one they have ever encountered; rather, it is
description of an organization constructed on principles
more likely to permit the organization to "double-loop"
learn and to "deutero" learn.
An effective learning system would require that
individuals follow a theory-in-use that allows them to
jointly inquire into the conditions for error listed above
in Figure 11. Argyris and Schon present a model of such a
theory, the Model II theory-in-use shown in Figure 18 on
the following page.
In contrast to Model I's minimization of negative
Governing
variables
Action
strategies
Consequences
on
Consequences
on
Effectiveness
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feelings and avoidance of public testing of theories. Model
II's interpersonal behavior encourages public testing.
Whereas Model I begat private, self-sealing views. Model II
begets views stated clearly enough to be discomf irmable by
others. And whereas the defensiveness of Model I's
behavioral world limited learning to unthreatening
single-loop learning, under Model II members mutually
support one another in taking the risks required of
double-loop learning.
The organizational learning system which Argyris and
Schon think would be engendered by a Model II theory-in-use
is diagramed on the following page in Figure 19.
Xou and me as ends and means
There may be something revealing in the way Argyris
and Schon laid out their chart describing their ideal Model
II theory-in-use. There is a sense, in our culture of
reading from left to right, that the final goal of the
patterns described in the Figure 18 is the "increased
effectiveness" listed in the right hand column. This, once
again, is firmly in the common American pragmatic
tradition. And it is, of course, a central goal of most
organizational theorists.
Nonetheless, on reflection, I am left feeling
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uncomfortable about the view of people in this model. At
first, I applaud the picture of an open, non defensive
organization in which actors have "bilateral protection of
others." But on examination this seems for Argyris and
Schon do be a secondary instrumental value. The final
value is organizational effectiveness. This is a different
value than that contained in Kant's stricture that persons
be treated not as means but as ends themselves. Nor is it
the same as Jesus's plea for "agape," for care that does
not tally benefits and costs. Behind Argyris and Schon'
s
model one senses there is utilitarian view of men, one
treating persons as instruments of labor for the purposes
of organizations in the late twentieth century.
In the terms used by Argyris and Schon, there may be a
conflict between different "governing variables" contained
in their model. On the one hand, they seem to desire a
radical transformation of interpersonal behavior toward
greater trust and mutual support; on the other they seem to
serve the instrumental values of the status quo. Any
current model of collective learning must wrestle with
similar issues.
Hhe worth of such models
Some readers may feel that such an instrumental view
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of humans is shown in Argyris and Schon's use of charts and
boxes. And some may grow glassy-eyed in the face of
Argyris and Schon's complicated charts and models.
Sometimes it is difficult to understand those models and to
know whether they refer to anything real. The reality of
organizations is much more messy and human than the boxes
suggest. Argyris and Schon would agree.
But the purpose of models is not to claim complete and
final understanding of reality, but rather to aid in the
growth of at least partial understanding. Models give us
ways of looking at the world, of ordering chaos. Someone
starting out cold in the study of "organizational learning"
would be forced to spend time coming up with some
categories by which to capture at least part of reality.
Thanks to Argyris and Schon's models, there is no need to
start cold.
The area in which Argyris and Schon's models are most
useful is the area of interpersonal behavior of members of
an organization. This is their major contribution to an
understanding of collective learning. They have shown with
precision the manifold ways in which shared styles of
interpersonal behavior may effect learning by the
organization as a whole.
It must be admitted, however, that this careful
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examination of the internal organizational environment has
been at the expense of an examination of other environments
affecting an organization. Argyris and Schon have
described well the factors affecting an organization's
ability to learn about its internal workings. But they
have said relatively little about the impact on
organizations of changes coming from outside, such as
changes m practices of competitors or allies, changes in
the physical environment, or in the economy. And nothing
is said about the intrapsychic and spiritual aspects of
being, which, I will argue later, are important to a
complete understanding of ourselves and our operations
together in complete social systems. All the above
realities may affect how an organization learns, and they
are realities about which an organization must constantly
learn if it is to sustain itself in its changing
environmental realities. Of course, Argyris and Schon may
feel that by focusing on situations in which outcomes do
not match expectations, they are incorporating messages
about all relevant environmental realities. That may be
true, but nonetheless the fact remains that the conditions
of error that receive the bulk of Argyris and Schon'
s
attention are those conditions internal to the organization
itself. A complete model of collective learning would need
124
to say more about the impact of external
realities on collective learning.
environmental
Intervention
The Model O-II learning system, although a theoretical
construct, serves a practical purpose-it is a normative
model of the goal state members of an organization can
strive for when they embark on an effort to improve their
organizational learning. Members will also need a map of
their existing learning sytem, to clarify the systems
dynamics that currently limit learning. Finally, members
will need a model of how to make the transition from the
existing learning system to a better one.
Argyris and Schon think it unlikely that an
organization can provide these three elements without the
help of an outside "interventionist" skilled in
organizational learning. Such an interventionist can
provide a model of the goal, help map what exists, and
guide the transition. Without a skilled interventionist,
the members of an organization are likely to continue the
Model I interpersonal behaviors that obscure the
information needed to detect and correct errors in the
existing learning system.
Argyris may be right about the necessity of an outside
125
interventionist. But my reaction, is to despair that
enough such interventionists could ever be bred to bring
about a rapid transformation in human collective learning,
instead, I hold the hope that ideas like Argyris and
Schon's can travel faster than consultants, and that
learners can recognize ideas' worth and use them on their
own for self-transformation.
Argyris and Schon's descriptions of the transition
process tend to follow the discovery-invention-production-
generalization pattern shown earlier in Figure 10. But,
say Argyris and Schon, learning how to accomplish each of
these four steps will in turn involve a complete cycle of
its own as shown in Figure 20 on the following page. Thus
members will need to discover how to discover, invent ways
to discover, produce ways to discover, and generalize or
regularize those patterns of discovery. Only then will the
learning about discovery have become embedded in
individuals' images and organizational maps.
Such a diagram may be useful for analytical and
diagnostic purposes. Nonetheless, there is a danger of
taking diagrams too seriously. For instance, one wonders
if one could have an infinite regress of analytical loops.
Key to the process of intervention is the creation of
a "diagnostic map" by the members of the organization and
126
Source: Argyris and Schon, 1973, p.i4i
Figure 20
Learning to double-loop learn
the interventionist working together. This brings together
scattered and previously private impressions and data into
a single coherent picture of the organization's learning
system. It helps members see how the organization is
inhibited in its learning, as well as the degree to which
members were not even aware of such limitations.
Argyris and Schon recommend beginning this mapping
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with a "census of the problems" (p. i 78 ) , assessing the
degree to which the problems are accessible, defined, and
solvable. Then Argyris and Schon have clients complete
detailed, firsthand case studies. These may be written, in
which case Argyris and Schon ask clients to record both
what is actually said between members as well as what the
recorder thought privately. (This helps to clarify
differences between espoused theories of action and
theories- in-use, and between what is discussable and
taboo.) If written accounts are impractical, tape
recordings of problem-solving meetings can be used. In any
case, case studies should offer directly observable data,
not secondary categories as are given by some
questionnaires. This primary data, then, can be used to
reveal the nature of individual therories-in-use, the norms
and strategies forming the behavioral world. This in turn
permits identification of the "primary loops" that inhibit
organizational learning, as well as the "secondary loops"
impeding inter-group behavior.
Argyris and Schon also suggest questions that may be
asked to reveal the nature of organizational games which
affect learning. These games, by which individuals aim at
maximizing long-term income while minimizing responsibility
for error, encourage members to whitewash information, thus
128
inhibiting public appreciation of realities.
Once a map of the existing learning system is
completed it can be used to predict the organization's
behavior under a variety of circumstances. This allows the
map to be tested and revised. As predictions are
confirmed, client commitment to the map increases.
However, initially, clients are likely to resist the
diagnosis offered by the interventionist's map. But those
very reactions offer further confirmation of the presence
of a certain kind of theory-in-use.
In order for clients to become committed to
interpersonal theories of action closer to those of Model
II, they need some demonstration that it works, and how to
make it work. Here the behavior of the interventionist is
critical. By constantly adhering to Model II values in his
own interactions with clients, an interventionist offers a
living model to his clients. By embracing and working
through expression of negative feelings, by constantly
seeking clarification and confirmation of views, by
discussing the undiscussable, by encouraging risk and
discouraging competition and perfectionism, by exposing his
own maps and theories to testing—by all these means— the
interventionist demonstrates the beneficial possibilities
of a Model II theory-in-use.
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With mapping completed, and with Model II before them,
members of an organization will still need to invent,
produce, and generalize a more effective learning system
for their organization. This is hard work, but success in
the discovery phase will have encouraged members to begin.
They will now have a realistic sense of the difficulties of
transition, the costs of keeping Model I, and the benefits
of Model II.
Since the publication of Hxganizat i or al Learning
,
Argyris (1982) and Schon (1982) have continued their
investigations of learning in organizational settings,
using extensive transcriptions, and elaborating on methods
for unfreezing the Model I theory-in-use, and encouraging
the learning of Model II modes of behavior.
Thus we see that Argyris and Schon, calling on their
extensive experience as consultants, offer a clear and
detailed set of guidelines for those attempting to serve as
interventionists in organizations. I like their practical
intent. Any general model of collective learning, if it is
to make a difference in the world, will follow their
example and include clear guides and tools for those who
are collectively attempting to learn collectively about
collective learning.
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IIs.gs and Mmi ts as a Genpr^ i Modpi
Qi Co l lective be a ming
Argyris and Schon insist that organisational learning
is an ongoing process in which solution of one problem
gives rise to the next. It is in the spirit of "good
organizational dialectic," then, that I examine their model
of organizations as a contribution to the problem of
understanding societal learning at large. My concern
motivating this dissertation is to begin working toward a
general model of collective learning, toward one that holds
for all aid societal transformation in an endangered age.
To what extent, then, does the work of Argyris and Schon
contribute to that quest? To what extent does their model
of organizations hold for other kinds of social systems and
offer help for society as a whole?
Off ers terms and tools
As a contribution to dialogue about collective
learning, their work is invaluable. Although I have chosen
to describe at length aspects of their thought, I have
hardly done justice to the complexity of thought in their
cases and models. Their work gives the most detailed
account in the literature of the links between styles of
interpersonal behavior and organizational learning. Their
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articulation of the
conditions of error,
theories-in-use, has
where we are. Their
ways Model I theories-in-use produce
and the way error reinforces such
given us a "map" by which to know
construction of an ideal learning
system based on Model II principles helps us to talk about
where we might go. Their guidelines for interventionists
have addressed issues of how to get there. So extensive is
their work that it touches on most of the issues we are
likely to confront in working toward a general theory of
collective learning. By articulating a view of
organizational learning as a change in shared
theories-in-use accomplished via the agency of individual
members, they add substance to the discussion about the
relation of individuals and their groups in collective
learning. By defining organizational learning in terms of
error,' they clarify the kinds of philosophical choices
that must be made in constructing a theory of collective
learning. By distinguishing between "double-loop" and
single-loop" learning, they have revealed the intense and
central role of norms and goals, and the inevitability of
stress and conflict in trying to change them. By
describing such conflict they have highlighted the
importance of theories-in-use that support members in
addressing it. By revealing the inevitability of conflict
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in deutero-learning, by admitting the pain such
self-examination of habits and norms produces, they have
prepared us to endure the process. In short, theirs is a
major contribution; they have given us terms for discussion
and tools for action.
That does not mean, of course, that I accept their
model without reservation. I have already pointed to ways
I find their perspective limited. These include the focus
on internal environments to the exclusion of others; the
pragmatic assumptions which may limit the kinds of learning
considered by the theory, and the tendency to view persons
and means for organizational ends, in conflict with
espoused Model II norms.
the mode l apply to oth er social systems
My concern here, however, is not with that kind of
reservation; rather, it is to ask, "Could their model of
organizations serve as a model of collective learning by
social systems in general."
In order to answer "yes" to that question, we will
need to be convinced that the elements in their model are
elements found in all social systems. Are the elements
found in families and nation states, volunteer fire
departments and armies, schools and scientific societies,
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friendships and the human species?
One element can surely be found in all of those-the
presence of behavioral worlds, it is almost a necessity
that for there to be a social unit there must be a degree
of shared understanding by members about how to act. That
is, individuals must share similar theories-in-use that
pattern their exchanges. Members of a family must share
compatible theories about what to do when they are angry;
members of a nation must share rules about how to choose
its leaders.
By extension, then, it is probably fair to infer that
social systems have "theories of action," both "espoused"
and "in-use, " they share certain assumptions, strategies
and goals. While one family may value the expression of
feelings, good and bad, another family may suppress them.
While one nation may value freedom of speech, another may
accept state control of the press. There may be other
terms besides "theories-in-use" with which to describe what
members of a social system share, and I have already
indicated my sense that that term may be to narrow.
Nonetheless, I am willing to accept the notion that all
social systems share something like a theory-in-use.
All social systems may also be seen to have some form
of social structure, however informal. While structure
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does not command much of Argyris and Schon's attention in
Organizational Learning
, we have seen that in Beyond H,.
ittable State schon felt that some organizational structures
were more flexible than others, allowing more rapid
allocation of resources to changing tasks, and thus
facilitating organizational learning.
Just as all social systems may be seen to have norms,
so too may it be important for them to have models of ideal
future states, to organize collective transformation.
Argyris and Schon- s Model II serves this purpose for
organizations. Some variant of it may well serve for
families and nations.
These, then, are a few of the ways in which Argyris
and Schon's description of organizations may hold as a
description of other social systems. However, there may be
other elements of their model which do not so easily fit as
descriptions of other social systems.
One such element is the assumption by Argyris and
Schon that organizations have clear and limited sets of
goals. That may be so. But as the size and complexity of
its goals and the goals of its members. Could you give me
a neat list, for example, of the "goals of the United
States of America"? Millions of people have been tossing
that list around for some time. I am not saying such a
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very long list could not be made, nor that a short list
like the Bill of Rights would not help; I am only saying
that the task would be frustrating, full of confusions,
conflicts and abridgements. But the utility of Argyris and
Schon's model rests on a workable definition of a social
system's norms and goals. In a complex and pluralistic
social system, the utility of their model may be limited.
Argyris and Schon's approach may also be limited in a
second way as a tool which large social systems can use to
foster their learning. Their approach depends on bringing
together scattered impressions for consolidation of a
shared map of members' collective learning system. They
have used this approach with relatively small groups of
people in organizations. But we have yet to invent
adequate techniques by which to accomplish this for a
nation or a species. This is not to say Argyris and
Schon's approach is not a useful model; it is. But we have
far to go before we can accomplish in large systems what
they have in organizations.
In sum, many of the elements in Argyris and Schon's
model can be seen as adequate to describe social systems
other than organizations. But as the complexity of social
systems increases, the utility of a goal-based model may
decrease.
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IS-
.
their model inc l usive enough to work ? i n their
introduction to £x_ganizat i ona
l
earning
, Argyris and Schon
point out that "unless people acting as agents for
organizations and are able to learn how to detect
and correct double-loop errors, the survival of society may
be in doubt (p. 5) . But, with the exception of a few such
sentences, society as a level of analysis or action is
ignored in .Organ izational T.P* r ninr,
This maintenance of a relatively restricted focus is
of course sensible. It allows Argyris and Schon to keep
their already ambitious project within manageable bounds.
Nevertheless, there is a difficulty in such sensible
constraints it may exclude from analysis important parts
of the reality which Argyris and Schon wish to explain.
The difficulty is that, by Argyris and Schon' s own
admission, the source of the inhibitions to organizational
learning is in society at large. As they say, the
inhibition to organizational learning is "reinforced (and,
as we shall see, caused) by the theories of action with
which most people are acculturated in modern industrial
societies" (p. 4) . "People in our society are programmed
with Model I theories-in-use that predispose them toward
single-loop learning rather than double-loop learning"
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(p. 122)
.
I agree. Elements of Model I are everywhere— in
spelling bees and S.A.T.'s, in Reagonomics and the arms
race.
Look again at the governing variables and strategies
of Model I as shown in Figure 13 and consider the extent to
which they are taught from pre-school to "post-docs."
Maximizing winning, minimizing losing" is the name of the
school game in class, in sports, in social life. Be
rational; minimize expression of negative feelings; define
behavioral objectives; control tasks unilaterally. These
are all likely to be habits of someone who has had ten or
twenty years of schooling in our culture.
But how do Argyris and Schon propose to change such
deeply ingrained habits? By a few sessions with an
interventionist. Where? In some of the most competitive,
high pressure organizations around. It is not surprising
that Argyris and Schon report very few cases of lasting
double-loop learning and in those, very limited success.
Not that I don't respect the attempt— I do. It's the
best yet. I am just afraid that intervention as Argyris
and Schon describe it will simply be incapable of bringing
about the scope of societal learning demanded by our times.
It is unlikely to be sufficiently successful either at the
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level of organizations or at the level of society.
The interventions they suggest are likely to be
limited in their success with organizations because they do
not counter the inertial force of societal pressures acting
on members of the target organization. Even if a company,
for instance, were to magically change its espoused theory
of action, employees would still encounter Model I forces
everywhere else they went, making it difficult for them to
maintain commitment at work and integrity elsewhere in
their lives. But a magical organizational change is
unlikely in the first place— it will require the cumulative
commitment of the organization's members. But here, we are
left with the difficulties individual members face in
trying to change the Model I theories of other members of
their organization.
I am reminded of a friend with whom I worked at a
software consulting firm, a firm that was both high
pressure and "hip." One weekend in 1970, my friend
attended an "Esalen East" workshop. On Monday he came in
esctatic, and urged one and all to bare their deepest
feelings. People did not. And when during a recession, my
high-priced friend was let go, I wondered if at least part
of the reason was not that he made people feel at least
slightly uncomfortable with his questions. It may be
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revealing to note that since then his efforts have been
directed at developing men's support groups outside of
organizational settings.
Thus individuals learn that it is dangerous to try to
change the behavioral norms of others within existing
organizations. I find it unlikely, therefore, to expect
much change in the Model I behavior to come from solitary
members, nor to come from the society at large which
surrounds an organization. The habits of the organization,
when reinforced by those of society, will be difficult to
change.
We have seen that the interventionists of Argyris and
Schon have had only limited success with individual
organizations. Therefore it may be unrealistic to expect
such interventionists to have a cumulative effect on
society at large. Not that Argyris and Schon even discuss
such cumulative effects— they offer no comprehensive
strategy at all for change at the societal level.
Of course, there may not exist any single switch that
can convert all of society at once. We must start
somewhere, and Argyris and Schon are doing so, in a domain
in which they are knowledgeable. But I am skeptical in
part because the very organizations likely to hire
high-priced consultants like Argyris and Schon are also
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likely to be "successful" ones, saturated with the
win-lose, competitive ethos which inhibits the risky
business of moving away from Model I. Many are also likely
to be ones in which members are employees; thus the already
threatening business of questioning existing norms will be
doubly threatening, because careers and income may be in
jeopardy. Finally, many of those organizations, at least
in the United States, will be ones in which the
relationships are instrumental, with members treating one
another as means rather than ends. Such relationships may
be less capable of working through the threats of systemic
diagnosis and change than relationships founded on genuine
care.
What strategy, then, would I suggest instead? This is
not the place for me to discuss in detail how to overcome
the kinds of limitations mentioned above. That will have
to wait for subsequent discussion of strategies encouraging
collective learning. For now though, clues from the work
of Argyris and Schon might suggest how to begin.
First, it might make sense to focus on groups that are
already more sympathetic to Model II theor ies-in-use and
already suspicious to those of Model I. These would need
to be social systems characterized by open and honest
dialogue, and by mutual support and care. Such social
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systems are probably less likely to be found in the
competitive worlds of business, government and academia in
which Argyris and Schon have done most of their work.
Rather, there may be more chance of their appearance in
religious communities or new age groups, knowledge
intensive industries, alternative schools, home schools,
peace groups, and the like. My hunch is that such social
systems are more likely to incubate effective collective
learning about collective learning.
A second clue for the design of successful strategy
comes from Schon' s observation in Bevond the Stahls
that public learning tends to be systemic. Changes do not
occur isolation. A change in one element of a culture is
sure to involve changes in others. In order for one thing
to change, others must change. And when one thing does
change, so will others. Thus it makes sense to strive for
a strategy of collective learning which focuses not on an
individual organization, but rather on a social community
as a whole. Margaret Mead's study of the Manus suggests
that in some ways it may be easier to transform an entire
socio-cul tural system than it is to change some small part
of it (1956) . A history of America, from the time of the
pilgrims through the experiments of the utopian communities
of the last century on through the establishment of the
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alternative communities of the last two decades, attests to
the awareness that experiments in thorough going social
change may be best incubated in autonomous communities
committed to a shared vision. Thus we may be more likely
to find successful experiments in collective learning about
collective learning in communities committed to that
effort, in such communities members might then receive
support and reinforcement for their efforts to change.
They would get such support everywhere
— at home, school,
worship, play.
But such systemic efforts by sympathetic communities
must not be short-term. They must be sustained if they are
to reach the level of regularized change in a community's
collective culture. No weekend workshop this. Lifetimes.
With such sustained and systemic efforts by
sympathetic groups, there may be some hope of creating
lasting living models of what collective learning can be.
But if we limit ourselves to the strategies of Argyris and
Schon, I see little hope of success. Organizations and
their members will not be able to change because they will
be overwhelmed by the force of the prevailing Model I
culture. And if organizations themselves do not change,
then there is little hope that the society as a whole will.
So in the end, Argyris and Schon' s theory is not
143
"pragmatic" because it fails to understand the whole. But
it is surely too much to expect one or two individuals to
comprehend the whole. Instead we are forced to look for
strategies that promote widespread participation from a
diversity of perspectives in a sustained dialogue about
collective learning. Only with such participation can we
hope for a theory grounded in the great range of concrete
realities of our diverse experience. And only with such
participation can we hope for a social whole harnessing the
insight and energy of its members, who are its learners and
its workers. Only then is there a chance of arriving at a
theory that is adequate, a theory of the whole, a theory
that works.
The participants in such a collective endeavor are
sure to find themselves time and again using the concepts,
terms and tools developed by Chris Argyris and Donald
Schon.
CHAPTER V
JURGEN HABERMAS: SOCIETAL LEARNING AS
HOMOLOGOUS TO COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT
If I complain that Argyris and Schon have too narrowly
limited their consideration to learning by organizations,
I can hardly have the same complaint about Jurgen Habermas,
who conceives of the entire "hisotry of the species" as
arising from episodes of societal learning.
Jurgen Habermas is not easy to understand. Immersed
in a conceptual heritage including that of Kant, Hegel,
Marx, Adorno, and Piaget, and developing his own concepts and
distinctions over the last three decades, his writing in a
given article is only comprehensible in relation to the rest.
He writes at a high level of abstraction which, one senses,
can only be fully known in his own German noun-building. My
attempt to abstract a paraphrase here does not do justice to
the original. I offer it in the spirit in which American
tourists bring back sketches of the Alps.
Habermas's Model of Societal Learning
and the Historical Process
Let me, then, offer a postcard synopsis of some key
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features of Habermas's model as I infer it from his various
writings. While these differ in phrasing and detail, their
overall thrust is consistent with the provisional flow-
chart I have abstracted in figure 21.
Existing Social Order
Technological
learning
Normative Learning
can
accumulate as
a store of
cognitive
potential for
later implemen-
tation
stimulate forces
of production to
new levels which
old relations of
production can-
not accommodate
Socialization of
individuals to norms
1
Individual develop-
ment of moral
reasoning
1
New forms of social
integration
expressed in world
views, embodying a
higher stage of
moral reasoning
Trial institutionalization
of new forms of social
integration
'
Unleashing of technical
knowledge for productive
forces
|
Stabilization of new social
order based on higher stage
of moral consciousness
Figure 21. Social evolution per Habermas
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Te chnical knowledge and normative knowledge
To understand the model requires understanding a
distinction Habermas draws between two dimensions in which
the species learns: 1) ‘'technically useful knowledge deci-
sive for the development of productive forces" and
2) "moral-practical consciousness decisive for structures
of interaction" (1979, p. 148).
These two dimensions correspond to the two aspects of
what Marx called the "mode of production" (1979, p. 138).
On the one hand a given mode of production is characterized
by a certain stage of development of the "forces of produc-
tion," that is, the labor power, the technical knowledge,
and the organizing knowledge which coordinate labor. On the
other hand, a mode of production is characterized by a stage
of development of "relations of production," that is, social
institutions determining how labor is combined with the
means of production, who controls production, how wealth is
distributed and how interests are satisfied.
Habermas sees the former dimension— the forces of
production—as regulated by "rules of instrumental action,"
which direct the transformation of material, and by
"rules of strategic action" which coordinate cooperation
in production (1979, pp. 131-132, p. 145).
The second dimension--the relations of production
—
is affected by "rules of communicative action" which
structure the distribution of products, control, and
14 ?
interests. The rules of communicative action are linguis-
tic, intersub jective
, supraindividual understandings by
which interactions are mediated (1979, p. 118 ). They
prescribe the reciprocal expectations of members of society
about interactions and consequences, about roles, norms,
and principles justifying these norms (1979, p. 82). At
the core of these rules are law and morality, which provide
consensual regulation of conflict without force (1979,
P. 99).
Historical materialism and societal learning
The distinction between the two dimensions--the
technical and the normative--is important because it is
the basis on which Habermas "reconstructs" historical
materialism. Marxists have traditionally focused on the
economic base as the sole source of development in history,
viewing law, politics, and social consciousness as mere
"superstructure." One of Marx's statements most often
cited in support of this view is the following:
The mode of production of material life conditions
the general process of social, political, and
intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of
men that determines their existence, but their
social existence that determines their consciousness.
(1970, pp. 20-21)
Habermas argues that the context indicates that
Marx did not intend the distinction to be applied in all
circumstances but "only for the critical phase in which
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a society passes into a new developmental level" (1979,
p. 143). In such a crisis, Marx sees the following
occurring:
:
. . the material productive forces of society comeinto conflict with the existing relations of produc-
tion. From forms of development of the productive
forces, these relations form into their fetters.
Then begins an era of social revolution. The changesin the economic foundation lead sooner or later to
the transformation of the whole immense superstructure.
(1970, p. 21)
By this account one could view the process as
endogenous learning in which individuals develop new
cognitive-technical capabilities which are put to use,
developing the forces of production to a stage at which
the relations of production are no longer adequate. In
this sense, the societal learning in the technical domain
could be seen as a "trigger" to the development of new
levels of societal integration.
Is technical learning the "trigger"?
Habermas claims that the historical record offers
important cases—among them the rise of European capitalism
--in which the development of productive forces followed,
rather than "triggered," development of advances in social
integration. Habermas tries to clarify the situation with
a distinction between the development of a store of poten-
tially usable technical knowledge and its actual use. Thus
Habermas says, "This potential knowledge, however
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can be implemented to develop the forces of production only
when the evolutionary step to a new institutional framework
and a new form of social integration has been taken" (1979,
P- 1 47).
Unfortunately, on the prior page, Habermas himself
cited cases (in Polynesia and South Africa) "in which system
problems arose as a result of an increase in productive
forces, overloading the adaptive capacity of societies
organized on kinship lines and shattering the primitive
communal order."
Thus, Habermas leaves the reader confused about
whether technical learning is or is not a trigger to social
evolution, and i'f so, when. The confusion is compounded by
the fact that Habermas sometimes talks of systems problems
arising from the development of productive forces, and
sometimes, as the result of ecological factors such as popu-
lation growth (for example, p. 162). (For that reason
the sources of system problems have been drawn with dotted
lines in figure 21.)
Normative learning follows its own
developmental logic
Whatever Habermas's views on the role of technical
learning as a trigger of social evolution, his main
objection to the Marxist historical explanation is that it
fails to recognize the pivotal role of normative learning
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as the "pacemaker" of social evolution. For, though Marx's
description may account for the development of disequilibri-
um between forces of production and relations of production,
it fails to account for the restoration of equilibrium, at
a new level of social integration. For that to happen, the
relations of production must be altered, and that demands
a non-technical kind of knowledge, a moral mode of thinking
that gives rise to new structures of interaction preferable
to the old. Thus, in Habermas's view, the replacement of
the overburdened kinship system by the state required the
achievement of a level of moral understanding less tied to
the power of persons and more dedicated to general
principles. But without such developments in the collective
moral-practical understanding, the social system would be
unable to overcome its tensions caused by disequilibria
between the forces of production and the relations of
production. The social system would be stuck. But with
an advance in the system's structures of interactions, the
social system is suddenly able to unleash stored-up
technical knowledge, improving the forces of production.
"Thus for social evolution, learning processes in the domain
of moral-practical consciousness function as pacemakers
(1979, p. 160).
If that sounds like heresy to historical materialists,
they may be even more discomfitted to hear Habermas say
that moral understandings and their rules of communicative
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communicative action "do develop in reaction to changes in
the domain of instrumental and strategic action; but in
so doing they follow their own logi c" (italics his).
These developmental logics betoken the independence--and
to this extent the internal history--of the spirit" (1979,
p. 123). Is this an echo of Hegel's "spirit coming to
know itself"? Not quite, for Habermas's analysis is
"materialist" by making reference to system crises in the
mode of production, and "historical" by seeking causes of
evolutionary changes in the whole range of contingent
circumstances. Habermas does claim that normative struc-
tures display their own developmental logic from stage to
stage. However:
This logic says nothing about the mechanisms of
development; it says something only about the range
of variations within which cultural values, moral
representations, norms and the like—at a given level
of social organization-can be changed and can find
different historical expression. In its developmental
dynamics, the change of normative structures remains
dependent on evolutionary challenges posed by
unresolved, economically conditioned system problems
and on learning processes that are a response to them.
In other words, culture remains a superstructural
phenomenon, even if it does seem to play a more
prominent role in the transition to new developmental
levels than many Marxists have heretofore supposed.
This prominence explains the contribution that
communication theory can, in my view, make to a renewed
historical materialism. (1979. P* 98)
Individual and societal learning are
interdependent"
^
Before we examine the logic of development, the
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internal history' of normative learning, we should review
Habermas s statements about how it is that societies can
"learn" and in what sense they do so:
Individually acquired learning abilities and infor-
mation must be latently available in world views
before they can be used in a socially significant
way
,
that is, before they can be transposed into
societal learning processes
.
Since the cognitive development of the individual
takes place under social boundary conditions, there
is a circular process between societal and individual
learning.
. . . The rationality structures embodied
in the family have first to be absorbed by the child
in the development of his interactive competence.
. . . But the state of societies could itself only
be changed by constructive learning on the part of
socialized individuals. It is only in a derivative
sense that societies 'learn.' (1979, p. 121)
Or, in another phrasing:
It is the personality system that is the bearer of
the ontogenetic learning process; and, in a certain
way, only social subjects can learn. But social
systems, by drawing on the learning capacities of
social subjects, can form new structures in order to
solve steering problems that threaten their continued
existence. To this extent the evolutionary learning
process of societies is dependent on the competencies
of the individuals that belong to them. The latter
in turn acquire their competencies not as isolated
monads but by growing into the symbolic structures
of their life-worlds. ( 1979 » P* 15*0
Societal homologues to individual
moral development
Since Habermas sees social evolution as requiring
learning by both society and individuals, his research
strategy is to examine some existing theoretical models of
individual cognitive development for clues towards a model
of learning at the societal level. His suggestion is that
153
there are homologues between the structures of consciousness
developing during the history of the species.
Thus, drawing on the work of Piaget, Freud, and
Jane Loevinger
,
among others, Habermas presents evidence
for the existence of stages in the development of the ego
—for example, l) symbiotic, 2) egocentric, 3) socio-
centric-ob jectivistic, 4) universalistic. He then goes on
to suggest that similar stages may be discerned in the
evolution of worldviews seen in societies' myths, religions,
philosophies, and cosmologies. Similarly, Habermas draws
on the work of George Herbert Mead and others to suggest
that homologues exist between the structures of ego identity
and group identity. But it is in the domain of moral
consciousness that Habermas has furthest pursued the
suggestion that homologues exist, and it is those we will
consider here.
The focus on moral consciousness is appropriate given
its importance for the reconstruction of historical mate-
rialism. Returning to figure 21, we will remember that
societal learning occurs both in the cognitive-technical
areas bearing on the mode of production, and in the moral-
practical, bearing on the maintenance of inter-subjective
understanding on which social interaction and integration
depend. The dynamics of production are well worked out
by historical materialists, and Habermas has not pursued
cognitive homologues in that domain. But reconstruction
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is needed in the interactive domain, and it is here that
Habermas has focused his work. And while the evolution
of worldviews and the structure of collective identity
contribute to this, it is ’’law and morality [which] mark
the core domain of interaction," for they provide the
consensual, non-violent regulation of action conflicts
which allows other forms of communicative action to
continue
.
And, of course, Habermas had available to him an
already worked out model of moral development at the
individual level—namely that of Lawrence Kohlberg. A
summary of Kohlberg’ s stages of moral reasoning, as reported
by Turiel in 1974 is given in figure 22.
Habermas describes the three major divisions of
Kohlberg' s model as follows
:
At the £re conventional stage , at which actions, motives,
and acting subjects are still preceived on a single
plane of reality, only the consequences are evaluated
in cases of conflict. At the conventional stage ,
motives can be assessed independently of concrete
action consequences; conformity with a certain social
role or with an existing system of norms is the standard.
At the postconventional stage
, these systems of norms
lose their quasi-natural validity; they require justif-
ication from universalistic points of view. (1979,
p. 156)
Habermas then uses Kohlberg' s classifications to distinguish
a number of levels of social integration according to the
stage of moral reasoning evident in the following three
societal structures: 1) those structures of general, normal,
non-conflictual
,
everyday action, as in family relations;
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'• Sl.ifti'i of A I oifit ComiioiiMiets
(according 10 Lawrence Kohlhtr/')
Obedience and
punishment
orientation
Instrumental
hedonism
Lententrie defereme to superior power
or prestige, or a trouble avoiding set.
Objective responsibility.
Right action is that instruinentally sat-
isfying the seif s needs and occasional-
ly those of others. Naisc egalitarian-
ism and orientation to exchange and
rec iproc ity.
i
I’rttonvciilioiul
lev cl
Good-hoy Orientation to approval and to pleasing
orientation and helping others. Conformity to ste-
reotypical images of majority or na-
tural role behavior, and judgment by
intentions. II
Conventional
Law and-order Orientation toward authority, fixed level
orientation rules, and the maintenance of the social
order. Right behavior consists of doing
one's duty, showing respec t for author-
ity. and maintaining the given social
order for its own sake.
( ontrac lual- Right action is defined in terms of in-
legalistic dividual rights and of standards which
orientation have been initially examined and agreed
upon by the whole society. Concern
with establishing and maintaining hi-
'
dividual rights, equality. and liberty.
Distinctions are made between values
having universal, prescriptive appli-
cability and values sjKcifie to a given
society. III
l *n i versa 1- Right is defined by the decision of con- I’ostconven tinnal
ethical- science in accord with self -chosen level
print iplc ethical principles appealing to logical
orientation comprehensiveness, universality, and
consistency. These principles are ab-
stract; they are not cone rete moral rules.
These are universal princijdes of. jus-
tice, of the reciprocity and equality of
human right>, and of respect for the
dignity of human beings as individual
persons.
Smote: I liioi Turicl. "Conflict anil Transition in Adolescent Moral Develop-
ment." Chilli nutUijimenl
-T) ( 1074 ) 14-29.
Sources Habermas, 1979, p.77
Figure 22. Kohlberg's stages of moral reasoning.
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2) the structures of conflict resolution, morality and
law given hortative expression in worldviews, myths, etc.;
3) the structures of institutionalized law and binding
morality. For a given society the stage of moral reasoning
seen in each of the three structures may be at variance.
Habermas’s tentative sketch of these configurations is
given in figure 23.
Societal Structures
Level of Social Integration Normal Action Worldview Law
Neolithic societies C
Early civilizations C
Developed civilizations C
Modern age Post
Pre + C Pre
C C
Post C
Post Post
Key; "Pre" = preconventional
; "C" = conventional
;
"Post" = postconventional
.
Figure 23* Habermas's stages of moral development
in societal structures.
Habermas admits that his scheme is tentative, and
gives little evidence for corroboration. But the following
example which he offers may give a sense of the pattern
by which societies institutionalize moral structures
homologous to those observed in individual moral development.
By his account, in neolithic societies the normal (i.e.
relatively non-conflictual) actions were regulated by con-
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ventional kindship norms, and motives were assessed inde-
pendently of consequences. But the neolithic legal system
was preconventional
, relying on feuding law that assessed
only consequences. But the neolithic legal system was
preconventional, relying on feuding law that assessed only
consequences, compensated damages, and restored the status
quo ante. Conflicts were sometimes settled by temporary
couts of arbitration whose "law" was merely that to which
parties could agree. The consciousness embedded in world-
views, on the other hand, had elements of the conventional
stage of moral consciousness. Thus, many myths tell stories
of conflict resolved by "conventional" criteria.
As suggested in figure 23 above, that consciousness
became institutionalized in law with the development of
early civilizations. While neolithic societies sometimes
institutionalized special roles for special needs (for
example, temporary chiefs for wartime), such roles were
not permanently linked to the system of justice. But as
conflict over land overloaded neolithic capacities to
handle conflict, the role of a ruler who adjudicated
conflict became permanent. But his legitimacy came from
deciding on cases according to a structure of moral
consciousness widely expressed in worldviews. No longer
were conflicts resolved merely by what parties could agree
to according to their concrete distribution of power, but
according to social norms grounded in tradition. These
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norms embodied principles characteristic of a conventional
stage of morality, including the evaluation of actions
according to intentions as well as consequences, the
ascription of liability to individuals, and the adminis-
tration of punishment rather than retaliation.
A seventh stage of individual moral development
Beyond the stages sketched in figures 22 and 23 ,
Habermas also gives hints about the possible character of
normative structures of the next emerging society. But to
understand that, we must first understand a seventh stage
of individual moral development which Habermas adds to
Kohlberg's original six, and which serves as the base for
the next societal homologue. Stage 7 is summarized at
the bottom of Habermas's scheme in figure 24.
Kohlberg's highest stage, Stage 6
,
(in the 1974
formulation) has at its center the individual conscience
operating under self-chosen abstract universal principles.
An example of such a principle is Kant's categorical
imperative; "Act only according to that maxim by which
you can at the same time will that it should become a
universal law." In Kohlberg's sixth stage, the conscience
seems to be operating under something akin to Kant's "pure
practical reason" which makes its ethical choices indepen-
dent of a person's inclinations, needs, or interests.
However, it is precisely such interests which are
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Role Competence Stages of Moral Consciousness
Ace
level
Level of
Communication
Reciprocity re-
quirement
Stages of
morai con-
sciousness
Idea of the
good life
Domain of
validirv
Philosophical
reconstruc-
tion
Age
level
1 Action* and Generalised
Incomplete
reciprocity
I
Maximization
of
pleasure
—
avoidance
of pain
through
obedience Natural and 1 la
consequence*
of action
pleasure/
pain
Complete
reciprocity
2
Maximization
of
pleasure
avoidance
of pain
through
exchange of
equivalents
social en-
vironment
Naive
hedonism
Roles Culturally
interpreted
needs
3
Concrete
morality of
primary
Group of
primary
reference
II bystems of
norms
(Cone rete
duties)
Incomplete
rcc iprocity
groups persons
4
Cone rete
morality of
secondary
groups
Members
of the
political
community
Concrete
thought in
terms of
a specific
order
lib
Universalized
pleasure/
pain
3
Civil liberties,
public
welfare
All legal
associates
Rational
natural law
(utility)
IK Principles L'mversalized
duties
Complete
reciprocity
6
Moral
freedom
All humans
as private
persons
Formalistic
ethics III
Morai and
political
freedom
All as
members of
a hetive
world
society
L mvcrsal
ethics of
speech
Universalized
need inter-
pretations
Source: Habermas, 1979, p. 89
Figure 24. A seventh stage of moral development per
Habermas
.
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the concern of ethical choice. Thus Habermas's approach,
rather than washing moral reasoning of the taint of needs,
maintains them as an integral part of deliberation. The
difficulty in the Kantian approach is that the search for
the universal is made dependent on the individual, who is
expected, on his own, to suppress all his individual
inclinations as factors in his reasoning.
Habermas's approach, on the other hand, admits the
presence of individual interests, but seeks to overcome
them through a communal dialogue. The goal of such
dialogue would be to reach a consensus about which interests
are generalizable and which are not. This requires
reflexive discourse in which individuals continually submit
their principles of justification to testing by others.
Thus individual conscience and interpretation of need
become objects of discourse. But participants of such
discourse should as far as possible make their judgments in
a way that is free from the distortions of internal or
external constraints. And they should seek an agreement
with whose validity any and all such participants would
agree. Of course, such participation does not exist, but
it serves as the ideal for a "universal ethics of speech."
Thus Habermas’s seventh stage differs from Kohlberg's
sixth in that "the principle of justification of norms is
no longer the monologically individually applied principle
of generalizability but the communally followed procedure
1 6
1
of redeeming normative validity discursively."
The next stage of s ocial integration
What then would be a future societal homologue to this
seventh stage of moral development? Habermas offers only
hints. It would replace the moral freedom of the autono-
mous individual of stage 6 with freedom that is political
as well as moral. A world society of unconstrained indiv-
iduals would have participation as a central principle.
And the pursuit of happiness' might one day mean something
<^ii'Terent--for example, not accumulating material objects
of which one disposes privately, but bringing about social
relations in which mutuality predominates and satisfaction
does not mean the triumph of one over the repressed needs
of the other" (quoted by McCarthy 1979, p. xxiv)
.
However, Habermas reminds us that every stage of
societal learning, while institutionalizing a solution to
one problem, dialectically gives rise to consciousness of
another. Thus, Habermas speculates that while a post-
modern society may solve current problems (such as distrib-
ution of scarce material goods)
,
it may engender a new
problem centered on the supply of motivation and meaning.
Criteria of progress
According to Habermas, the dialectic of history is
not haphazard, and reveals a principle of progress. Any
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theory of social evolution implies direction and criteria
for progress. But Habermas rejects older criteria such as
"survival," and "complexity" as arbitrary and inadequate.
Instead, he rests his sense of progress on the intrinsic
nature of the communicative action that is at the center
of his philosophical system. For communicative action, if
it is to lead to consensus, must be founded on certain
presuppositions: "the presupposition, for instance, that
true propositions are preferable to false ones, and that
right (i.e. justifiable) norms are preferable to wrong
ones" (1979, P* 177)* These presuppositions are not a
matter of choice, they are unavoidable. They are prerequis-
ite to meaningful discourse. Therefore, Habermas concludes:
I do not regard the choice of the historical-materialist
criterion of progress as arbitrary. The development
of productive forces in conjunction with the maturity
of the forms of social integration, means progress of
learning ability in both dimensions: progress in
ob jectivating knowledge and in moral practical insight.
(1979, p. 177)
Evaluation of Habermas's Model for Collective
Learning about Collective Learning
Our concern in this chapter is to gain an understanding
of some existing models of collective learning which offer
major contributions toward the "001 task" of collective
learning about collective learning. Of those major models,
that of Habermas is the one with the broadest and deepest
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theoretical penetration. The paraphrase of his philosophy
I have given does not do justice to the scholarship and
originality he applies to a range of fundamental philo-
sophical issues. His theory of the history of the species
builds on intimate knowledge of historical materialism; his
theory of societal learning proceeds from novel, carefully
worked out philosophies of knowledge and communicative
ethics. His consideration of issues of development draws
on a great range of scholarship from diverse disciplines.
As such, his model goes far towards a paradigm which bridges
a variety of perspectives. Of the available models, his
is philosophically the most complete and coherent.
Habermas's breadth does not detract from his immediate
value for our historical moment. In an age when technical
learning has given us devastating nuclear arsenals but when
normative learning has yet to offer institutionalized modes
of resolving international conflict, other people need to
follow Habermas in elucidating the process by which such
institutionalization may occur.
Here, an understanding of the link between individual
learning and societal learning may prove critical. Society
will not be able to institutionalize systems for resolving
international conflict without substantial learning by
individuals. But individual learning by itself will not
be sufficient; it must be alloyed into something different
in kind--societal learning that addresses our common problems.
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For reasons like this, I consider the central value
of Habermas's work to be his attempt to construct a model
that links the "history of the species" to individual
cognitive development. Neither is adequately explained,
it seems to me, without an account of the other. A theory
of societal learning must include a theory of individual
learning, and vice versa, since each is dependent on the
other.
Habermas '
s
. Model Depends on the Validity
of the Individual Homologues
Habermas's model is not without problems. Principle
among them is his reliance on homologues for the elaboration
of his theory. r irst, a homology depends on the validity
fHe description in the root homologue. If the descrip-
tions of individual learning are inadequate, they cannot be
the basis for an adequate account of societal learning.
But the models of individual development which Habermas
uses are themselves open to some question.
Many questions cluster around the issue of whether
or not the models are in any way culture-bound. For
instance, one of Kohlberg's proteges, Carol Gilligan ( 1981 )
•
has suggested that her mentor's model of moral development
has a masculine bias, and that it does not accurately
describe the development of moral reasoning in women. For
example, she sees the Platonic path to universal principle
as less important to many women than the development of
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their ability to care creatively for parties in a conflict.
Thus, a model of the development of society's normative
structures would be substantially different if based on
the homologue of Gilligan's model than if based on Kohl-
ber ' s.
Another example of variation in source models
is the suggestion by Seymour Pappert that computers may
immerse children in a "culture" so different from any
prior human culture that the Piagetian model of cognitive
development may have to be revised. Specifically, he sees
the importance of "procedural" thinking— the creation,
nesting and repeating, revising, and blending of procedures
—as so central to computers that, when kids begin working
with them, their cognitive development may take paths
unanticipated in Piaget's model. A revision in that model
would, once again, require a shift in the societal
homologue
.
Of course, considerable study has been devoted to
the cultural universality of the Piagetian and Kohlbergian
models, and Habermas would quickly admit that scientific
models are necessarily captive of their historical settings.
But to the extent that there exists dispute about models
of individual learning, a model of societal learning
constructed by homology is also open to dispute.
Similarly, a theory of societal learning based on
homologies is limited by the choice of homologues. Thus
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Habermas has chosen, rightly I think, tto focus on models
of moral development. But he has ignored work by Fowler
(19 75 ) and others which offer models of spiritual
development. As this is different, and as the models dif-
fer, so too would models of societal learning constructed
on such models.
Is the use of homology valid?
A second, more fundamental issue is not so much
whether the root homologues are well chosen and valid, but
whether the very use of homology is a valid basis for the
construction of social theory. This is an issue to which
Habermas himself is sensitive. He warns against over-
hasty parallels between societal and individual development,
and enumerates a list of provisos about the use of such
homologues. These include consideration of the many ways
in which societies differ from individuals, altering the
nature of the homologous structure of consciousness.
Nonetheless, he feels genuine homologues can be found,
and makes the search for them central to his research
strategy. As a strategy, it is a useful stimulus to
thought. The history of science is full of examples of the
beneficial uses of analogy and metaphor. But the lasting
value of the metaphor is not just in the initiation of
thought, but in the degree to which the inner structure of
the metaphor gives a coherent and compelling account of
167
the phenomena. And here the jury on Habermas's homologies
is still out.
For my part, I find the descriptions of the homologies
given so far as sketchy and unconvincing. Habermas works
from a European theoretical tradition quite different from
that of American empiricism, and develops his thought from
logical imperatives rather than empirical ones. But I
would like a more thorough examination of the degree to
which his theoretical structure is confined in the histor-
ical and anthropological record. When biologists construct
theory by referring to homologies between a human arm and
a bird's wing, they are using clear and carefully observed
comparisons. Homologies between individual and societal
learning need to be similarly grounded in careful observa-
tion.
The biologists' use of homology is also more restric-
ted than Habermas's in another way: theirs does not leap
from the level of individual to group phenomena. When
biologists compare the bone structures of a human and a
bird, they are comparing individual creatures, presumably
genetically linked to common individual ancestors. But
when Habermas compares the structures of consciousness in
individual humans and societies, he is comparing two
different levels of organization whose "genetic" links
are obscure.
My reservation about such cross-level comparisons is
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that, while societal structures may arise from individual
structures of consciousness, that does not mean that they
replicate individual structures in a mirror-like
fashion. Though a molecule is made of atoms, its structure
is not a mere repetition of atomic structure "writ large";
new organizing principles come into play. Nor is Henry
Moore’s sculpture "The Family" reducible to its molecules.
And modern culture is hardly reducible to the individual
psychology of Henry Moore and others. In a similar way,
although societal learning is obviously constituted of
individual learning, thinking of it as only a mirror-like
homologue may miss something. New organizing principles
may be required to understand the leap from individual
learning to societal learning. While I cannot yet state
what those organizing principles may be, I am cautious
about treating societal learning as a merely magnified image
of individual learning.
Habermas is cautious about a similar cross-level
comparison— that made between biological and cultural evolu-
tion. Among his reservations is the fact that while the
mechanisms of genetic imitation are now well analyzed, the
same cannot be said of the mechanisms involved in cultural
tradition and learning. As he says;
As long as these mechanisms are not adequately analyzed,
however, we cannot judge whether the comparison between
imitation and tradition is merely metaphorical or
whether the underlying social learning mechanism is
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m some way functionally equivalent to the process of
mutation. One difference should arouse our suspicion;
whereas the mutation process produces chance variations
the ontogenesis of structures of consciousness is ahighly selective and directional process. ( 1979
.
p. 172)
In what sense is societal learning homologous
to individual learning?
Habermas does not seem to take his homologies between
individual and societal learning as merely heuristic tools,
but as something reflecting actual processes. But his
exposition of the nature of the processes and homologues
is not always clear.
Perhaps some confusion might be reduced if we disting-
uish here between two ways of viewing society as "learning. 1
One way is to think of society as a learning entity, just
as an individual is a learning entity. The second way is
to think of society as part of an integrated process in
which society is both a result of individuals' learning
and a cause of it. To think of societal learning in the
former sense would mean that a homologue between individual
and societal learning envisioned the societal entity as
mirroring the same stages, structures and dynamics of
learning as individual entities display in their learning.
But Habermas usually does not seem to be thinking
in these terms, at least on careful examination. Rather,
he seems to be thinking of societal learning in the second
sense. He talks of individually achieved structures of
consciousness. In this sense, a homologue is not so much
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a case of entities having similar structures, but ones
embodying similar principles of consciousness. Thus,
when Habermas classifies early state civilizations’ legal
order as "conventional," he does not seem to be describing
a learning entity (the state) which behaves toward other
states according to "conventional" modes
* rather, he seems
to be saying that legal system's method of thinking about
resolution of conflict (internal to the society itself)
had characteristics of the conventional model of moral
reasoning.
However, we can then ask who it is who is reasoning
confentionally
. Although Habermas does not ask that
question, I am sure he would agree that it is individuals--
for example, the rulers, judges, and the majority of the
members of society giving assent to the legal system.
So in what sense can "societal" learning be said to have
occurred? Perhaps in this sense—that those members of
society who rule or prevail have made conventional moral
reasoning the collective rules of the game. But this
is a less forceful homologue than it first seems, and
certainly different from the first sense mentioned above.
At the center of these difficulties is a need for
a clear definition of "who" it is that is learning in
"societal learning," and in what sense. These slippery
issues are ones we will pursue in the next chapter.
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Research questions
Let us accept the interpretation that Habermas means
societal learning to be some sort of societal institution-
alization of more mature modes of individual reasoning.
What, then, can be said of the status of his "research
agenda" and its import for collective learning about
collective learning? What questions remain to be answered?
First, much more needs to be learned about the psycho-
sociological process by which advances in individual
cognitive structures become the structures which are
followed by the members of society in dealing with their
collective problems. Is this a matter of the percentage
of members achieving a level of cognitive development,
or a matter of the level achieved by key decision makers?
Can the distribution of such individual achievements be
measured, or only guessed at in this historical record?
To the extent that historical patterns of individual
development can be measured, do such measures support
Habermas's assumption that there exist discreet stages of
societal learning, following an invariant pattern. Not
bnly do we need to know more about how individual learning
affects society, we also need to know more about how
societal structures constrain and motivate individuals'
learning. Such questions raised by Habermas's model call
o ut for research, which builds and integrates the knowledge
established by the separate disciplines in the social
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sciences
.
Beware of bifurcations
If the individual learner turns out to be pivotal
after all, even in the hidden core of Habermas’s scheme,
that warns against the neat separation Habermas makes
between the technical and normative domains of societal
learning. I, as an individual learner, do not make such
a neat division. I live in a world in which technologies,
worldviews, and legal structures all are impinging on my
consciousness simultaneously and continuously. It is
difficult for me to divide my reasoning about nuclear power
into purely technical or purely normative domains. Nor is
it easy to identify when a multiplicity of technical and
economic factors triggered normative thinking, and when
normative insights suggested technical directions. My
mental life is an ecology of mutually interacting
influences. It seems better understood as an orchestra
rehearsing toward a symphony than as a series of solo
voices.
It should not be surprising, then, that many careful
historical examinations protray technical and normative
factors as affecting each other in parallel, rather than
in sequence. Thus, Robert Merton's lucid study, Science
,
Technology, and Society in Seventeenth Century England.
describes the interacting effects of puritan values,
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technological developments (in mining, transportation, and
the military), social developments (as in postal systems,
the Royal Society), external forces (such as military
threats), and economic forces (for example, profits from
maritime trade). Merton concludes his study with a caution
against one factor social theory.
The continual interpenetration of forces in social
history merely reflects the fact that societal learning
operates through individual learners whose nature is to be
continually integrating disparate cognitions. This suggests,
in other words, caution about Habermas's bifurcation of
technical and normative learning. And it suggests that the
issue of which factors are "triggers," "base" or "super*-
structure," an issue inconsistently handled by Habermas,
and long plaguing Hegelians, Marxists, and Weberians, is
an issue arising from an artificial bifurcation.
But if we shift to wholisitc or ecological models of
societal learning, with wholistic individual thinkers as
operators, then perhaps we might be better able to model
the observed dynamics.
Habermas's contribution is to link an account of the
history of the species to the logic of development of
structures of individual consciousness. What one senses
is now needed is a theory that better integrates theories
of individual learning and theories of societal learning;
that includes societal learning as a factor in individual
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learning and vice versa; and that unifies them under a
single scheme.
Such an integration is a long way off. As a step
in that direction, in the next chapter I will adopt a
view of individual learning as largely influenced by
collective factors, and a view of collective learning as
arising from the learning of social individuals in social
intercourse with each other.
CHAPTER VI
TOWARD A GENERAL MODEL OF COLLECTIVE LEARNING:
CLARIFICATION OF ISSUES AND TERMS
In Chapter I
,
I pointed to the growing number of
efforts to model social processes as processes of collective
learning. I argued that such modelling could aid under-
standing of social systems by clarifying assumptions,
terms, concerns, and issues, and by revealing new dilemmas
in turn.
This iterative, question-answer-question process was
evident in our review of models in Chapters II to V. In
Karl Deutsch's seminal work, we found concepts and terms
useful to those who followed. ! Among these were the
delineation of functions that must be performed for a
system to process information, pathologies which result
from those functions not being met, and distinctions among
kinds of learning according to what is changed in the
process., However, we also saw that this cybernetic model,
born of electronics, gave little attention to the role of
human learners in human social learning. March and Olsen's
model, however, makes no such omission; they conceive of
organizational adaptation as a direct outgrowth of what
individuals perceive to be the effects of organizational
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action on its environment. With this view they are able to
identify limits to experiential learning brought on when
the links are weakened between individual beliefs, indiv-
idual actions, organizational actions, and environmental
responses. But the simplicity of their model helps to
reveal factors which they have left out, such as the shift
in a member's beliefs engendered by his organization's
actions. Such learning about the internal organizational
environment is addressed in detail by Argyris and Schon.
In perhaps the most thoroughly worked out model to date,
they describe the manifold ways in which the "behavioral
worlds" and "theories-in-use" affect what an organization
learns and how well. In particular they demonstrate how
the prevailing "Model I Theory-in-use" with its win-lose,
protect yourself attitudes, inhibits open organizational
inquiry into threatening issues. Argyris and Schon develop
methods of intervention to help members of organizations
move from Model I to Model II. But, such intervention
faces a difficult task, because the Model I behaviors are
a pervasive part of our culture and not easily changed with
interventions in a single organization. That is, Argyris
and Schon' s model, complete as it is, is not complete
enough; it does not account for the force of societal
factors. And while such larger societal forces do receive
attention in the work of Jurgen Habermas, his model lacks
any detailed description of the process by which
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individual learnings actually get impounded in homologous
social forms.
We Now Need a More General Model
Each of the above models makes its own contribution
and reveals its own shortcomings. This is to be expected
because each arises from the concerns of its disciplines
and does not intend to go beyond them. But while this is
prudent scholarship, it creates a dilemma. A complete
account of the learning in any given social system is
likely to require an account of the learning of social
systems other than itself.
No social system is entirely autonomous; it is affec-
ted by the learning and actions of other systems. For
example, the learning by a business organization is likely
to be affected by the learning by departments, competitors,
governments, and by society at large. A government's
learning is likely to be affected by that of business
organizations, and by society at large. A society's
learning is a function of learning by component parts, and
is affected by other societies with which it comes into
contact.
The range and complexity of these mutual influences
is not adequately represented in any existing models. Each,
by focusing on the subject of its own discipline, largely
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ignores the full range of influences. Argyris and Schon,
;
for example, shed light on interpersonal dynamics within
organizations, but do not attempt to examine the societal
sources of those dynamics. By their own description, Model
I interpersonal behaviors are part of almost everyone’s
socialization and are at the core of industrialized society
and culture. And though they say there can be no organiza-
tional change to Model II behaviors without social and
cultural change, they do not offer a theory of social change.
Instead, they stick to their disciplinary strength--the
examination of interpersonal relations in organizations.
Thus their strategy for intervention and change is primarily
focused on learning by individuals and relatively small
groups, and not on larger societal processes as well. Of
course, Argyris and Schon are aware of this dilemma. What
I am suggesting here is that one way out of the dilemma
may be to search for a more inclusive, integrated theory,
one which may suggest more wholistic and effective
strategies for action.
In a similar way, Deutsch's model of decision by
central governmental organs lacks an account of the immense
sea of social intercourse on which political decision
floats. And Habermas's grand theory of social evolution
lacks an account of the dynamics by which the cognitive
development of individuals becomes embedded in society’s
institutions.
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Each model is incomplete. Each, by focusing on only
one level of collective learning to the exclusion of others,
fails to do justice to the full range of factors affecting
the level in question. By focusing on one part, each model
not only fails to understand the whole, it also fails to
understand fully the part which it examines.
This was appropriate for the period of trailblazing
during which these models were made. And I am sure each
author is aware of these difficulties. But I sense the
time is now nearing when a more integrated model might be
possible. The fact that scores of recent studies (cited
in Chapter I) from a diversity of disciplines have all
examined a social system as a "learning" - system, suggests
there may be an implicit common perspective permitting
their integration.
If this is a time when the developments in separate
disciplines prepare the way for a cross-disciplinary
integration, it is also a time that calls out for such
integration for practical reasons. This is an age of inter-
dependence. Most social systems are part of a vast, often
global network of other social systems. Most depend on
each other for sustenance, security and satisfaction. The
problems any one system faces are often enmeshed in a
tangle of related problems in other systems. Learning is
more and more a multisystem matter. So it would help in
addressing the problems of our time, if we were able to
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fashion an integrated model accounting for the interactions
of the collective learnings of the parts and the whole.
One approach to integration might be simply to patch
together existing models of the various levels of social
systems. But, the result would be like a lizard's body
with an elephant's head and the legs of a daddy longlegs
—
neither pretty to look at nor likely to live.
.
A more pleasing approach would be to search for a
universal pattern. It is worth asking if there is a common
pattern in the learning of social systems of all kinds and
sizes--families and Freeze movements, businesses and
nations. But, as noted above the pattern would need to
account for the effects of the learning of social systems
on each other. It would need to be able to be applied
simultaneously to the learning of a focal social system,
its subsystems, its peer systems, and the suprasystems of
which it is a part.
This second approach, however, demands that a host
of issues be addressed. The first is whether such a model
is possible in principle, whether all social systems share
enough learning-imbued features to provide common ground for
a general model. Another is to specify in what sense the
term collective learning is being used, and why such usage
is valid. Further, any general model will need to specify
the process by which collective learning proceeds, with
acknowledgment of the impact of other social systems'
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learning. Are there varieties of collective learning?
Gan a typology be advanced to describe the variety of
collective learning styles? These are some of the questions
a general model must address. My approach in this chapter
will be to address them in turn by suggesting my own prelim-
inary responses to them, in the hope that such a prelimin-
ary model may aid the process of further modeling.
Identifying Common Learning-related Features
Shared by All Social Systems
The first issue any attempt to form a general model
of collective learning must face is whether there are
enough' commonalities across all social systems to provide
a basis for comparison. And a general model must not only
demonstrate that these commonalities exist; it should also
be as explicit as possible about its assumptions about the
nature of those commonalities, for they will set the
parameters— the terms, questions, premises, views, and
limits—within which the modelling will proceed. In the
section which follows I will suggest a tentative list of
commonalities and assumptions about them. Other investig-
ators could offer a different list. But the strength of
any eventual model will vary with the extent that its
basic assumptions about common elements are clear and well
founded.
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For my purpose here I need not be overly precise
m defining what I mean by a "social system." I have in
mind a group of humans, interacting to accomplish functions,
following some pattern of communication and interaction.
These groups are "systems" in the sense that the actions
of one member affect other members, in a network whose
whole is not comprehensible only in terms of the parts.
However, I am not subscribing to a purely "general systems"
view of social groupings, with its tendency to overdraw
the sharpness of boundaries between systems, to stress
self-maintenance at the expense of self- transformation,
and to understate the complexity of a system's goals. And
I emphatically wish to avoid the tendency among many
general systems theorists to talk at such a level of
abstraction that they forget that social systems are peopled
with real, living, unique, quirky individuals whose minds
and personalities are a source of surprise, innovation,
and learning.
Just as persons are unique, so too are social systems.
No two families are exactly the same, nor any two
businesses. Each has its own history and character.
Further, following the definition above, social
systems may include groupings that vary greatly in size
and complexity. They may be as small as a couple and as
large as the human species. They may be relatively simple
in purpose and pattern (as in the case of thirty thousand
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people at a baseball game) or relatively complex (as in
the interactions of people in a thirty thousand person
company)
. There is any number of ways to classify this
diversity; for purposes of discussion, I will suggest
classifying social systems into the following ten levels:
dyads, as in friendships or marriages; small groups, as in
discussion groups; crowds, as in a theater; informal
organizations, as in neighborhood groups; formal organiza-
tions, as in businesses or universities; movements, as in
the "Freeze"; poleis, as in the Greek city state or the
New England town meetings; governments, local, state, and
national; internatipnal organizations, as in the United
Nations; socio-cultural systems, as in that of the Tasaday
or modern industrial society; and homo sapiens.
The immense diversity of size, complexity, purpose,
history, and character of social systems should make us
question whether any meaningful general model is possible,
even in principle. There is the danger of confusing apples
and oranges, and baking orange pies.
But a biologist can safely compare apples and oranges
as fruit, and fruit and humans as living things. Similarly,
it is at least conceivable that social systems as different
as a bridge club and a nation might share some salient
common features.
Without such salient common features, however, a model
of social systems in general will not be possible. Further
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for our purposes, those features must be integrally related
to learning} they must be important to the process of
"collective learning." Finally, the features must be
genuinely held in common, with similar meanings for the
different social systems.
Such common features can be found in the models we
have already reviewed, although those models were not
intended as general models. Although Deutsch was describing
governments, all social systems may be seen to process
information, make decisions, and dissociate and recombine
resources. All social systems may be seen to share March
and Olsen* s description of organizations as systems linking
individual beliefs, individual actions, systemic actions,
and environmental response. Surely all social systems have
"behavioral worlds" and something like "theories-in-use"
as described by Argyris and Schon. And all social systems
are faced with occasions on which outcomes do not match
expectations, and all go through some process for either
hiding the error or bringing forth ideas about how to
correct it. Finally, although Habermas was describing
society at large, social, systems of all sizes share some
of the features he describes. Among these are the presence
of technological and normative systems, and members capable
of cognitive development, communication, and discourse.
These features above are enough to suggest that
sufficient common ground exists to form the basis for a
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general model of collective learning systems. Further,
common features are to be found in other models not reviewed
here, and from other disciplines. However, each feature is
expressed in the terms of its source discipline; their
combination would be a hodge-podge. Therefore, I will
suggest below five common features phrased in simple terms
not encumbered with special usages by different disciplines.
Any features held in common by all social systems
are sure to be so commonplace as almost to escape notice.
In fact, one of the benefits of this excercise may be to
restate things that are so obvious they are often ignored.
But while the presence of the commonalities below should
be obvious, it may be less obvious that they are all the
products of prior learning and the producers of new
learning. Therefore, I have usually phrased the common-
alities in terms of learning. And because these terms
provide the materials for a subsequent sketch of collective
learning, I will delineate my assumptions about them. The
first of the five commonalities is the presence of "environ-
ing realities."
All social systems exist in environing realities.
It should be obvious that social systems of all kinds
exist in the world and interact with it. Whether a family
or the human species as a whole, a social system gets its
energy, food, and materials from its physical environment.
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And whether a business or a nation, a social system inter-
acts with other social systems.
Three sorts of environing realities can be disting-
uished. The first consists of physical realities, both
inorganic and organic. The second consists of social
realities, including those outside the social system and
those inside. I include a third sort of reality-
spiritual realities
—widely felt to be a part of our
existence.. While these may be described by such different
terms as "God," "soul," "Atman," "ground-of-being, " or
"ultimate reality," they form an intense part of the
experience of most human cultures.
Each existing model tends to focus on a particular
aspect of reality. For instance, most of Argyris and
Schon's attention is directed at internal social realities.
But a general model, if it is to be complete, should account
for interactions with all the environing realities, since
each has important influence on the life of a social system.
Even the spiritual realities, even if thought of as illusion
by a modeler, deserve inclusion because beliefs about
spiritual realities do direct actions of members of many
social systems.
"Environing realities" suggests my meaning better than
"environments." "Environments" as commonly used calls forth
the notion of physical and biological settings; I wish to
call forth the notion of all realities on which a social
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system depends. Farther, "environment" often overdraws
the "boundary between a social system and its world; I wish
instead to picture a flux of interacting, overlapping
realities.
These environing realities are "learnable." Members
of social systems may study their nature and learn ways
of dealing with them. Insofar as the survival, well-
being, and satisfaction of a social system depend on its
environing realities, it must be able to learn about them.
Because environing realities meet real needs of real people,
changes- in those realities are important motivators for
learning.
Each class of environing reality requires slightly
different kinds of learning to account for the differing
levels of predictability and purposiveness in their
phenomena. Biologists use different approaches from
physicists, social scientists from biologists, and mystics
from social scientists. Different social systems may
vary in their skill in learning about each of the kinds of
reality. A complete model of collective learning should
give an account of the full range of realities learned
by different social systems.
Environing realities are not discreet entities
separate from learners; in many ways they are the products
of collective learning. At a physical level, for instance,
the air in Los Angeles in i960 was the product of the
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collectively learned automobile culture; the air in 1983
is the product of collective efforts to reduce pollution.
At a more conceptual level, the very view of "reality" is
to a considerable extent a social construction (Berger and
Luckman 1967). For example, Turnbull has described how the
"same" physical forest is viewed as two very different
realities by two cultures in Zaire (1965). The hunter-
gathering Mbuti pygmies view the forest as friendly,
animate, conscious--almost a mother or father. A group of
villages, however, view the same forest as an enemy,
literally to be beaten back, a source of evil. Environing
realities, this is to say, are "learned"; they are the
literal and conceptual products of social systems'
collective learning.
A complete model of collective learning should reflect
this interactive quality, by which environing realities are
both products of collective learning and propellors of it.
All social systems are composed of learners
No one will dispute the second commonality-
-that all
social systems, by definition, are composed of individual
humans. And few will dispute that virtually all humans
learn; even the most severely "retarded" humans learn some
things. The capacity for learning is one of the hallmarks
of our species. Since my concern is with collective learn-
ing, I will henceforth refer to members of social systems
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as learners.
Any model which fails to include a description of
the learner (as sometimes happens in the cybernetic models),
simply is not representing the reality of social learning
systems. Further, an eventual general model of collective
learning will need to state and justify its assumptions
about the nature of learners. These assumptions will
affect what the model pays attention to and what it
suggests as strategies for improvement of collective
learning. There is a great number of questions about the
learner that any model must address; we will mention only
the most salient ones here.
What do learners learn? A model which thinks of
learning as a change in behavior will be very different
from a model which thinks of learning as involving a change
in cognitions. Argyris and Schon would not have found what
they did if they had confined themselves to behavior; by
assuming that theories-in-use are inferrable, they pursued
research revealing much about people's process of reasoning
I favor the view that learning involves changes in
cognitions. This is not to say learning does not lead
to changes in behavior; it obviously does. But I view such
changes as mediated by internal mental activity. This
view is supported by the fact that identical stimuli
may lead to less than identical responses, that children
can generate an infinite number of never-experienced
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sentences, and that organisms modify responses to achieve
goals. In all these instances, the behaviors seem to have
been more than a mere response to stimuli; they seem to
involve mental mediation. (Wallace 1970).
Various names have been given to mental constructs
including schemata" (Piaget 1969)1 "personal constructs"
(Kelly 1955 ) . "scripts" (Shank and Abelson 1977), and
"theories of action" (Argyris and Schon 1974). However,
each of these has its own meaning and sphere of concern.
Since I wish to include learnings of all kinds, and to
prepare the way for a description of collective learning,
I will simply refer to all such cognitions as "lessons"
and the totality of those cognitions as an "individual's
lesson set." These are a "set" in four senses--as a group,
as an organization, as a formation of habits, and as a
preparer and conditioner of further learning. The lessons
in the set are a vast network of interrelated cognitions
able to be configured in countless ways for countless
purposes. They overlap and are difficult to classify. For
discussion, they may be seen to include at least the follow-
ing overlapping sorts of learnings;
1. Lessons about environing realities , theoretical and
factual knowledge about physical, social, and spiritual
realities
2. Lessons about how to behave , practical social habits
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telling what to do when, with whom, where, and how
3. Lessons about technique, skills, and technologies
(other than social); instrumental, how-to knowledge
Lessons about language
, about how to communicate
dispositional lessons
, feelings associated with things,
attitudes, including the sensing of what is problematic
or promising
6. Lessons about purposes
,
why-to knowledge, ethics,
norms, and values, needs, interests, and goals
7. Lessons about learning
,
how to find and solve problems,
and how to teach others
I have not included instinctive lessons or genetic
lessons. Over the long course of societal evolution, such
learnings" may or may not play an important part. A com-
plete model should state its position on such factors, for
instance on the effects of the "coevolution" of genes and
culture suggested by Lumsden and Wilson (1981). My own
inclination is to accept that coevolution is a factor over
periods of tens of generations, but that collective learning
is of far greater importance over shorter periods, and now
is on the verge of controlling genetic change itself.
In this network of lessons, some are a more pervasive
part of an individual's lesson set than others, and harder
to "unlearn." Thus, Argyris and Schon have described how
much more threatening it is for someone to question her
central goals than it is to question instrumental tactical
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lessons.
Hoy/_do learners learn? Any general model must
describe how people learn if it is to do justice to the
wellspring of collective learning. Although no universally .
accepted theory of learning exists, the choice of learning
theory is likely to affect the nature of the model. One
based on Skinner's theory would stress schedules of
reinforcement; one based on Piaget would pay attention to
assimilation and accommodation. An eventual model should
offer a grounded theory that integrates understandings from
such fields as individual psychology, social psychology,
and cognitive anthropology. For now, I will draw on elem-
ents from Dewey, Piaget, Argyris and Schon, Deutsch,
Barnett, Fisher, Skinner, and others in a highly provisional
sketch intended only to suggest what sorts of elements
might be considered in an eventual model. In particular,
I wish to highlight the issue about the ways an individual’s
learning is affected by her interaction with others. A
paper diagram, however, cannot do justice to the fluid
quality of mental activity, in which many things are
happening at once. A computer model might come closer.
Further, an adequate model must reflect the fact that lear-
ners learn in different ways, using reason, intuition,
sensation, feeling, imitation, and judgment.
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learning.
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learner? Any model must make assump-
tions about the degree to which a learner's actions are
determined or free, predictable or novel. The deterministic
assumptions of behaviorists
,
for example, are likely to lead-
to a view of collective learning that is quite mechanical,
structured, and reactive. Such a model could hold out the
promise of prediction. On the other hand, the assumption
that learners have some degree of freedom is likely to lead
to a more existential model, less concerned with prediction
than action.
While I cannot review here the ancient debate about
freedom, I will admit my preference for the view that all
learners have the capacity for choice, freedom, and unpre-
dictability. The extent to v/hich that capacity is exercised
may be to some extent ’’determined" by socio-cultural influ-
ences. Indeed, one of the "variables determining" the
effectiveness of collective learning may be the degree of
freedom and novelty encouraged in learners by their social
systems. At any rate, in my view, the term "learning"
cannot have its full meaning without such freedomj without
it learning is confined to "adaptation."
How social is the learner? There can be varying
assumptions about the degree to which a learner is a separ-
ate, autonomous monad living in its own world and the degree
to v/hich the learner is a social creature, influenced by
others and influencing them. A model built on an atomistic
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view of learners is likely to resemble a billiard table with
balls knocking against each other. A model based on a more
fluid social view might more resemble a weather system,
whose currents move and blend with each other.
I prefer the more fluid view. No one lives alone
;
feral children are rare and do not survive without human
intercourse. without social intercourse one remains what
the Greeks called an "idiot," a purely private person.
There is a large body of current thinking to support
the view that learners are both products of social inter-
course and producers of it. George Herbert I,lead has argued
persuasively that minds arise through social intercourse
(1962). In his view, thinking is a form of internalized
conversation (p. 3 75 ) « We become self-conscious
intelligence through the reflexive action of language,
pointing out meanings to one another. "Out of language
emerges the field of mind" (p. 133 )* "Mind can never find
expression, and can never come into existence at all,
except in terms of a social environment" (p. 223).
Mead, and later Erikson (1968) have argued that the
growth of one's sense of self depends on social interchange
and mutual mirroring.
Piaget recognized the importance of the social matrix
for the development of a child's reasoning ( 1969 ). Thus,
"decentration" is only possible through the child's
experience of others in social interactions. Lawrence
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Kohlberg has noted that the development of a person’s moral
reasoning is prodded by exposure to someone else's reasoning
at a slightly higher level (1966).
Many anthropologists have shown the extent to which
a learner's mode of thinking is a function of his culture.
Jack Goody has argued that the development of print and
literacy has allowed people in modern societies to think
differently from those in earlier traditional societies
( 1977 ). Writing permits lists, formulae, and tables; it
permits skeptical and "constructive rumination" across time
and space. Luria observed illiterates using concrete,
context-bound modes of solving problems, while schooled
people used more abstract logical operations (1976, 1979).
All these views support the perception of the learner
as a social creature whose thoughts and thinking are largely
a product of his interactions with others. In this way a
learner is socialized to his culture.
The relationship is not one way, however. To be
social is to interact. Others influence me and I influence
others. As Berger and Luckmann have argued, the result is
a dialectical process in which man collectively produces
a social world, which acts back on its producers, who
internalize its order in the process of socialization, in
an unending cycle (1967).
In this social process, there are some parts of an
"individual's lesson set" which are relatively accessible
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to other people and some that are not, as diagramed in
figure 26 .
Figure 26 . Individual lesson set.
This is not the same as Polanyi's distinction between
tacit and explicit knowledge (1962). As he shov/s, know-
ledge that is tacit can be conveyed even if it cannot be
told, as happens when a master conveys nonverbalized skills
to an apprentice. Here, I am concerned with the distinction
between what can be conveyed and what cannot. The lessons
which are accessible provide the material with which
collective learning proceeds.
The boundaries between accessible and private are
gradual and flexible. What is accessible to a friend may
not be to a stranger. What was unconscious and private
before psychoanalysis may monopolize conversation afterward.
In one organization, there may be very little accessing of
one another's lessons; in another, a great deal.
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Do_ learners differ? To say that learners are
socialized to their cultures is not to say they are all the
same. Even genetically identical twins are exposed to
diapering experiences, which form differing individual
lesson sets. A model of collective learning which ignores
these differences ignores the attribute by which collective
learning is more than individual learning. Just as two
people's experiences are certain to have differed, so will
their lessons. This may prod the two to search for lessons
ch can accommodate the full scope of their experience.
Social interaction between unique individuals can be a goad
toward understandings broader and more universal than that
achievable by an individual learning alone.
Why do learners learn? A complete model should ac-
count for what motivates learners and toward what ends
they learn. There is not space here to review the range
of thought on motivation, nor to support a view here. But,
as a first step, I will at least state my assumptions as I
now hold them.
Across a variety of explanatory systems, it seems to
me, there is a common theme— that learners seek a more
satisfying harmonization of their lesson sets and their
worlds. Dewey sees inquiry as "the directed or controlled
transformation of an indeterminate situation into a deter-
minately unified one" ( 1938 * P* 17 ) • Piaget describes
learners as in a continual process of "equilibration" to
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bring their schemata into balance with reality. Through
assimilation of data and accommodation of schemata, the
schemata are enriched to make maintenance of equilibrium
easier over a broader range of environmental demands (1969).
Leon festinger's theory sees people as seeking to reduce
dissonance between their cognitions ( 1957 ). But learners
may not just try to reduce dissonance; under favorable
conditions they may seek out questions (Arlin 1975). In
Folanyi's terms they may have "heuristic urges," personal
commitment with universal intent ( 1962). But such
searches lor trutn may not be possible until more pressing
basic needs have been satisfied (Maslow 1954
, 1968). And,
at a physiological level, Donald Hebb posits that organisms
seek an "optimal level of arousal" ( 1949 ). At the level
of social organizations, March has suggested that members
"satisfice" rather than seek optimal solutions (1953).
Cangelosi and Dill have observed that the prime movers in
organizational learning are stresses--"performance stress,"
when performance does not meet goals, and "disjunctive
stress," or conflict between groups and individuals (1965).
In all these views, the learner may be seen as seeking
a more satisfactory harmonization—a reduction of dissonance,
and a fuller understanding of the world. This may include
harmonization of bodily needs through learned behaviors,
harmonization in social relations, in personality,
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harmonisation of spiritual impulses, and harmonization of
lessons. In all these cases, needs are being met through
actions mediated by mental activity. Learning seeks to
alter the lesson set in a way that better harmonizes the
lessons with each other and the learner with her world.
o ummary
. All social systems are seen to have
learners. Any general model must state its assumptions
about the learner. Mine are that learners have lesson sets
with which they seek to harmonize the elements of their
experience. Learners are social; they and their lesson
sets are the products and producers of society. They
exchange lessons, and that exchange enters into the process
of individual learning. Each learner's experience and
lesson set are unique; by comparing them, learners are
prodded into expanding the range of their lessons beyond
the confines of their own experience.
All social systems have collective lesson sets
Every member of any social system brings with her an
individual lesson set of the kind represented earlier in
figure 26. Some of her "accessible lessons" are shared with
others in the social system. Further, members hold in com-
mon certain central lessons with which they order their
lives together as a social system. These relationships,
for a dyadic social system, such as a married couple, are
represented schematically in figure 27.
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Learner 1 Learner 2
Figure 27 • A dyadic social system.
The "co-ordering lesson set" includes all the shared,
learned understandings
,
habits, knowledge, and dispositions
with which members of a social system order their lives
together. It includes the kinds of lessons enunciated in
the earlier description of the individual's lesson set.
These are summarized in figure 28 ; to them is added an
eighth sort of lesson, about modes of co-learning. So
central are these modes of co-learning for a model of
collective learning that I will treat them separately
in the following discussion.
Environing
realities
Social behavior
Technology
Language
Dispositions
Purposes
Learning
Co-learning
Figure 28. Co-ordering lesson set.
It is difficult to imagine any group of people
persisting as anything like a "social system" without at
least a minimal co-ordering lesson set. A couple would
have difficulty surviving without at least some shared under
understandings, goals, values, interests, and agreed upon
rules of interaction. A church would hardly be a church
without come shared beliefs. A scientific community
could not function without common language, concerns, and
standards. An industry requires a core technology. A
nation rests on laws.
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The lessons in the co-ordering lesson set are vital
to a social system and are held by virtually all members
of the social
-system. But there is a second vast set of
lessons held by only some members but nonetheless acces-
sible to others when needed. I call this the "aggregate
accessible lesson set." It is that portion of the lessons,
shown above in figure 26, which include all accessible
lessons in all members' individual lesson sets. It does
not include the widely held co-ordering lesson set, nor
private lessons.
All social systems have such an aggregate accessible
lesson set. A husband and wife, for example, are constantly
accessing each other's lessons—about where he left the car
keys, her second cousin's name. A business could hardly
run without members being able to access each other's
specialized knowledge--a salesman's experience with a
customer, a lawyer's about new tax lav/s. The life of a
society is made up of individuals sharing lessons, large
and small. One of the functions of any social system is
to pool lessons to accomplish purposes not possible in
isolation. The ability of members to call on one another's
separate lessons may be one of the hallmarks of a healthy
social system.
There is no sharp demarcation between the aggregate
accessible lesson set and the co-ordering lesson set.
Lessons may vary in the percentage of members holding them,
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m their governing force, and in their importance for the
life of the social system. Thus the belief that all cit-
izens should
-have the right to vote is probably held by
virtually all Americans, has the force of law, and is
clearly part of the' American co-ordering lesson set. I.ly
belief that governments should foster societal learning
is accessible to others but not part of the American co-
ordering lesson set. In between there are lessons not so
easily classified. Belief that liquor should not be sold
was for a time part of American law, although held by only
a portion of the population.
I will consider a lesson to be a part of the co-
ordering set to the extent that it is held by all member
learners, governs their interactions, and is central in
ordering their lives together as a social system. To the
extent that a lesson does not meet these criteria, it is
part of the aggregate accessible lesson set.
Because the demarcation between the co-ordering set
and the aggregate set is gradual does not eliminate its
usefulness, anymore than the gradient between "green" and
"blue" reduces the usefulness of those terms.
A helpful tool for describing such gradients is the
"fuzzy set theory" developed by Lotfi iadeh ( 1972 , 1976 ).
The anthropologist Willett Kempton ( 1973 ) used this theory
to quantify the gradient of responses, classifying mugs,
cups, and drinking vessels as subsets of one another. This
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technique might be usefully applied by an eventual model
of collective learning to distinguish members of the
aggregate and co-ordering sets.
I will use the term "collective lesson set" to refer
to the composite of all lessons contained in the aggregate
accessible set and the co-ordering set. It does not contain
those lessons which remain private to individuals.
It is important to recognize the extent to which
lessons in the collective lesson set are "meta-individual"
as well as individual realities. What I have learned is
real for me; what I learn and is accessed by another is
real for both of us. What the two of us have learned in
order to co-order our relationship is real for us as
individuals and real between us as a system of individuals.
That the collective lesson set is a "meta-individual"
reality can be seen by considering the origins and destina-
tions of lessons. They do not pop up from nothing; they
emerge from an endless mixing of prior lessons among
millions of minds. Newton said that if he saw farther it
was because he stood on the shoulders of giants. The fact
that he and Leibnitz both independently invented calculus
at about the same time suggests that the collective lesson
set of the time was finally ready for that invention, only
waiting for individual inventors to recognize the emergent
possibility. Kroeber (1917) has pointed to the frequency
of simultaneous invention as support for the
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supraindividual quality of culture.) This is to say that
what an, individual learns is
"more-than-individual" insofar
as it has origins in the lessons of other individuals.
Not only the origins hut the destination of some
lessons suggest a more-than-individual quality. When one
member of a social system may access the lesson of another
member, the lesson has in a way become common property.
It is there for public use. What Newton learned has been
used by countless learners since; the lessons outlived the
original learner.
Some lessons in the aggregate accessible set become
so central to the life of a social system that they become
part of the co-ordering set, but they seldom arrive there
without some alteration. The originator's lesson is
usually modified by others, and recombined with other les-
sons in new configurations. Locke's philosophy did not
make its way into the American co-ordering lesson set
unchanged. Adams and Jefferson, supreme court justices,
and others have reworked his ideas, and those of others,
with less concern for the originators than for the learning
tasks at hand. The constitution is a meta-individual
creation.
The constitution, once created, became a reality with
more-than-individual force. It set the rules which
individuals were to follow. To it, millions of young
Americans have been socialized, with little choice.
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It channels our actions and learning,
its reinterpretation.
even as we go about
The meta-individual quality of the collective lesson
set will he important in my discussion later about whether
collective learning is distinguished from individual
learning.
Culture" as used by some cultural anthropologists
refers to much the same sort of shared learned things as
I include under the term "co-ordering lesson set." Unfor-
tunately, not all anthropologists use the term in the
same way; hundreds of definitions exist, not all of which
put the learned quality at the center. Further, "culture"
is now used by organizational theorists and executives to
refer to organizational character. And "culture" to many
means opera. If I were to use "culture" instead of co-
ordering lesson set, I would be misunderstood by many.
I would also break the continuity of my usage of "lesson
sets" to describe individual, aggregate, and co-ordering
levels of activity. Finally, I would lose the emphasis on
^^6 learned quality of elements in collective learning.
Like the first two commonalities—environing realities
learners the collective lesson set is both a product
of learning and producer of it. Such an important part
of the ordering and enriching of a social system's life
should be represented in any eventual model.
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All social systems have learning fields
The fourth feature shared by all social systems is
that they have what I will call "learning fields." By this
I mean that at a given time a social system has a range of
dissonances to resolve and a range of opportunities for
exploration. It has potential learnings waiting to be
learned.
I use the term "field" in two senses—as a space and
as a charge. As a space, a learning field is the range
within which a social system may learn and beyond which
it cannot. Homo sapiens can now learn about quasars, but
could not do so until the collective lesson set included
radio telescopes. The learning field has enlarged.
As a charge, the learning field contains tensions
and potentialities which energize learning. These charges
may come from a variety of sources. The collective lesson
set may be at odds with environing realities, by inaccurate
or incomplete understanding of it. That may be the case
for the United States lesson set as it tries to cope with
changing realities in Central America. Or a charge may be
engendered by conflicts between elements of the co-ordering
lesson set, as in the conflict between the United States
habit of hegemony and its belief in self-determination of
peoples. But charges need not just be "negative," they
may be "positive" as when the scientists Darwin and Wallace
sensed within the collective lesson set the opportunity for
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a new theory of evolution.
These charges are sensed by individual learners as
agents of their social systems. But a social system may
have a myriad of small charges, opportunities for learning.
So it selects only some of them for collective attention
according to the strength of the charge and the habits of
the system. Thus, only a few issues achieve the status
of what Schon called "ideas in good currency."
Each social system varies in the range of its field
and the configuration of its charges, but all systems have
some such learning field. It is in the nature of any social
system that it is established to solve a certain class of
problems. Each pays attention to a certain sort of issues
and opportunities. A hospital responds to epidemics and
invents solutions. A business is sensitive to problems
with its profits and to opportunities in its markets.
An eventual model should somehow represent how a
social system senses and responds to demands and opportu-
nities for learning.
All social systems have modes of co-learning
The fifth feature common to all social systems is
properly a part of the co-ordering lesson set. It is the
modes by which members of a social system share what they
have learned and change what they share. It is the means
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by which learners access the aggregate accessible lesson
set and reconfigure the co-ordering lesson set into more
satisfying order. I call this "co-learning” because it
involves the joint sharing of learnings and the joint
learning of new co-ordering lessons. It draws on the co
ordering lesson set's language, tools, and social rules,
which form filters limiting exchange between learners.
It can be represented as shown in figure 29.
Figure 29. Modes of co-learning.
Any social system has some modes of co-learning.
Members of any system are continually communicating with
each other, exchanging what they have learned. However,
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the mode for such communication might vary. I n 0ne society
it may be oral, in another, oral, written, and electronic.
In one business the exchange of ideas may be frequent,
candid, and informal [ in another it may be infrequent,
defensive, and formal.
All social systems also occasionally modify their co-
ordering lesson set, however slowly. Because the environing
realities which sustain social systems change, so too must
members change their co-ordering lesson set's methods of
dealing with those realities. And because members live
and think, they are likely to see new possibilities which
alter the co-ordering set. Even the most traditional
societies change. If they do not, they are not likely to
survive changing circumstances. And in the modern world
of rapid change, heavy demands are put on members of social
systems to anticipate and respond to such change. It
requires rapid co-learning.
Co-learning is composed of many functions. The
method or style of fulfilling each of those functions may
be seen as a sub-mode of a social system's overall mode
of co-learning. A sample list of such sub-modes is shown
in figure 30 , drawing on the insights of the authors
reviewed earlier. A moment's reflection should confirm
that each of those functions is met in some way by all
social systems. Deficiencies in meeting them result in
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Functions
Storing lessons
Accessing lessons
Framing lessons
Channeling lessons
Distributing lessons
Concerting lessons
Sensing learning
charges
Assigning specialized
learning
Dissociating and
recombining lessons
Testing lessons
Facing conflicts over
alternative lessons
Resolving conflict
Instituting lessons
Socializing learners
Learning about
collective learning
Examples of vajryinir morinr,
Oral/literate/electronic
Random/intenti onal
Testable/untestable
Single channel/multichannel
Elitist/populist
Hierarchical/participatory
Real-time and gradual/
crisis-oriented
Haphazard/planned retraining
Informal-individual/
structured-organizational
Impressionistic/controlled/
existential-experimental
Denial/airing
Win-1ose/win-win
Informal custom/formal law
Planned/informal
Haphazard/intentional
Figure 30. Constituent modes, of co-learning.
213
the kinds of pathologies suggested by Deutsch. All these
component modes of co-learning may also he seen on reflec-
tion to he the products of prior collective learning.
Toward a typology
. One task for an eventual model
to offer a typology hy which the varieties of
approaches to collective learning in different social
systems may he classified. This would be useful for
research! and for a practical assessment of real social
systems. Paul Shrivastava (1983) has offered such a
typology for organizational learning systems based on two
dimensions: 1) the extent to which the learning systems
are evolutionary or designed and 2) the extent to which
they are individually oriented or organizationally
oriented. An eventual general model of collective learning
might pursue that path hy developing a multi-dimensional
typology based on the variation for each of the sub-modes
listed in figure 3a
These commonalities can be a basis
for a general model
To review, we began with the question whether the
diversity of social systems share enough commonalities to
permit a general model. I have argued that all social
systems share enough commonalities to permit a general
model. I have argued that all social systems have
environing realities, learners, collective lesson sets,
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learning fields, and modes of co-learning. Each of these
is both the product of prior learning by the social system
and the producer of further learning. As such, they provide
grounds for answering that a general model might be possible
,
at least in principle.
The development of a general model is still a long
way off, however, with many issues yet to be resolved. The
resolution of those issues will, I hope be easier with the
terms and clarifications we have made thus far.
Defining Collective Learning
Any general model will need to clarify the sense in
which it is using the term "collective learning," and why
the term is appropriate.
We have already gained a sense of the diversity of
possible responses to this issue in the models we have re-
viewed. Although each uses the term in a variety of ways,
we may summarize them as follows. For March and Olsen,
the term refers to organizational adaptation to the environ-
ment. For Argyris and Schon it is the process by which
individuals detect and correct error in the organizational
theory-in-use. For Deutsch it is a dissociation and recom-
bination of the system's structures, channels, and resources
to meet goals, change them, preserve the system, or preserve
some higher values. For Habermas, it is the incorporation
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m societal institutions of more developed modes of reason-
ing.
Attempts have been made to categorize the manifold
ways in which the term is used. Argyris and Schon categor-
ize theories of organizational learning according to whether
the organization is primarily viewed as a group, an agent,
a structure, a system, a culture, or as a political entity
(1978, pp. 319-331). Shrivastava discerns four uses of
"organizational learning": 1) as adaptation to the environ-
ment by adjustment of organizational rules, 2) as changes
in shared assumptions and theories, 3 ) as development of
knowledge about action-outcome relations, and 4) as the
institutionalization of experience for better decision-
making.
Another way to categorize models and their usage
would be to see how they answer the following questions:
1. What is the intent of the model?
2. What sort of thing is a social system that it may
engender collective learning?
3. What does collective learning change?
4. How is collective learning distinguishable from individ-
ual learning.
5. Who or what evokes that change?
6. By what process?
7. When is a given case of the process said to be complete?
8. By what criteria?
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9. What energizes it, and toward what ends does it strive?
10. In what sense is this really learning, or is it merely
a metaphor.
Obviously, different models would answer the questions
differently. But an eventual general model will need to
address these questions in a way that is compelling for a
variety of perspectives. As one step in that direction, I
will offer my own current provisional responses to each in
turn.
What is the intent of the model?
While I have barely begun to describe collective
learning, much less explain or predict it, I am clear about
my own goals for an eventual model: that it aid people in
social systems from the smallest to the largest to learn
how to learn together to address the complex and lethal
problems we confront.
What sort of thing is a social system that
it may engender learning?
If a social system were unpeopled, "it" would not
learn. Nor could a system of lobotomized and comatose
bodies learn. A learning system requires the action of
minds. Even computerized "artificial intelligence" systems
have the seeds of mind planted in them in the form of
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programs conceived by human minds in order to perform the
initial intelligent functions for the system. Real social
systems are composed of real people who have minds and who
learn. It is they who perceive environments, sense problems
and invent solutions. A social system, however, is not a
mere congery of learners { it is a system of learners who
organize their learning and actions in order to satisfy
needs not satisfiable in isolation. They share a
co-ordering lesson set which frames their purposes and
interactions. In particular, they have common modes of co-
learning by which they share each others accessible lessons,
broadening the range of understanding beyond that possible
alone. Through the modes of co-learning they are able to
alloy their lessons into synergistic structures more power-
ful than their own. And through the modes of co-learning
they are able to reflect on their co-ordering lesson set,
and to agree to more satisfying modifications.
A social system thus engenders its own form of
learning. It provides the structures, incentives and
rewards by which individual learners turn their capacity
for learning toward collective learning tasks.
What does collective learning change?
Collective learning changes the collective lesson set.
At one level, it may change the aggregate available lesson
set. At another, it may change the co-ordering lesson set.
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Such change in the collective lesson set is preceded
by changes in individual lesson sets. These may become
part of the aggregate accessible set, and may eventually
work themselves into the co-ordering set. At that point
they will be part of the socialization of members. By
definition, the lessons of the co-ordering set influence
all members and are held by most of them. Thus a change
in the collective lesson set is concommitant with changes
in individual lesson sets.
Further, changes in the collective lesson set may
cause secondary changes. They may cause changes in the
physical and social environments. They will change the
learning field, discharging certain dissonances and cre-
ating others. And as noted earlier, they may act back on
individual learners, socializing them to a new lesson set.
However, the primary focus of change in collective
learning is the collective lesson set.
How is collective learning distinguishable
from individual learning?
Individual learning changes the individual lesson set;
collective learning changes the raore-than-individual collec-
tive lesson set. It is critical here to recall the discus-
sion earlier about the "meta-individual" qualities of the
collective lesson set. There I argued that when a lesson
becomes part of the aggregate accessible set it takes
219
on qualities different from it as an individual’s learning.
It becomes public property. It takes on a certain dynamic
of its own. It may outlive the original learner. It gets
mixed, analyzed, and reconfigured with other lessons by
countless other learners. And if it becomes part of the
co-ordering lesson set, it takes on even stronger meta-
individual qualities. It has the force of law or custom
on member learners. New members are socialized to it, with
little choice. It prods, channels, and limits the direction
of further learning.
However, this distinction between the individual and
meta-individual is a matter of some dispute among anthro-
pologists. Alfred Kroeber argued (first in 1917) that
"culture is superorganic and superindividual in that,
although carried, participated in, and produced by organic
individuals, it is acquired; and it is acquired by learning"
(19^8, p. 259) • In this view culture is transmitted, it
persists beyond and above individuals and their societies,
and largely determines their lives. It is a cumulative
and joint product "that is enormously bigger than any
individual man" (p. 255) • It is like a coral reef formed
over thousands of years by trillions of polyps secreting
calcium carbonate, whose lattice is the current home of
living polyps.
Homer Barnett had a different view:
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.
. .. cultural facts are never anything else but ideas.
•
.
• • In dealing with culture we are inevitably dealing
with multi
-individual ideas, that is, with ideas sharedby more than one person. But this sharing does not
take the ideas into a new plane. It does not make them
supraindividual with an autonomy of their own. They
are no different from any other ideas. They have the
same principles of thinking as idiosyncratic ideas.
They do not act with forces and features of their own,
and assuredly they do not behave like wind and stone.
(1953, p. 15)
The difference between Barnett and Kroeber persists
among anthropologists according to Roger Keesing in a
review of theories of culture (1974)*
But we are still left between the horns of a con-
ceptual dilemma* on the one hand, of cognitive reduc-
tionism that misses the magic of shared symbols and the
only partial overlap between the psychological world of
the individual and the code of cultural meanings and
conventions; and on the other, of a spuriously autono-
mous and spuriously uniform world of cultural symbols
freed from the constraints of the mind and brain by
which cultures are created and learned and through
which they are realized,. *(p. 57)
This is a slippery issue not easy to resolve. What
is clear is that if Barnett is entirely right, then there
is no important or valid distinction to be made between
individual and collective learning. In this view, "col-
lective learning" would be sloppy verbal shorthand for what
is in reality learning occurring only in individual minds.
I will try to address this issue by considering
the following two questions. Who or what evokes a change
in the collective lesson set? By what process?
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Who or what evokes a change in the
collective lesson set?
Perhaps some of the difficulty we have just discussed
can be resolved by examining the full nature of the entity
through which collective learning occurs, and the nature of
the process.
Consider someone sitting under an apple tree, eating
an apple. If she asked, "What produced this apple?" she
might answer, "The tree." But, after a bite, she might
ask, "What produced the tree?" and answer, "An apple's
seed, growing in the soil under the rain and the sun,"
savoring the whole.
Similarly, I sense that we need to overcome partial
views and try to see the subject whole. If we treat indiv-
idual learners as if they are not in intimate interaction
with their social systems, then we miss part of their life.
If we treat social systems as if they are not composed of
quirky learners, then we miss part of their life.
Barnett is only partly right. He is right that ideas
reside in minds, but he forgets the social origins of minds.
Following George Herbert Mead, I view mind as arising from
the exchange of ideas in social, lingual intercourse.
Lessons do not simply "reside" in minds; they build the
residence. Building does not happen in isolation; it
requires at least some social discourse. Of course, a
learner does spend time alone rearranging her residence.
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But many of the materials came from town.
The very process of individual learning usually
involves the influence of others and their ideas, as I
tried to suggest above in figure 25. A learner's process
has social dimensions.
So, yes, it is learners who learn for a social
system. It is they who perceive environing realities,
sense changes in the learning field, examine the collective
lesson set and devise changes to it. But they do not do
so as isolates. They do so as social learners whose minds
and learnings are formed in social interchange. The apple
grows on the tree.
But this is still only part of the answer to the
question. We need to acknowledge the tree. A social sys-
tem is not just an agglomeration of individuals; they are
joined in a more-than-individual organization to accomplish
purposes not attainable in isolation. Their activity is
prodded and channeled by the co-ordering lesson set. Their
power arises from their ability to access each other's
lessons via the modes of co-learning. And these modes
format discussion, screening, and decision, leading to
changes in the collective lesson set. These changes are
the product of more-than-individual things— the modes and
dynamics of the social system as a whole.
A social system does not exist in a vacuum, however,
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anymore than a tree exists without soil and air. Changes
in environing realities may prompt learners to change
their collective lesson set. Lessons learned from other
social systems may stimulate a change.
In short, the who or what which brings change to a
collective lesson set is a social whole. It is a social
system composed of socialized and socializing learners,
operating under a more-than-individual co-ordering lesson
set, and responsive to the influence of data from environ-
ing realities and lessons from other social systems.
By what process is the collective
lesson set changed?
The dialectic
. The essential process required for
collective learning to proceed is a dialectic between
individual learners and their meta-individual collective
lesson set.
Without learners to reflect on the collective lesson
set, collective learning would not be possible. They sense
whether the lesson set satisfies, whether it is in harmony
with realities and with itself. They do the dissociating
and recombining of lessons. Together they decide on new
configuration of the collective lesson set.
But they are products of their social systems'
collective lesson sets. They cannot learn without them.
Thus, there is a continual back and forth interplay.
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Individual learners and meta-individual lesson sets are
products and producers of each other. We have seen many
examples of this in our prior discussion and I need not
elaborate further here. What is important is to recognize
that this dialectic is a necessary part of collective
learning.
This dialectial view, in conjunction with the wholis-
tic view just discussed, may provide a degree of resolution
to the dilemma presented by Barnett’s position. This view
acknowledges both the reality of individual learning and
its influence, and the reality of more-than-individual for-
ces, dynamics, and structures.
The flow. In this dialectic, the influence of
society on the individual may often seem much more direct
and powerful than the influence of individuals on society.
The path can be a long one from the origination of a lesson
by an individual to its incorporation in some form in the
co-ordering lesson set.
Accurately describing the nature of that path and
process will be one of the major tasks for any eventual
model. I do not have the empirical material on which to
ground such a model. However, it is possible to glean
from existing literature suggestions about what some of the
elements of an eventual general model of the process might
be. In particular, the model of "public learning" offered
by Schon, the models of organizational learning offered by
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Argyris and Schon, and March and Olsen, the model of
"revitalization movements" offered by Wallace (1956), and
the model of "knowledge diffusion" offered by Rogers and
Shoemaker (1971) are all grounded in extensive empirical
research. From these I will draw elements for the follow-
ing provisional sketches of aspects of the process of
collective learning. The sketches are offered to highlight
issues and possibilities.
The most basic outlines of the flow are clear, and
are summarized in figure 31» A socialized and socializing
learner learns something new. She does so in something
like the process shown earlier in figure 25 , that is,
interaction with others and her environing realities.
Individual Aggregate Co-order
Learning Learning Learning
added to made part of
^Individual lesson > aggregate >co-ordering
1 accessible lessen set
I lesson set
,
1
• 1
»
'i' *
! 4 4 '
Figure 31. Overall flow of collective learning.
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If what she has learned is not private, she may
convey it to others; it may become part of her social
system’s aggregate accessible lesson set. Her mode of
communicating with others about the lesson is conditioned
by the social system's modes of accessing, storing, framing,
channeling and distributing lessons. If the lesson arises
primarily out of interchange with environing realities, it
adds, however slightly, to the depth and range of under-
standing of reality possible for the social system as a
whole. Insofar as the lesson is unique, it is a goad to
a broader, more universal understanding. If the lesson is
primarily about the collective lesson set, it is a prod to
self-understanding and integration for the social system.
Any new lesson adds to the possibilities for dissociation
and recombination and reconfiguration of the collective
lesson set. And it enlarges the resources for individual
learning. In all these ways, the addition of a lesson to
the aggregate accessible set is important for the social
system and its members. I will call this addition
" aggregate learning .
"
The aggregate accessible set may also be diminished.
For instance, members of an organization may be laid off,
die, or grow fearful and closed. Records may be destroyed.
I will call this "aggregate lesson loss."
When a lesson becomes part of the aggregate accessible
set, it may in certain circumstances become material for a
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reconfiguration of the co-ordering lesson set. I will call
such a change "co-ordering learning " to contrast it with
"aggregate learning."
Both aggregate learning and co-ordering learning are
the products of a collective process, but in varying
degrees. Aggregate learning is a collective product in at
least two ways. First, as I have argued earlier, a lesson
offered by an individual is not solely his own creation.
He could only use it by calling on the socially created
collective lesson set of the social system and of the cul-
ture at large. Second, it can only be part of the aggreg-
ate accessible set if he is able to convey it to others.
But such conveyance depends on collectively created
language and collectively created modes of communication.
Aggregate learning is both an individual and collective
achievement.
Co-ordering learning is a collective product in much
more intense ways. Like aggregate learning, it builds on
the prior collective lesson set and depends on collective
language and modes of communication. But it alters the co-
ordering lesson set. That affects all members of the social
system, not just a few. And it may affect their fundamental
ways of understanding the world and ordering their relations.
As such, co-ordering learning is a much more wide-
spread and conflictual process than aggregate learning.
This is not just because some members and subgroups have
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interests in the maintenance of the status quo, which is
usually true. And it is not just because the re-ordering
may call for individuals to unlearn culture-wide habits
acquired from birth, though this too may be true. It is
also because of the importance of order itself.
Without order humans feel what Berger and Luckmann
(1967) call "anomic terror." During periods of chaos,
people in collectivities rush to "mobilize a system of
beliefs to reestablish social order" ( Smelser 1963 )
.
This is consistent with the view I expressed earlier that
the central impulse for a learner is to establish a more
satisfying harmonization of his lesson set and his world.
Learners seek order.
But this presents a conflict for learners is a social
system. A major source of order is the co-ordering lesson
set. To question it is to threaten disorder. But without
such questioning and disordering, it is not possible to re-
order a more satisfying lesson set. Learners' needs for
order can be both a prod and barrier to co-ordering learn-
ing.
The method of dealing with that paradox is one of the
central determinants of the character of a given social
system's colllective learning. It varies with the quality
of the modes of co-learning listed earlier, especially with
the modes of facing and resolving conflict. A better under-
standing of these modes is likely to be one of the key
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contributors to an eventual general model.
Co-order learning can be seen to involve a number
of phases, as sketched in figure 32. The sketch relies
heavily on Wallace (1956) and Schon (1971). In each of
these phases the tension is evident between keeping the old
order and establishing a new one.
Co-order learning is preceded by individual learning
which leads to aggregate learning. The lessons involved
are ones concerned with the co-ordering lesson set. The
individuals who come up with important new ordering ideas
are often under great stress (Wallace 1956). They may be
so intimately familiar with the old order that they are
painfully aware of its limits for satisfying the need for
order, as happens with scientists in paradigm crises
(Kuhn 1972).
The new lesson is communicated and gains acceptance
with a subgroup of the social system. The members of the
subgroup are ones for whom the benefits of the new order
outweigh the risks of abandoning the old. This may be
because they are young, alienated, or cosmopolitan. By
being a group, they provide each other with the needed
sense of social order.
But the group seldom accepts a new lesson as is.
As a group they reconfigure the lesson, recombine it with
others, and adapt it for broader consumption, cohering and
extending their social order.
Function
Individual learner
learns new lesson
about co-ordering
It is added to the
aggregate accessible
lesson set
Sub group adopts
Sub group reconfigures
System wide crisis
or demand
Conflict between
sub groups
Conflict resolution
by force or discourse
Trial incorporation
into co-ordering
lesson set
Regularization and
socialization
TIME }
Figure 32. Phases in co-ordering learning.
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The innovation may remain only a subgroup's unless
a crisis or demand arises which forces most members of the
social system to question elements of the existing co-
ordering lesson set. This may be of the same sort sensed
earlier by the innovators and subgroup.
The crisis engenders intergroup conflict. Some
groups hold fast to the old order, others zealously advance
their own. All are responding to the same threat to order.
The stakes are high, and so is the level of conflict. A
social system’s success in dealing with this phase in a
way that leads to a more satisfying order depends on its
modes of facing and resolving conflict. Some modes may
deny conflict; others may air it. Some modes may resolve
the conflict through power struggles; others may seek
creative blend solutions that dissociate superficially
conflicting goals from shared core goals and that reconfig-
ure the lesson set to meet these core goals (Eiseman 1977).
After such conflict the co-ordering lesson set is
likely to be altered in at least some respects, possibly
incorporating substantial elements of the innovator sub-
groups' lessons. A period of trial incorporation may
ensue, to confirm or disconfirm the worth of the new order.
If the configuration stands the test of time, it
becomes a regularized part of the co-ordering lesson set.
New members are socialized to it. Order is reestablished.
Insofar as that order emerged from modes of co-learning
232
which encourage learners to acknowledge and test one
another's claims and to create commonly satisfying
resolutions, to that extent the new order is likely to have
a broader range of application and satisfaction than the
former. The members will have achieved co-order learning.
Modeling intersvstem influences
. The pattern I
describe is based on others' empirical studies and proceeds
from the dynamic of a central human urge— the urge for a
more harmonizing order. However, much work remains until
we have a general model demonstrated to hold for all kinds
of social systems.
If a general pattern were found, it might then be
nested in a way that could at once account for the learning
of a focal system, its subsystems, peer systems and supra-
systems. In programming terms, the general routine could
be "called" when needed. Further, the mode of linkage of
those routines would need to be specified. At this point
I can only note the need and possibility of such linkage.
A sketch of the interactions of collective learning by
different systems is given in figure 33* The intersecting
circles represent learners sharing a co-ordering lesson
set and aggregate accessible lessons. The pattern shown
for the "focal" social system is a general pattern that
can be seen to be operating for the other social systems.
SUPRASYSTEM
FOCAL SYSTEM
SUB- SUB-
SYSTEM SYSTEM
t M- CD
Throughout the flow
and phases of collec-
tive learning shown
in figs. 31 and 32,
members of the focal
system accommodate
lessons from sub-
systems, peer systems,
and supra systems,
contributing to the
reconfiguration of the
aggregate set and the
co-ordering set.
Figure 33. Inter-system lesson exchange
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When is a case of collective learning complete?
The process of collective learning is long and
complex. Individuals and subgroups are learning lots of
things all the time, simultaneously. Not all that activity
leads to a complete sequence of learning, but the partial
learnings engendered in individuals and subgroups may be
material for other learning. Further, there is a gradient
of commitment and permanence in the collective adoption of
any new lesson.
For purposes of discussion, I will consider a case
of aggregate learning to be complete whenever something
one learner has learned is made accessible to others in the
social system. This happens constantly.
Co-order learning is only complete when most members
of the social system are socialized to a new lesson.
By what criteria is learning to be assessed?
Any eventual model will need to be clear about what
sorts of changes are to be included as "learning." Should
all changes to the collective lesson set be called "learn-
ing," or just some? This is important because no model
can escape embodying a set of values, whether tacit or
explicit.
One approach would be to specify criteria which must
be met before a change in the collective lesson set may be
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called "learning.
" Examples might be that a new lesson
increase the range in time and space of the environmental
realities accounted for in the collective lesson set.
Another might be the increase in the satisfaction and
happiness of members. Another might be increased effective-
ness in meeting goals. Another might be whether the new
lesson set meets more universalizable standards of truth,
goodness and beauty. Another might be the extent to which
the learning is the result of unconstrained discourse and
reason.
The advantage of specifying criteria is that it makes
values explicit. For instance, it would reject the adop-
^ion of Nazism by Germans as "learning" because it was evil,
A second approach would be to admit any change what-
soever to the collective lesson set as an example of learn-
ing and then apply standards of evaluation to the result.
In this approach the adoption of Nazism by Germany might be
seen as adaptation to defeat, and depression, but such
"learning" would then be evaluated as evil by obvious
criteria. This approach need not imply any lesser commit-
ment to moral and intellectual values. It simply disting-
uishes between the process of learning and the evaluation
of its results.
I am not sure what the best resolution of this issue
is. My current inclination is to accept any case
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Of a socialized change in the co-ordering lesson set as
a case of learning, and then to apply criteria for
evaluation of it. One reason is that, as I have argued,
all such changes result from the cognitive activity of
learners, no matter how limited. To that extent, the
result may be considered learning. A second reason for
taking this approach may be clearer after I have answered
the next question.
What energizes collective learning, and
what are its ends?
I am assuming that all humans seek an optimal level
of consonance. They seek order. They try to make sense
of the world. In the terms I have used, learning seeks
a more satisfying harmonization of lesson sets and
realities.
Collective learning is energized when charges
develop in the learning field. These may be because of
changes in realities, differences of views between
learners, or dissonances noticed by a learner reflecting
on lesson sets.
In all these cases, learners seek to reestablish a
harmonized order. But because the experience is social, it
prods learners to seek ordering concepts broader than they
might think of if not exposed to others' experience.
If the resolution of dissonance is denial or the
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imposition of a view by force, then the level of learning
is very low. But ray faith is that such resolutions will
not last long. They will be forced again and again to
confront opposing views, so long as there is any social
life.
I am here confessing a faith that in the long sweep
of social history, progress toward broader and more univer-
sal lesson sets is almost inevitable. It is built into
who we are as people who compare experience and seek
harmonizing orders.
This faith is tested by short-term setbacks. But I
see most of those arising because the collective learning
process was constrained. Nazis burned books, suppressed
dialogue, and confronted others' claims by slaughter.
It is for this reason that I sense an evaluation of
collective learning to be so vital to our predicament.
If we can reveal how to achieve the kind of inquiry based
on trust advocated by Argyris and Schon, and the uncon-
strained discourse advocated by Habermas, then perhaps we
will have fewer Hitlers. Perhaps then we will advance more
surely toward a more inclusive order. Maybe then my faith
would seem fact.
In what sense is this learning, and
in what degree metaphor?
It should be clear by now that I take the notion of
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collective learning seriously, as more than momentary
metaphor. I see it as learning because it arises from
learners and because it adjusts social wholes to realities.
I see it as collective because member learners, their
collective lesson sets, and their environing realities are
mutually interacting participants in the process.
Next Steps
Modeling is iterative. My discussion has been meant
as a provisional clarification of the kinds of issues which
any general model of collective learning must confront.
To achieve a valid general model, a collective learn-
ing process will be required. Differing views from differ-
ing disciplines will need to be dissociated and recombined
into an order that satisfies the range of perspectives.
Specific propositions will need to be advanced and tested.
The rewards could be social systems—from families to
schools to nations to the human species—better able to
deal with their changing realities, more able to engage
with each other in open inquiry, and more able to establish
a satisfying order.
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